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Abstract 
Government often imposes social and environmental regulation on business to protect 
public interests. Alternatively, firms may collectively and voluntarily take on social and 
environmental responsibilities, which is frequently known as “industry self-regulation 
(ISR).” However, in the context of this qualitative study, neither of these two alternatives 
proved efficient. 
I study the management of the Municipal Hazardous or Special Waste (MHSW) 
programs in Ontario, in which post-consumer household materials such as residual paint 
and dry cell batteries were collected and managed. According to the concept of the 
circular economy, preventing and/or re-entering waste into the product stream is key to 
solving global resource unsustainability, and this aim requires innovative business 
solutions. As my historical study of the period from 1981 to 2018 demonstrates, after 
business failed to voluntarily and consistently self-regulate to address used products, the 
government mandated waste management with a stringent regulation. Rather than 
spurring innovation, this prescriptive regime provoked escalating stakeholder conflicts. 
Ultimately, however, a hybrid regime evolved that married government regulation with 
ISR and kickstarted business proactivity and innovation. I study this regime to answer the 
central question: How can business and government coordinate their actions to realize a 
circular economy? 
Based on this analysis, I propose a specific hybrid model in which business and 
government coordinate their actions by iteratively interacting to set rules and enforce 
them through five core practices. I compare this model with the pure models of ISR and 
government regulation to understand how it can address their respective shortcomings, 
such as business avoidance and underperformance, and how it can spur proactivity. 
Further, grounded theorizing enables me to identify four salient tensions that characterize 
this model: decoupling versus integration, control over means versus ends, 
harmonization versus distinctiveness, and as the outcome of the model, compliance 
versus proactivity. To secure proactivity and innovation, these tensions must be aptly 
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balanced. The model can be useful in similar contexts that present urgent socio-
environmental problems but little chance for the formation of collective actions with 
innovative outcomes—a common situation in many circular economy initiatives. 
Keywords 
Hybrid Regulation, Collective Action, Industry Self-Regulation, Circular Economy, 
Resource Loops, Tensions, Post-Consumer Waste 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
Business is increasingly deemed responsible for its social and environmental impacts. To 
address these impacts, government often imposes regulation on firms to protect public 
interests. Alternatively, firms may collectively and voluntarily take on social and 
environmental responsibilities and “self-regulate.” 
One of the emerging responsibilities of business is to manage the impact of post-
consumer materials on the natural environment, usually known as waste. New 
approaches, such as the circular economy, put emphasis on the importance of finding 
innovative solutions to return used materials to production and consumption lines, rather 
than merely disposing of them. However, because managing waste is costly, firms may 
not voluntarily take this responsibility. Further, to collect and manage used consumer 
products, firms may need to work collectively, but collaboration is uncertain. As a result, 
government intervention is required. Nonetheless, in such new areas, it is unknown how 
government regulation can foster collaboration across firms to yield innovative solutions. 
I study the management of the Municipal Hazardous or Special Waste (MHSW) 
programs in Ontario, in which post-consumer household materials such as residual paint 
and dry cell batteries were collected and managed. My historical study of the period from 
1981 to 2018 demonstrates that both of the above alternatives (i.e., government 
regulation and self-regulation) failed to provide the expected results, especially the 
needed innovation to realize a circular economy. Ultimately, however, a hybrid regime 
evolved that married government regulation with self-regulation and kickstarted business 
proactivity and innovation. 
Based on this analysis, I propose a specific hybrid model in which business and 
government coordinate their actions to make sure the intended outcomes are achieved. 
This model can be useful when firms are expected to cooperate to address a new business 
responsibility, but they are not motivated to do so. The model can also resolve many 
shortcomings of conventional government regulation and voluntary self-regulation. 
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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 
 
Authority Resource Productivity and Recovery Authority (RPRA); an 
organization introduced by the Resource Recovery and Circular 
Economy Act, 2016 to uphold the monitoring and enforcement 
of the Act upon the termination of Waste Diversion Ontario 
(see below). 
Industry Funding 
Organization (IFO) 
A corporation that is designated for a waste diversion program 
(Resource Recovery and Circular Economy Act, 2016). An IFOs is 
funded by industry to fulfil the expected responsibilities on 
behalf of its members. 
Industry Stewardship Plan A plan for the management of a designated waste operated by, 
or for the benefit of, one or more stewards who are designated 
in respect of that waste (Waste Diversion Transition Act, 2016). 
Municipal Hazardous or 
Special Waste (MHSW) 
waste that consists of municipal hazardous waste or municipal 
special waste, or any combination of them, whether or not the 
waste is owned, controlled or managed by a municipality, as 
defined in Ontario Regulation 387/16. 
Recycling Refers to any operation by which materials are reprocessed 
into products, materials or substances, whether for the original 
or other purposes. It includes the reprocessing of organic 
material but does not include energy recovery and reprocessing 
into materials that are to be used as fuels. 
Steward A person designated in respect of municipal hazardous or 
special waste under the Waste Diversion Transition Act, 2016, 
and its relevant regulations and rules. This term often refers to 
individual firms and may include but is not limited to brand 
owners, first importers, and manufacturers. 
Waste Diversion Ontario 
(WDO) 
A non-Crown corporation established under Waste Diversion 
Act, 2002, to “develop, implement and operate waste diversion 
programs for designated wastes in accordance with this Act 
and monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of those 
programs.” 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
More than any other segment of our society in Ontario, the activities of 
private industry have focused public attention on the dangers of 
imperfect waste management practices. […] Corporate enterprise is 
faced with—and must confront—the sometimes conflicting 
considerations of profit maximization and the public welfare. […] [A]s 
a generator of waste, industry must be held accountable for the 
handling and treatment and/or disposal of that waste. (Ministry of the 
Environment, 1983: 5) 
In 1983, when the above statement was made in a proposal known as Blueprint for Waste 
Management in Ontario, regulators hoped that it would persuade business to voluntarily 
take an active role in managing post-consumer materials and develop innovative 
solutions to reduce, reuse, recover, and recycle waste. Nevertheless, in the context of this 
study, it took about three decades until signs of the expected proactive business responses 
appeared, and even then these business actions were not purely voluntary. Indeed, neither 
government persuasion (1980s and 1990s) nor its coercion through imposing regulation 
(2000s) caused the expected proactivity and innovation. However, in the early 2010s, a 
regulatory regime evolved that included elements of both government regulation and 
voluntary self-regulation by firms, which started to yield proactive outcomes. 
This research aims to study a group of consumer waste management programs in Ontario 
to gain insight into this hybrid model and how it works. In this way, the current study will 
advance our understanding of how business and government can coordinate their actions 
to generate proactive business solutions when both voluntary self-regulation by business 
and government regulation are unlikely to produce the innovative solutions needed for 
social and environmental problems. 
In this chapter, I prepare the ground for this exploratory journey. In doing so, I first 
outline how business has historically been preoccupied with mere acquisition and 
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transformation of natural resources, and how disregarding consumed (and limited) 
resources impacts the natural environment and society. I then explain how, to solve this 
problem, new approaches such as the circular economy call for innovative solutions to 
address the entire material loops (e.g., by re-entering waste into business operations). 
However, these approaches require active involvement from collectives of firms, and 
business might have little or no incentive to voluntarily adopt such costly practices. 
Therefore, the classical solutions, such as conventional forms of industry self-regulation 
(ISR), may not generate the needed proactivity. Similarly, formal government regulation 
may also fail to spur costly proactivity by firms who are typically preoccupied with profit 
maximization. Accordingly, after describing this research gap, I explain how I studied a 
hybrid model that can fill this gap to help realize a circular economy. 
1.1 Business and Material Resources: A Broad Perspective 
Society is becoming increasingly sensitive to the negative impacts of business on the 
natural environment. Business is recognized as one of the major actors that can help or 
hinder sustainable development—that is, development that meets “the needs of the 
present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs” (WCED, 1987: 43).1 A core practice by which business influences 
sustainable development is material resource acquisition and transformation, until the 
final product or service is delivered to consumers. Nonetheless, what is perceived by 
firms as a “final” product is not the final state of material resources in the broader 
ecological and social systems. The material phases before and after resource acquisition 
and transformation have been largely neglected by most firms, leading to environmental 
harm and resource overconsumption. As a result, the products and services that we 
currently produce and consume require the regenerative capacity of 1.6 Earths (WWF, 
2016). Clearly, this situation is far from sustainable. Moreover, it hinders 
“intergenerational equity,” which is a tenet of sustainable development. 
                                                 
1
 I use the word “sustainability” as a general term to refer to the state in which sustainable development is 
practiced. I may also use “business sustainability” when the emphasis is particularly on the role of business 
in sustainable development. 
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Both business practice and theory have historically developed based on this limited view 
of entire material cycles. Management theory, for example, is mainly built upon the 
assumption of unlimited natural resources. Even those management scholars who have 
addressed resource constraints did not tackle the limits of material resources in the macro 
perspective. For instance, based on industrial economics literature, lack of access to a 
resource may create barriers to entry for new entrants not because of the planet’s limited 
regenerative capacity, but because of proprietary access of industry incumbents to a 
specific resource (Porter, 1980). Similarly, the resource-based view of the firm argues 
that firms can achieve sustained competitive advantage by utilizing resources that are 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and organized (Barney, 1991); yet even these rare resources are 
usually non-material assets that are exclusive to the firm. In contrast, assets such as 
common raw materials are abundant and accessible to all rivals. Firms consume these 
seemingly limitless resources to create and capture value and the boundary of a firm has 
been conventionally limited to the provision of products and services, not what occurs 
before and after it (Davis, 2017). 
The limited attention of business to material cycles is arguably due to the fact that 
business and society operate on different levels. However, the cross-interaction of these 
levels is now under more serious scrutiny by various actors (Geels, 2011). As such, 
growing attention is being directed to business’s role in the overconsumption of resources 
and the post-consumption phase of materials. In the dominant “take, make, waste” model 
of doing business, used resources return to nature as “waste” (i.e., undesirable materials 
that should be jettisoned, and are often left to the care of society-level actors such as local 
governments). 
Emerging models challenge this linear approach to resources. For example, the industrial 
symbiosis approach suggests that separate industries can exchange materials, energy, by-
products, and waste materials, as a firm’s waste can be another firm’s input. This 
synergistic approach can create competitive advantage when industries collectively 
utilize geographic proximity (e.g., in eco-industrial parks) and design their business 
models based on cooperative interactions to exchange input and output (Bansal & 
McKnight, 2009; Chertow, 2000; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2012). Extended producer 
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responsibility and product stewardship are two other approaches that expand the 
responsibility of firms to include the post-consumer phase of products, deeming business 
accountable for appropriate management of used materials (Kunz, Mayers, & Van 
Wassenhove, 2018; OECD, 2016). Cradle-to-Cradle is another such methodology, 
providing tools to consider entire material cycles in the design and manufacturing of 
products (McDonough & Braungart, 2002). More recently, the circular economy has been 
introduced as an exhaustive concept that synthesizes various pre-existing approaches and 
tools, including those mentioned above, to close resource loops (European Environment 
Agency, 2016). 
1.2 The Imperative of the Circular Economy 
The circular economy approach suggests that it is necessary to decouple economic 
growth from environmental degradation and resource depletion, and that in doing so, we 
must close resource loops and transition to a circular society (Lieder & Rashid, 2016; 
Murray, Skene, & Haynes, 2017). This approach is associated with a variety of distinct 
pre-existing concepts and proposes an aggregation of several strategies to extend resource 
life cycles (Merli, Preziosi, & Acampora, 2018). Those who develop these strategies, 
such as the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, highlight the capacities of existing tools and 
knowledge in prolonging resource cycles. 
The concept and models of the circular economy aim to keep biological and technical 
materials, components, and products at their highest utility and value in their most 
extended life cycle (Bocken, Olivetti, Cullen, Potting, & Lifset, 2017; Geissdoerfer, 
Savaget, Bocken, & Hultink, 2017). In contrast to the “take, make, waste” approach, a 
circular economy aims to close the loop, namely by designing out waste and pollution 
and converting waste into food for other processes (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013). 
The sharing economy, remanufacturing, reverse logistics, and recycling are among the 
most common approaches in the utilization of the concept. 
As the idea of the circular economy has evolved, it has attracted different stakeholders, 
especially government and business, each with their own agenda and interpretations 
(Lieder & Rashid, 2016). The concept is being used increasingly to draw attention to the 
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critical problem of resource scarcity and the imperative of closing resource loops. The 
core message of this concept is arguably the most important issue of this century and 
could help humankind cement sustainable development. 
Thus, realizing the circular economy is imperative—but exactly how to achieve that 
realization remains an ongoing question. Indeed, most research on material loops is 
practical and applied, concerned with technical issues that require deploying engineering 
and operational tools, such as life cycle analysis or material flows (Blomsma & Brennan, 
2017; Merli et al., 2018; Reike, Vermeulen, & Witjes, 2018).2 Many scholars have drawn 
attention to the need for studying the diverse social, political, legal, cultural, cognitive, 
and ethical aspects of closing resource loops (Blomsma & Brennan, 2017; Boons & 
Howard-Grenville, 2009) at different macro, meso, and micro levels, using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Hoffman, 2003). Some theoretical aspects of the 
circular economy have received limited scholarly attention, such as socio-cultural 
dimensions and institutions (Fischer & Pascucci, 2017; Moreau, Sahakian, van 
Griethuysen, & Vuille, 2017), or the role of stakeholders (Kunz et al., 2018). Still, as 
Walls and Paquin’s (2015) review of research on industrial symbiosis reveals, 
organizational perspectives on material loops remain fragmented and many questions are 
still  unanswered. 
This thesis aims to tackle one of these gaps in management theory. Before explaining this 
gap, I first offer some background information regarding the empirical context of my 
research, which will help to better frame the knowledge gap and the exact research 
problem that this research addresses. 
1.3 The Context, Motivation, and Study 
In Canada, the need for business’s involvement in managing consumed materials came to 
the attention of the public and regulators as early as the 1980s. For instance, in 1983, in 
                                                 
2
 An exception might be the research on sustainable business model innovation, which includes studies that 
deal with resource loops; yet, this area still remains largely unexplored. For a review, see Bocken, Short, 
Rana, and Evans (2014) and Urbinati, Chiaroni, and Chiesa (2017). 
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the Ontario, the Ministry of the Environment published a proposal, known as Blueprint 
for Waste Management in Ontario, that called for cooperation between the government, 
municipalities, industry, and public in this regard. Later, in the mid-1990s, the Canadian 
Paint and Coatings Industry, persuaded by the provincial government of British 
Columbia, instigated programs to collect and manage residual coating material from 
consumers. Through events like these, waste management was gradually deemed a 
responsibility not only of the government, but of business too. 
The response from business, however, varied—and continues to vary—significantly 
across different jurisdictions. In some provinces and industries, such as in the above-
mentioned industry in British Columbia, the member firms shaped collective actions by 
establishing ISR regimes (Barnett & King, 2008; King, Prado, & Rivera, 2012; Lee, 
2009) and coordinating their actions to manage post-consumer materials. In contrast, 
most industries in Ontario avoided actively and consistently taking on such responsibility, 
except for a few industries that established short-lived programs for consumable 
containers and packaging materials (e.g., single-use soda cans). 
Motivating businesses to manage post-consumer materials is difficult for several reasons. 
On the one hand, such programs add the weight of further operations onto firms. The 
costs of these operations can impact firms’ financial competitiveness, especially when 
firms are not harmoniously involved in such initiatives across geographical regions. 
Moreover, most firms cannot collect their used products individually—historically, such 
operations have been done by aggregating all similar consumer waste, regardless of their 
producers. Thus, transferring the responsibility of managing everyday post-consumer 
materials to producers would often require them to act collectively. This characteristic 
makes waste management distinct from the many firm-level environmental 
responsibilities of business, and helps to explain why a collective action was not 
voluntarily undertaken by most industries in Ontario. In the absence of a shared will and 
readiness for cooperation to adopt a collective action to collect and manage waste, such 
an initiative is unlikely to be embraced by average individual firms. 
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Business’s avoidance of voluntary self-regulation ultimately led to the imposition of a 
regulatory regime by the Ontario government. Nonetheless, the collective nature of waste 
management that called for aggregation of materials resulted in new problems, as 
translating it into individual firm-level mandates was difficult. As a result, the regulatory 
regime that the government designed proved inefficient. Far from exhibiting the 
proactivity and innovation needed to solve the bigger problem of used materials, firms 
merely focused on minimal compliance with the costly regulation. 
This research is motivated by the observation that both voluntary and mandatory regimes 
(i.e., ISR and government regulation) were tested and failed in yielding the desirable 
outcome of transferring the responsibility of used products to business in Ontario in a 
way that results in innovative solutions to close material loops. Voluntary solutions by 
business failed because in the absence of a common will to collaborate with other firms, 
the needed collective action was not fulfilled, except in a few isolated cases. Government 
regulation also failed because, in that complex multi-stakeholder context, it could not 
define firm-level actions that were both efficient and led to innovative solutions for the 
extensive consumer waste in different industries. Hence, the problem of business 
solutions for waste remained unsolved for more than three decades. 
Further motivating this study was the fact that after several years of contradiction among 
business, government, and other stakeholders, the regime evolved in a way that instances 
of proactive business actions were noticeable. This proactivity was a harbinger of 
innovative solutions that have started to return various types of waste to resource loops, 
rather than disposing of them. For instance, a few firms sought new solutions to upcycle 
used tires to more valuable playground mats, or to develop new products from low-
quality residual paint. My investigation in the field demonstrated that the resultant regime 
blended some elements of government and self-regulation. This research aims to study 
this regime. 
To this end, I have studied the so-called Municipal Hazardous or Special Waste (MHSW) 
program in Ontario, including nine broad material groups that fall under the same 
regulatory regime and constitute materials such as coatings, solvents, and pressurized 
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containers. This group is important for two reasons: (1) some of the first representations 
of proactive business involvement emerged from this program, and (2) the group includes 
various programs for different materials, and this helps me to explore the repetitive 
patterns based on which the evolved model operates and develop theory. By focusing on 
this phenomenon, I was able to define an inductive qualitative study and collect extensive 
data from interviews with different key members in all stakeholder groups, as well as 
observations, available public data, and some internal documents. I initially studied the 
history of the consumer waste management programs in Ontario (1981 to 2018) to better 
understand the nature of the evolved regime, and as the ultimate goal of the research, 
investigated the patterns and characteristics of the regime that can result in proactive 
business actions.  
The study makes several practical contributions, as it can help businesses and regulators 
to make informed decisions and manage the transition to a circular economy more 
effectively. As an illustration, since the inception of the MHSW program,3 about 10,000 
tonnes of residual materials have been collected each year in Ontario in the paint and 
coatings material group alone, which has had a significant environment and financial 
impact. Indeed, most of resources we consume are converted to different forms of waste. 
Hence, given the limits of material resources, any solution for the transition to a circular 
economy is a driver of sustainable development (Millar, Mclaughlin, & Börger, 2019). 
1.4 The Theoretical Positioning and Knowledge Gap 
Based on the motivations and goals outlined above, this research is positioned squarely in 
the field of ISR. In self-regulatory regimes, as a form of collective action by business, a 
group of firms (generally referred to as “industry”) set rules to coordinate their actions to 
meet a collective responsibility, such as environmental protection (Baron, 2016; Gupta & 
Lad, 1983; King et al., 2012). ISR can take various forms (for a taxonomy see King et al., 
                                                 
3
 The MHSW program is one overarching program that covers a number of smaller subprograms for 
different MHSW materials. Therefore, in this thesis, I will use “the MHSW program” to refer to the whole 
regime and “MHSW programs” to refer to diverse embedded cases within the overarching program. 
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2012). The field of ISR has benefited from many outstanding studies, ranging from the 
collective actions studied by institutional, behavioural, and political economists (most 
importantly, Elinor Ostrom), studies in policy and law, and a number of works in 
business and strategy. Yet, unexplored gaps and grey areas remain. Those gaps that 
pertain to this research are outlined below. 
First, ISR is often known as a proactive strategy for firms that aspire to higher goals than 
compliance with formal requirements. Rather than avoiding and resisting regulations, 
such firms respond to social expectations even before government regulation commands 
the same (Gupta & Lad, 1983; Rivera, Oetzel, Deleon, & Starik, 2009). Nevertheless, 
scholars have noticed that ISR can become a self-serving measure by business to forestall 
regulation and protect business from stakeholders like regulators and environmental 
activists by adopting minimal actions (Barnett & King, 2008; King & Lenox, 2000). In a 
broader sense, many studies on voluntary actions for environmental protection have 
failed to find evidence that participating firms demonstrate better environmental 
performance than non-participants (Borck & Coglianese, 2009; Darnall & Sides, 2008; 
Rivera & de Leon, 2004). Therefore, given that the circular economy (like the studied 
waste management programs) calls for proactive involvement of business to explore 
innovative solutions, it remains unknown what type of self-regulation can secure 
proactivity and innovation. This question is of critical importance, because the alternative 
to self-regulation—that is, government regulation—is even less likely to lead to 
proactivity, as firms frequently respond to such regulation with minimal compliance-
based actions and “pinhole seeking”. 
Second, ISR and government regulation are often viewed as substitutable alternatives—
one would obviate the need for the other. Further, some scholars have warned policy 
makers that intervention in voluntary collective actions can crowd out participation and 
harm the outcomes (Frey, 1994; Ostrom, 2000a). Yet, both management and policy 
literature have long acknowledged the influence of government on self-regulation in one 
way or another (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; King et al., 2012; Reeson & Tisdell, 2008). 
Still, the blurry boundary between the two alternatives has remained underexplored in the 
self-regulation literature. In contrast, many policy scholars have emphasized the 
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advantages offered by innovative combinations of the two alternatives (Rubenstein, 2011; 
Sinclair, 1997). Arguably, such combinations are particularly important when firms resist 
voluntary self-regulation, as is the case in this study, and demands that we explore how 
government regulation can drive self-regulation that results in innovative solutions 
towards a circular economy. 
My collected data from the MHSW program revealed that both of these gaps can be 
addressed via the studied phenomenon: not only were self- and government regulation 
ultimately blended and their actions coordinated towards the same goals, but also, after 
several decades of avoidance and contradiction among the actors (business, provincial 
government, municipalities, service providers, etc.), instances of proactive business 
actions began to emerge. This thesis aims to investigate this phenomenon and answer the 
broad question: How can business and government coordinate their actions to realize a 
circular economy? 
1.5 Findings and Contributions 
By exploring the patterns among different practices in the MHSW programs, I propose a 
model which I call “hybrid regulation,” that involves both government and business in 
both rule setting and enforcement—the two stages of a regulatory regime. This hybrid 
model can resolve the problems of either alternative, such as business avoidance of self-
regulation, free riding, information asymmetry, underperformance, and minimal 
compliance with rules rather than developing innovative solutions. Due to these common 
problems, which are widely recognized in the literature, aiming more of either of 
government regulation or self-regulation can hardly trigger a circular economy. Instead, 
the solution can be found in innovative mixes of the two, such as the proposed model. 
Further, to understand the characteristics of this model, I use a grounded theorizing 
approach (Strauss & Corbin, 2008), which reveals that the marriage of two alternatives is 
characterized by four tensions. At the outcome level, an ongoing tension between 
compliance and proactivity is salient. Three other tensions also shape the characteristics 
of the model: decoupling versus integration, control over means versus ends, and 
harmonization versus distinctiveness. I have identified the underlying mechanisms that 
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sustain these tensions, which will be explained in detail. I argue that these tensions are 
constructive, and that the hybrid model requires the tensions to be managed in balance. 
This research is important for several reasons. Theoretically, it represents a case which is 
currently deemed extreme (Hällgren, Rouleau, & de Rond, 2018) but seems to be an 
emerging and growing model. This model extends the field of self-regulation. 
Conventional forms of ISR and government regulation have shortcomings, especially 
with respect to producing truly proactive outcomes when doing so is costly. However, the 
heightening magnitude, urgency, and complexity of environmental issues demand urgent 
solutions. As such, efficient coordination mechanisms to respond to a taxing collective 
responsibility of business, such as closing the resource loops, remain underexplored. On 
the one hand, voluntary self-regulation is costly and might not be shaped organically; and 
even if business takes action, it might not lead to the innovative results expected. On the 
other hand, government regulation in such a new field may hinder innovation by 
establishing command-and-control regimes and setting compliance-based requirements 
on individual firms. The proposed model can prevent such problems. 
Moreover, studies on group efforts for sustainability often assume that participants, such 
as firms and government, are cooperative. This study, however, investigates a context 
with minimal collaboration among firms, governments, and stakeholders, where firms do 
not shape a self-regulatory regime, nor do different actors collaborate to help the 
consequent government regulation succeed. My findings suggest that achieving a circular 
economy is possible in the absence of organically shaped cooperative relationships; in 
fact, a confrontational relationship that is defined aptly and managed continuously can 
also generate the expected outcomes. This finding is particularly important for 
sustainability challenges which require urgent measures to be taken by business. 
Formation of collaborative relationships may take many years, and our present 
environmental situation does not afford the luxury of long-term norm-based institution 
formation processes that engender such collaboration. When firms are unlikely to take 
proactive and timely self-regulatory regimes, a hybrid model can deliver better outcomes. 
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This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the literature to frame the 
research question. In Chapter 3, I explain the specific context for my research (i.e., the 
MHSW programs in Ontario) and the research process. In Chapter 4, I develop the case 
narrative that reflects how the programs evolved over nearly four decades, which is 
relevant for comparing the hybrid model with the two conventional alternatives (ISR and 
government regulation). Chapter 5 explores the dualities and ongoing tensions that 
characterize the hybrid model. In Chapter 6, I explain the hybrid model and discuss the 
pertinent theory. Chapter 7 explains how this research contributes to our knowledge 
about collective actions that can facilitate the circular economy and other collective 
responsibilities of firms in general, its contributions to practice, the limitations of this 
case study, the proposed future research, and conclusions. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Theoretical Overview 
In Chapter 1, we noticed how firms have historically been preoccupied with mere 
acquisition and transformation of raw materials, disregarding the higher-level resource 
cycles in the natural environment, and how society’s expectation of business with respect 
to closing resource loops has surged in recent years. When a new set of expectations 
emerge in society, business may adopt different actions to align with these expectations. 
In a conceptual endeavour, Rivera et al. (2009) categorize these strategies in six groups. 
At the highest level of cooperation, business responds to societal-level expectations by 
adopting independent self-regulation and taking leadership in environmental protection 
proactively; such a response is beyond compliance as there is no policy to comply with 
yet, and the action is taken on a voluntary basis. In contrast, the other five business 
strategies are business responses when regulation is already imposed, or at least 
impending. These five strategies include acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, 
and finally, manipulation as the most resistant strategy, where business aggressively 
challenges the environmental policy (Rivera et al., 2009). Put differently, business can 
either voluntarily and proactively respond to emerging societal-level expectations, even 
before government policy mechanisms are activated, or it can play with government 
regulation in one way or another. Each of these approaches might be taken by an 
individual firm or by a group of them (i.e., an industry).4  
When a collective of firms responds to emerging expectations, members need to 
coordinate their efforts among themselves. In this chapter, I review the literature on how 
business coordinates and responds to societal and environmental expectations. Research 
has explored such collective responses in the form of voluntary collective actions and 
industry self-regulation (ISR), analyzing how the collective efforts are shaped and how 
the incumbents coordinate among themselves. Furthermore, although these strategies are 
                                                 
4
 Following the tradition of the literature, the term “industry” is used here to refer to a collective of firms 
that shares specific interests and commonalities in the context of discourse. I may also use “the industry” to 
refer to a particular group in the context of this study. 
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generally built on the explicit or implicit assumption of proactivity (i.e., the voluntariness 
of the self-regulatory regimes), the literature has also acknowledged that exogenous 
actors may intervene in these actions in various ways and at various stages. I review the 
literature on such interventions as the starting point of this phenomenon-driven research. 
2.1 Conventional Collective Actions to Protect the 
Commons 
Those entities, such as individuals or groups, that share an interest may choose to pool 
their resources, set rules, and take actions collectively to serve their collective interest 
(Olson, 1965). Collective actions arise when the efforts of two or more actors are 
required to accomplish an outcome (Sandler, 2015). Collective action may also preserve 
the collective good: one which, if provided to one group member, cannot be withheld 
from any of the other members (Oliver, 1993; Olson, 1965). If one entity’s use of a 
collective good precludes the others’ use, the collective good is known as “rivalrous.” 
Such goods are generally known as “common goods” or “commons,” and include goods 
like fisheries or public parking lots. These common goods might be regulated by 
governments, but they can also be managed by people negotiating rules through 
traditions, norms, and practices (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). If collective goods 
are not rivalrous, they are typically labelled as “public goods,” a category which include 
items such as roads, educational systems, and legal systems (Apesteguia & Maier-
Rigaud, 2006; Helfrich, 2012). 
Collective actions control common goods, as short-term self-interests generally fail to 
satisfy collective interests. Using common resources will benefit the single entity at the 
costs to the collective, resulting in “the tragedy of the commons,” one type of market 
failure (Hardin, 1968, 1994). Collective actions can prevent these failures and thus, have 
been long studied by researchers. As Oliver (1993) discusses, many formal models of 
collective action seek to build on independent actions that ultimately change the broader 
landscape in an evolutionary process. Those studies of collective action that address 
common goods deal with concepts such as reciprocity, achieving benefits, and free riding 
(Ostrom, 1990, 2000b, 2010a; Ostrom et al., 1994). 
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Collective action is a broad concept that has been studied in a variety of fields. Collective 
actions can be used by collective protestors to achieve social change in the form of social 
movements (e.g. Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009), by entrepreneurs 
to gain socio-political legitimacy or shape a favourable regulated environment (Gurses & 
Ozcan, 2015; Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002), or by industry associations to promote 
and protect members’ agendas (David, Sine, & Haveman, 2013; Greenwood, Suddaby, & 
Hinings, 2002). Among these broad areas in the literature, the focus of this research is on 
those actions taken by industry members—that is, members of a group of firms that share 
an interest, even if they do not belong to one formally established “industry” or do not 
include all members that share the same interest. This specific type of collective action is 
known as ISR (Marques, 2017)F. 
2.2 Industry Self-Regulation  
ISR is a coordinated effort to set the rules of business by firms in an industry (Berchicci 
& King, 2007; King et al., 2012), typically done by an industry-level (as opposed to 
governmental or firm-level) organization (Gunningham & Rees, 1997), such as an 
industry association (Héritier & Eckert, 2009). Self-regulation is an institutional 
complement to existing government regulatory processes (Gupta & Lad, 1983). As a 
subset of collective actions, ISR is still a somewhat broad concept. With respect to what 
is being regulated, industry can regulate market entry (e.g., professional licences 
mandated and coordinated by industry-level organizations, such as medical councils), 
establish standards for uniform operations (e.g., safety standards), or, in specific contexts, 
set rates (e.g., harmonized prices) (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Gupta & Lad, 1983). In 
recent years, with increasing social and environmental concerns, self-regulatory regimes 
mostly revolve around such concerns (Baron, 2016).  
This research focuses on those actions that are taken in response to a collective 
responsibility (King et al., 2012). Collective responsibilities exist when business imposes 
externalities on other stakeholders by inefficiently using communal resources without 
paying for them. Often, the rights of these common goods are not clearly defined and 
protected (Helfrich, 2012); therefore, firms exploiting them can breach the rights of other 
stakeholders or pose a harm to society. The response of business to these collective 
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responsibilities should be inclusive across the industry, because all firms share them. In 
practice, however, not all self-regulations are inclusive. For instance, in one form of self-
regulation known as “certification programs,” some firms opt to participate to signal their 
superior performance and enjoy specific benefits almost individually (e.g. Blackman & 
Rivera, 2011). 
Self-regulation can be a preventative strategy: in response to the externalities created by 
business, stakeholders may attempt to impose the costs on firms, which may lead to 
stakeholder sanctions such as campaigns led by environmental NGOs. By shaping an 
action collectively, firms can take the lead and coordinate to avoid such costly sanctions. 
Research has demonstrated that self-regulated firms are less likely to be targeted by 
confrontational activists, as these firms are harder targets if a campaign is launched 
(Baron, 2012; Gupta & Innes, 2014). 
Self-regulation is also a strategy to forestall or impact potential government regulatory 
regimes when new expectations are emerging. As noted, scholars have identified various 
strategies that firms may employ to take the lead, collaborate with policy makers, or resist 
the public policy or its formation process (see Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004 for a 
review). Self-regulation is basically known as a cooperative tactic that proactively 
surpasses the expected compliance level (Rivera et al., 2009). Nevertheless, this 
“proactive” tactic might be utilized to pre-empt or weaken stringent government 
regulation (Darnall & Sides, 2008; Johnston, 2006; King et al., 2012) or be influential in 
forging future regulations (Delmas & Terlaak, 2001; Lee, 2009). 
A well-identified trigger of ISR is catastrophic past events. For example, in the context of 
the chemical industry, the Responsible Care program was formed after a tragic accident 
in a Union Carbide facility killed approximately 10,000 people in Bhopal, India (Fauchart 
& Cowan, 2014; Rees, 1997). Industry, as a whole, receives considerable benefits by 
establishing voluntary programs. The positive outcomes often spill over to all of the firms 
in a given industry, even if some have not participated in the program (Lenox, 2006). 
Conversely, a negative event for one firm in the industry can result in less harm for the 
others, such as less reduction in stock prices of other firms (Barnett & King, 2008). 
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Upon introduction of a self-regulatory regime, individual firms may opt to participate for 
various reasons. Participation demonstrates member firms’ responsiveness to stakeholder 
wants, which helps reputation-sensitive firms protect their social licence to operate 
(Gunningham, Thornton, & Kagan, 2005). Participating in some of these programs can 
secure access to technical assistance for individual firms (Khanna, 2001), reduce the cost 
of compliance, or create producer benefit (Blackman & Rivera, 2011; Maxwell & 
Decker, 2006). Voluntary actions may even create competitive advantage for firms when 
public awareness about environmental protection is noticeable (Arora & Cason, 1995). 
2.3 The Outcomes and Effectiveness of Self-Regulation 
Business argues that, compared to imposed government regulations, voluntary initiatives 
are not only more efficient and less costly, but can also foster innovation and go beyond 
the baseline requirements (King et al., 2012). Yet, empirical works do not always support 
this thesis. For example, in a study on the Responsible Care program, King and Lenox 
(2000) demonstrate that in the absence of an “iron fist” for sanctioning, participants did 
not improve their environmental performance faster than other industry members did. 
Howard, Nash, and Ehrenfeld (2000) assert that self-reporting by the firms participating 
in Responsible Care merely reflected those firms’ internal standards, which may not 
conform with expected standard practices and institutional norms (see also Howard-
Grenville, Nash, & Coglianese, 2008). Similarly, in the context of ski recreation facilities, 
Rivera and de Leon (2004) observe that participants of a sustainability voluntary 
program, despite acquiescing to respond to institutional pressures, were more likely to 
achieve lower ratings in third-party environmental assessments compared to non-
participants. 
Overall, although voluntary environmental initiatives are diverse, empirical works have 
found that those actions that are not monitored by third parties and lack performance 
standards have not enhanced firms’ social and environmental performance (Borck & 
Coglianese, 2009; Darnall & Sides, 2008; King & Lenox, 2000). Barnett and King (2008) 
suggest that the ultimate purpose of such programs (e.g., environmental performance) 
might have been misunderstood and replaced with disclosure of information about the 
environmental performance of firms, but stakeholders may deem the information per se a 
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benefit of the program. The advantage of collective initiatives to society improves upon 
imposing tighter requirements and control mechanisms, such as third-party monitoring 
and verification, public disclosure of the results, and sanctioning non-compliers by 
expelling them from the program (King & Lenox, 2000; Lenox & Nash, 2003). Still, 
enforcement is the Achilles’ heel of conventional ISR (Héritier & Eckert, 2009). 
2.4 The Many Shades of Voluntariness 
The literature on collective action and ISR generally assumes that such actions are shaped 
voluntarily. For instance, in the so-called “green clubs,” as one type of self-regulation, 
upon formation of the initiative by a firm (or group of firms), other impacted individual 
firms, based on their heterogeneous motivations and incentives, follow independent cost 
and benefit assessments and decide whether or not to join the club (Blackman & Rivera, 
2011; Potoski & Prakash, 2013; Prakash & Potoski, 2007). 
Furthermore, scholars studying collective action have warned policy makers about the 
disadvantages of intervening in voluntary initiatives (Ostrom, 2000a). Evidence suggests 
that when normative mechanisms shape and manage a collective action, external 
regulation can “crowd out” the participation of actors. Such exogenous interventions can 
impact intrinsic motivations and consequently harm the outcomes of the action (Beretti, 
Figuières, & Grolleau, 2013; Frey, 1994; Montgomery & Bean, 1999; Ostrom, 2000a; 
Reeson & Tisdell, 2008).  
Nevertheless, purely voluntary actions by firms may not be as ubiquitous as expected. In 
many cases, even if a collective action to protect the commons has been shaped 
voluntarily, participation of individual firms is due to some form of external forces, such 
as peer pressure. In collective actions with higher external forces, provisions might be in 
place to resolve information asymmetry and identify free riders, followed by a type of 
penalization mechanism for non-compliant actors. For these reasons, collective actions 
are sometimes identified as “quasi-voluntary” (Ostrom, 2000a). External pressures 
generally increase the costs of neglect.  
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The same mechanisms apply to ISR. At the collective level, the literature has long 
identified the role of costs, demonstrating that industries regulate themselves when the 
cost of adopting a self-regulation program would be less than the externally imposed 
costs from not undertaking self-regulation (Gupta & Lad, 1983: 421). At the individual 
level, the same cost-benefit mechanism applies to a firm’s decision of whether or not to 
join the existing self-regulatory program. External pressures, such as activists’ boycotts 
and government regulation, are serious threats that urge or coerce firms to adopt ISR 
(Baron, 2016; Egorov & Harstad, 2017; Maxwell, Lyon, & Hackett, 2000). 
Arguably, when the costs of non-participation exceed a certain level, posing high risks to 
firms, the nature of the program will become far from voluntary. Under such pressures, 
some reluctant firms may resort to ceremonial adoption, adopting practices that are 
decoupled from the firm’s core operations in a way that does not generate the ultimate 
expected outcomes (Bromley & Powell, 2012). One example is the ceremonial adoption 
of ISO 14000 standards (Boiral, 2007), where firms meet official requirements without 
realizing the expected superior environmental performance (Arimura, Darnall, Ganguli, 
& Katayama, 2016; Blackman & Rivera, 2011; Gamper-Rabindran & Finger, 2013). In 
this way, ISR can become merely a low-cost response to exogenous pressures—a 
response that decouples either self-imposed policy from practices, or practices from the 
intended outcome (Bromley & Powell, 2012). 
2.5 Government Intervention in Self-Regulation 
Scholars have long noticed the ubiquity of exogenous intervention in self-regulatory 
regimes, especially by governments (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Huyse & Parmentier, 
1990; King et al., 2012). In general, every regulatory regime constitutes two main 
activities: (1) rule setting and (2) enforcement (i.e., deciding how compliance with the 
rules will be monitored, controlled, and sanctioned, if necessary). Government may 
influence or intervene in either of these stages in different ways. 
Very few studies have delved into self-regulation in the government’s shadow (Egorov & 
Harstad, 2017). In an early attempt to explore these interventions, Rees (1988) identified 
three types of self-regulation based on government intervention. In voluntary self-
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regulation, government has no direct intervention. In mandated full self-regulation, 
government sanctions and monitors the regulation from a distance, but completely 
outsources both rule setting and enforcement to industry. Finally, in mandated partial 
self-regulation, industry partially regulates itself; in other words, government 
relinquishes either rule setting or enforcement to industry, but not both (Rees, 1988).  
As such, “self-regulation” can be a deceptive concept (Gunningham & Rees, 1997). 
Whereas this term conveys endogenous coordination (as opposed to direct government 
regulation), it is sometimes created, evolved, or enforced by actors that are exogenous to 
the industry, such as regulators (King et al., 2012; Rees, 1988). The involvement of 
strong exogenous actors, including regulators, blurs the boundaries of a case of self-
regulation.  
Scholars of policy have not only acknowledged this interaction, but also found it 
potentially useful. Huyse and Parmentier (1990) discuss that, beyond the pure models of 
government regulation and self-regulation, there is an overlooked grey area that is run by 
“sponsored regulation,” where the state encourages the formation of norms by various 
private parties. Although their arguments mainly revolve around norm formation and 
codes of conduct, these scholars also reiterate the need for further work on this grey area. 
Another attempt, albeit in the context of law and policy making, was made by Priest 
(1997), who proposed five models of self-regulation with different degrees of power 
delegation from government to industry. 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the various alternative institutional solutions to 
address market failure. Two of the solutions are pure models: voluntary action by 
industry and government regulation. The two other solutions are derivatives of self-
regulation in which elements of government regulation are used to secure the formation 
or implementation of the required action to protect the environment. Figure 1 graphically 
demonstrates the pure and mixed models considering the role of business and government 
in rule setting and enforcement stages. 
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Table 1. Pure and Rees’s (1988) Mixed Regulatory Regimes 
Type of Action Process of Regulation Instances of 
Representative 
Literature 
Rule Setting Enforcement (Control and 
Sanctioning) 
P
u
re
 F
o
rm
s 
Conventional 
Collective Action 
and Voluntary ISR 
By business Ranging from no 
enforcement to internal 
monitoring or third-party 
voluntary certification 
(King & Lenox, 
2000; Ostrom, 
1990; Ostrom et 
al., 1994) 
Government 
Regulation 
By 
government 
By judicial power and 
governmental coercion 
Brewer & DeLeon, 
1983; Sabatier, 
1975 
M
ai
n
 M
ix
e
d
 F
o
rm
s Mandated Full Self-
Regulation 
By business By business, but monitored 
by government to ensure 
effectiveness 
Rees, 1988; see 
also Huyse & 
Parmentier, 1990 
Mandated Partial 
Self-Regulation 
By business By government 
By 
government 
By business 
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Each of the regulatory models has its own shortcomings. ISR has been criticized for 
industry avoidance and delay in self-regulation, a lack of transparency (as it is run by the 
private sector), free riding and inadequate incentives to ensure wide-scale participation, 
and weak outcomes due to ineffective endogenous compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms, among other reasons (Egorov & Harstad, 2017; King et al., 2012; 
Rubenstein, 2011). Yet, government regulation involves common drawbacks as well: it is 
a costly and lengthy process to establish such regulation, it may not be designed with 
effective industry practices and efficiency in mind, and government may lack the 
resources to monitor and closely enforce the implemented regulation. Most importantly, 
government regulation often results in compliance, as designing a regulatory instrument 
to generate innovation is difficult; in fact, studies on the relationship between government 
regulation and innovative results have given no consistent results (Blind, 2012; Blind, 
Petersen, & Riillo, 2017).  
Mixed alternatives can solve many of these drawbacks, if not all of them. Free riding may 
be reduced when government manages the enforcement of a self-regulatory regime, and 
the outcomes may improve to different degrees, dependent on how closely government is 
involved. With respect to rule setting, again, the result may improve with government 
intervention as governments may set higher standards than industries would if let to their 
own discretion. Although the proposed mixed models in the past literature may not solve 
all of the common problems completely, new combinations of the two can be extremely 
useful. The grey area between the two pure forms of regulation can provide a fertile area 
for further innovative combinations (Rubenstein, 2011; Sinclair, 1997). 
Therefore, rather than adopting a dichotomous view that separates government regulation 
and ISR, scholars of policy have noticed the advantages of innovative combinations of 
the two alternatives (Rubenstein, 2011; Sinclair, 1997). With increasing pressures on 
firms to protect the natural environment—and with the understanding that external 
pressure can enhance firms’ environmental and social performance (Tashman & Rivera, 
2016)—scholars are recognizing the complex nature of exogenous pressures in self-
regulatory practices which are conventionally deemed voluntary, such as the role of 
regulatory settings (Arimura et al., 2016). 
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2.6 The Need for New Models of Self-Regulation for the 
Circular Economy 
The shortcomings of the existing models of government regulation and self-regulatory 
regimes are particularly noticeable in the area of environmental sustainability. As 
described in Chapter 1, the concept of the circular economy suggests new approaches to 
change the dominant models of doing business and close material loops with the aim of 
improving sustainability. To meet this ambitious goal, the circular economy primarily 
calls for business to utilize its innovation capabilities. Changing business models, eco-
design of products, and sustainability-oriented innovation are among the key drivers of 
this change (European Environment Agency, 2016). Implementing these solutions on a 
grand scale, however, is extremely challenging. On the one hand, such innovative 
transformations require costly changes in design, supply, and operations—and some 
industries will carry higher costs than others. For instance, many businesses would need 
to replace their raw materials with resources that are more environmentally friendly, but 
less available and harder to use. On the other hand, the circular economy and relevant 
concepts such as extended producer responsibility imply that business should accept the 
responsibility of downstream waste and manage it innovatively and sustainably; this 
often means expanded operations and increased costs. 
The economic ramifications of closing resource loops have meaningful implications for 
those aiming to foster a circular economy, such as policy makers and managers. As 
Moreau et al. (2017) discuss, the circular economy exemplifies the essential role of 
institutions in distributing costs among economic agents. As these costs have historically 
been covered by governments via tax systems, shifting them to business requires new 
institutional regimes. Yet, existing regulations may safeguard private interests, which 
could hinder the evolution of institutions to shift the responsibility for externalities 
(Moreau et al., 2017; Vatn, 2009). Hence, the question remains: Under what social, 
economic, or political conditions are the proposed strategies for a circular economy likely 
to succeed (Bocken et al., 2017)? More relevant to this research, we need to understand 
which regulatory regimes can facilitate the costly transition to a circular economy. 
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The shortcomings of the aforesaid regulatory alternatives curb their potential in pursuing 
a circular economy. In addition, these alternatives are problematic in transferring the 
responsibility of post-consumption materials to business, for two major reasons. First, 
managing post-consumer materials poses significant operational costs for firms; 
therefore, large-scale voluntary business-driven solutions may hardly take form. Second, 
given business’s reluctance to take voluntary action, governments may instead impose 
regulation, which creates a secondary challenge. Government regulation tends to translate 
society- and collective-level issues into individual-level mandates. For instance, cap-and-
trade systems to manage greenhouse gas emissions adopt methodologies that convert the 
overall carbon cap to a firm’s mandate in managing its externalities. However, based on 
the existing socially evolved means to manage post-consumption materials, consumer 
waste is collected and managed in an aggregated system in which consumers dispose of 
all waste in one or a few categories, regardless of subcategories and manufacturers. 
Therefore, requiring individual firms to collect and manage their used products from 
consumers will create new challenges for which easy and optimal solutions may not exist. 
In summary, the type of regulatory regimes to realize such a large transformation towards 
a circular economy are of critical importance but are not readily available. 
More importantly, when firms avoid taking voluntary action and government imposes 
regulation, an even more critical difficulty may unfold in the long term. In essence, the 
circular economy calls for innovation at all levels, especially in developing new business 
models as well as the needed technology to close material loops. If firms resist taking on 
this responsibility, government regulators could be urged to set the mechanisms needed 
to coordinate individual firms’ actions towards post-consumer material management. The 
more business avoids this responsibility, the more likely it is that government regulators 
will establish further structures. Nevertheless, organizing with too much structure 
discourages the proactivity and innovation of the system (Mintzberg, 1979; Sandhu & 
Kulik, 2018). In other words, when an official regulation is imposed, firms often seek 
compliance to avoid penalties of non-compliance. Yet, compliance-driven responses are 
far from the proactivity that the circular economy needs. Hence, it is hard to imagine how 
waste-driven regulation can spur the high level of industry proactivity required to propel 
a circular economy. 
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The need for new regulatory models should also be sought in the philosophical 
distinction between the two concepts of collective and shared responsibility. The ISR 
literature often touches on collective responsibility, where action is taken “to respond to a 
shared threat and protect members from stakeholders” (King et al., 2012: 106). In 
responding to a collective responsibility, all firms, regardless of their individual 
performances, are made accountable for the collective performance (Fauchart & Cowan, 
2014). An illustrative example is reputation commons, where a member’s action may 
have a spillover effect on the collectivity, regardless of how other members act, because 
the stakeholders are unable or unwilling to distinguish among the members (Barnett, 
2006; Fauchart & Cowan, 2014; King, Lenox, & Barnett, 2002).  
Across the ISR literature, the concept of collective responsibility is sometimes used 
interchangeably with that of shared responsibility; however, policy and ethics scholars 
have highlighted differences between the two. Whereas a collective responsibility rests 
on the collective in its entirety, a shared responsibility is distributable to a multiplicity of 
actors that contribute to a harmful outcome (Nollkaemper, 2018). Following Erskine, I 
refer to shared responsibility as “responsibility that is necessarily distributive among the 
individual members of a collectivity for outcomes that can only be achieved when they 
act in concert” (Erskine, 2014: 134). 
This distributivity constitutes a key difference between the two concepts. Collective 
responsibility has been criticized for not only diluting the responsibility of each 
individual, but precluding the observers (e.g., stakeholders or enforcers) from 
determining the true source of any harm, since the ultimate bearer of responsibility is 
basically individuals, not the collective (Narveson, 2002). With respect to this potential 
problem, Erskine (2014), discussing shared responsibility, suggests that individual 
constituents of a group action may bear even greater responsibility than they would bear 
for individual actions; this observation reflects the complex nature of shared 
responsibility. Shared responsibility is not the simple aggregation of individual 
responsibilities, because the actors are not usually isolated. They interact and their 
interconnection influences the outcome, and thus, the scope of the others actors’ 
responsibility (Nollkaemper, 2018). Interestingly, waste management has been widely 
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viewed as a shared responsibility of all involved actors, both by researchers (de Lorena 
Diniz Chaves, dos Santos Jr, Rocha, & Mara Santana Rocha, 2014) and by policy makers 
(Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2005). Arguably, a model that draws on 
collective industry actions to realize a circular economy should make it possible to trace 
the responsibility to the individual firm responses too. 
These gaps in the research demand new models which propose innovative mixes of 
regulatory regimes. Given their explained limitations, none of the existing models can 
propel the circular economy, and pursuing more of them does not resolve these 
constraints. Most significantly, the circular economy needs immediate innovative 
solutions for various types of material resources; yet none of the aforementioned models 
can secure this outcome. Hence, instead of pursuing more of each alternative, we must 
develop novel combinations that may drive the transition in different contexts. 
As I explain in the next chapter, the context of this research is the evidence of the 
shortcomings of previous models and how the need for new ones, in an environment with 
non-cooperative actors, gave birth to a hybrid regulatory regime through an evolutionary 
process. The level to which, in this context, government regulation and self-regulation are 
amalgamated towards a circular economy is unprecedented, to the best of my knowledge. 
We need to better understand the complexities of the interactions between government 
regulation and self-regulation (Mills, 2016) and how they can coordinate effectively. 
Coordination is generally viewed as organizing human and physical assets within some 
interdependent system to efficiently produce a value (Camerer & Knez, 1996; Lawrence 
& Lorsch, 1967; March & Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967). However, not every set of 
purposeful and interdependent actions to generate a value is coordinated. That is, 
organizations may choose to act together, whether voluntarily or under external coercion, 
without establishing solid mechanisms for deliberate coordination. Further, different 
forms of coordination may generate different levels of efficiency. 
In the context of this research, coordination materializes through the process of 
regulation, which involves both rule setting and enforcement. An effective and efficient 
regulatory regime could pave the path to a circular economy. To this end, I aim to answer 
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the question: How can business and government coordinate their actions to realize a 
circular economy? 
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Chapter 3  
3 Research Context, Data, and Methodology 
To address the research question, I conducted an inductive embedded single case study 
using a combination of longitudinal and grounded theorizing approaches. In the context 
of my research, various firms from different industries were interacting with regulators in 
managing post-consumer waste. Across nearly four decades, the interactions took 
different forms, from minimal voluntary involvement of business to a stringent regulatory 
regime to a hybrid model of co-regulation in which both parties were involved in rule 
setting and enforcement. This latter stage is the primary focus of the research, as it 
directly addresses the research question. However, what happened prior to the formation 
of the hybrid model is of crucial importance in understanding the hybrid model, its 
essential elements, and its advantages over the two pure regulatory models. Thus, the 
study embraces both a longitudinal investigation of the history of the phenomenon and a 
deep analysis of the hybrid model. In this chapter, I detail the study’s context, data, and 
methodology. 
3.1 Household Hazardous Waste Management in Ontario 
This study investigates past programs that have been developed to handle a group of post-
consumer materials, officially and collectively known in the regulation as the Municipal 
Hazardous or Special Waste (MHSW) program in Ontario, Canada. MHSW is a category 
of the broader post-consumer waste management system, as defined by Ontario 
Regulation 387/16. In practice, MHSW includes nine main groups of materials, namely 
paint and coatings and their containers, pressurized containers (refillable and non-
refillable), single-use dry cell batteries, antifreeze, fertilizers, oil containers, oil filters, 
pesticides, and solvents. In general, Ontario’s non-hazardous post-consumer waste 
management programs (e.g., its paper and packaging materials collection and recycling 
programs) were systematically launched in the early 1980s, and the MHSW program 
followed a few years later, inheriting legacies from non-hazardous materials programs. 
Yet, MHSW faced different challenges and evolved on a separate path over the 
subsequent decades. 
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Both from a financial perspective and with respect to the leadership in transforming the 
programs, paint and coatings constitutes the main material group of MHSW. To illustrate, 
in 2014, 9,422 tonnes of paint and coating materials were collected—equal to one-third 
of all MHSW materials. Eighty-two per cent of the collected paint was recycled. Budget-
wise, the highest revenue collected from the MHSW program came from paint and 
coating companies. Further, waste paint has a significant environmental impact. It is 
estimated that about 10 per cent of paint purchased by consumers remains unused. With 
the establishment of the waste paint program, consumers can return their residual paint to 
drop-off facilities at municipalities or some retail stores. 
With the gradual introduction of waste policies in different provinces across Canada, a 
separate sector has evolved in the paint and coatings industry to acts as the industry’s 
“compliance vehicle.” Waste programs keep hazardous materials, such as alkyd (or oil-
based) paint, away from the natural environment, and return the usable materials to the 
consumption cycle. Based on type and quality, most of the collected coating materials are 
used to manufacture recycled products with smaller environmental footprints compared 
to virgin coatings, incinerated to generate energy, or disposed of safely. Other MHSW 
materials also follow similar processes of recycling, recovery, or safe disposal. The costs 
of managing these waste materials are often higher than the incomes; therefore, all 
involved firms, known as “stewards,” pay a share of the costs of waste management 
operations. These costs are generally added to the price of the products, either by adding 
a visible handling fee to the consumer’s bill or by burying the fee in the price. 
These programs are managed by collectives that are funded by stewards. The collectives 
run the operations required for collecting the materials and consequently recycling, 
recovering, or disposing of them. Waste collection is usually done at established 
facilities, mainly run by municipalities or inside some retail stores. Hauling and other 
operations are mostly done by service providers, such as transportation companies and 
“recyclers.” Collectives often run the financial processes, internal monitoring, strategy 
development, communication and promotion, and reporting to the government bodies. 
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The formation of such collective actions has followed different routes in different 
Canadian jurisdictions. In Quebec, for instance, a high school teacher with social 
entrepreneurial characteristics sparked a rudimentary paint recycling program and urged 
the government and business to support it. In some provinces, such as British Columbia, 
most initiatives have been shaped after the government encouraged business to take 
actions before being forced by regulation. In contrast to such classical forms of collective 
action formation, and among all Canadian jurisdictions, Ontario’s MHSW program 
appear to be unique, as they were never instigated on a consistent basis before regulation 
finally mandated the stewards to collectively take responsibility under an unprecedented 
structure that was stringently constrained by government regulation. The imposed 
regulation created various conflicts among different stakeholders, such as stewardship 
collectives and the municipalities who were being paid by the stewards for their 
collection services according to the provincial regulation but were strongly criticized by 
the stewards, who viewed them as inefficient. As conflicts continued to soar among the 
provincial government and its representative bodies, the stewards (represented by their 
collectives), the municipal governments, NGOs, the public, and the media, the stewards 
increasingly strived to take more active roles by self-regulation. These dynamics 
ultimately led to new approaches by the regulators and adoption of a substitute industry-
led collective action under provincial regulation (as outlined in later chapters). 
Ontario’s MHSW program is unique, because in contrast to other provinces’ programs, 
government’s attempts to encourage business to participate failed for a long time; it was 
realized only after government’s coercion and went through a particular transition. 
Accordingly, this case is important for several reasons. Theoretically, it represents an 
emerging type of mixed regulatory regime that extends the field of collective action into a 
context where business is not cooperative, and for a purpose that is urgent and collective, 
but costly. Practically, such initiatives have strong environment impacts and can facilitate 
the circular economy, while involving significant financial transactions. Due to its 
novelty, the case of Ontario is closely monitored by many other jurisdictions, both within 
and outside Canada, which are developing their post-consumer material systems towards 
a circular economy. 
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3.2 Data Collection 
In order to conduct an inductive study, I collected extensive data from various sources. 
The data were collected from May 2016 to the end of 2018, and include the history of the 
phenomenon. The data collection process started broadly and unconstrainedly. As data 
collection and analysis proceeded, questions and data sources became more specific 
towards the research question until I reached data saturation (Langley, 1999; Langley & 
Tsoukas, 2016; Strauss & Corbin, 2008), as described in the next sections. 
Collecting data from such a multi-stakeholder context with a history of conflict and lack 
of trust among actors (i.e., business, government, and other stakeholders) was 
challenging. Initial steps were facilitated by a group of stewards, but I continued the 
collection process independently. Given the conflict of interests among the actors, this 
independence prevented the potential bias in the data. Not surprisingly, some informants 
were not readily willing to participate and, in some cases, the informants did not consent 
to contribute. In other cases, participation was realized after I explained the ethical 
protocols of this research, including the anonymity of participants, the participants’ 
withdrawal rights, and how the confidential data were protected. Different measures were 
taken to protect the data. For instance, in interviews, participants could choose not to be 
audio recorded at all or to partially speak off the record when they intended to provide 
sensitive information. 
The data include a variety of samples from all key actors involved in the phenomenon. 
These data were collected through multiple channels, summarized in Table 2 and 
discussed below. More details are provided in Appendices. 
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Table 2. Data Sources 
Source of Data Quantity of Data Description Application 
Public 
Documents 
Voluminous 
(enormous body of 
data from the 
involved 
organizations and 
other sources) 
Different reports, policies, 
government regulations, 
board meeting minutes, 
video-recorded events such as 
annual general meetings or 
past conferences, media 
materials, success stories, etc. 
Facts about the process and 
events, used both to develop 
the narrative and to 
triangulate the data from 
other sources 
Interviews 
54 interviews, 
average time 92 
minutes each, 32 
organizations 
Semi-structured, with various 
key experts from all main 
actor groups 
Understanding perspectives, 
tensions, and 
interpretations, making 
better sense of history and 
process 
Internal 
Documents 
Different records 
from an industry, a 
few documents 
from two other 
organizations 
Board meeting minutes, 
correspondence, member-
specific reports, internal 
newsletters 
Facts about events, actions, 
and salient issues at different 
times from the perspective 
of the focal organization 
Observations 
35 events over 75 
hours in total 
Including site visits, industry 
conventions, practitioner 
conferences, and regulatory 
and consultation webinars 
Understanding the context, 
critical issues from the 
perspective of different 
actors, current and future 
trends, and dynamics among 
the actors 
Supplementary 
Sources 
Numerous 
informal chats and 
correspondence 
Informal interviews, hallway 
conversations, follow-up 
emails or phone calls to 
inquire about a previously 
discussed issue, informal chats 
with consumers, storekeepers, 
or other involved people  
Better understanding the 
context, filling the emerging 
gaps, finding alternative 
sources of data, and 
verifying the data or findings 
3.2.1 Public Documents 
Many of the involved organizations from all stakeholder groups, such as collectives of 
stewards, governmental bodies involved in regulation and enforcement, NGOs, and 
municipalities have published an enormous body of public data in different forms. These 
documents include, but are not limited to, comprehensive reports (e.g., annual reports by 
the collectives who run the programs); bodies of policies, legislations, regulations, and 
guidelines released by the government or its representative organizations; publicly 
available board meeting minutes; video recorded events (e.g., annual general meetings of 
government bodies or public sessions to introduce policies); news clips; educational and 
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promotional materials that explain the programs to consumers; and numerous websites 
and webpages. Many of these sources are created due to the legal mandate of the 
stewardship companies. Public data were a main source of factual data to understand the 
events during the studied period, including the earlier years of program formation. 
3.2.2 Interviews 
I conducted 54 formal interviews with informed people from all groups of actors 
involved in the field, including stewards and industry leaders (e.g., manufacturing 
companies, retailers, importers, collective organizations, etc.), service providers 
(especially recyclers and consultants), the Ontario provincial government and its relevant 
bodies (i.e., regulatory and enforcement bodies), municipal/regional governments in 
Ontario, and NGOs involved in the programs. The interviewees were typically among the 
most informed people in the field. Many informants had experience in different 
stakeholder groups, which had given them broader perspectives. The interviewees were 
affiliated with 32 different organizations. 
The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth, with an average time of 92 minutes 
each. Forty-one interviews were conducted in person (mostly in the informants’ work 
setting), eight were conducted by phone, and three by video-conferencing media. The two 
other interviews, as requested by the informants, were written5. Most interviews were 
completely audio recorded, except for seven interviewees who did not allow recording 
the discussions; in these instances, notes were taken instead. Similarly, some parts of 
other interviews, as per request, were conducted off the record. Given the sensitivity of 
the data, six of the interviewees did not consent to the use of their data in the form of 
direct quotations or consented conditionally upon approval by them. Some excerpts of the 
interviews will be directly quoted in next chapters as representative data. To protect the 
confidentiality of the participants’ identities, each interviewee was identified by a code, 
consisting of a letter and a number (e.g., B17). The letter represents four broad actor 
                                                 
5
 In calculations, I considered an approximate time for the two written interviews. 
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groups: B for Business including firms and stewardship collectives, G for provincial 
government and its pertinent organizations, M for municipalities and local governments 
as well as their related associations, and S for service providers such as recyclers and 
consultants. In addition to the interviewees’ codes, I may also broadly mention their roles 
and expertise. 
The interview data were a major source of information to help understand the 
interpretation of different actors and conflicts among the interests and views of the 
complex phenomenon in hand. These data were the main input to the analysis of the 
identified dualities and tensions, as described in later chapters. 
3.2.3 Internal Documents 
Select documents pertaining to the stewardship programs of one of the involved 
industries were another valuable source of data. Documents included selected board 
meeting minutes, correspondence, internal reports, industry annual reports or reports 
about a specific subject, member-specific industry documents, and internal 
bulletins/newsletters for members of an industry. Although the provided documents were 
not as extensive as the public data, they were extremely valuable as they were mostly 
confidential or not provided to outsiders, and embodied retrospective but relatively 
reliable data about the events, actions taken by the industry, and positions held at 
different points in time. These documents reflect how the salience of the issues from the 
perspective of the industry had changed over time, and how new challenges, tensions, and 
perspectives have evolved, especially over the last decade. In addition, a few other 
organizations also shared a number of their documents on specific subjects. 
3.2.4 Non-Participant Observations 
I visited different pertinent sites (e.g., recycling plants and waste collection depots), 
attended industry and recycling events (e.g., board meetings and conferences held by an 
industry or a research-practice institute), and participated in different online webinars 
(e.g., those held by governmental bodies to introduce regulation or by service providers 
to promote their services). The purpose of these observations was twofold: to understand 
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the context and technical aspects of waste management, and to better capture the 
underlying dynamics and unnoticed data that might otherwise have been missed. 
My observations were complemented by note taking and informal conversations. In many 
cases, observation fed into other data collection methods, such as interviews. Overall, 75 
hours were spent on 35 observation opportunities. 
3.2.5 Supplementary Sources 
Data were also complemented with follow-up emails, phone calls, hallway conversations, 
and informal and unrecorded short interviews, both with people involved in providing 
other sources of data or with new people, such as consumers, store representatives, or site 
staff. These data had various planned or unplanned applications. They were collected to 
provide a broader and multi-faceted perspective of the phenomenon. They were also used 
to fill the emerging gaps through the research process, including ambiguities and any 
questions that evolved during the analysis. In some cases, interim findings were also 
discussed in these friendly conversations, which provided opportunities for collecting 
further data or confirmation of the findings.  
The above five sources of data were complementary, but they also allowed me to 
triangulate the data (Yin, 2016). For instance, I tested the precision of data supplied by 
different informants by tracking the interview data in reliable documents, or fact 
checking with informants from other stakeholder groups. The same process was used to 
control for potential social desirability, which is likely in such contexts. Triangulation 
was especially critical in understanding events and actions at different times. For 
example, a claim on the proactivity and voluntariness of an action by business was 
controlled by comparing the data from two conflicting stakeholders and from documents 
that may reject the claim. However, where the data involved interpretation rather than 
facts, triangulation was not required to provide evidence for the data’s “correctness.” 
Analysis of the data began almost simultaneously with its collection. Therefore, the focus 
of data collection gradually shifted from understanding the general trends and events to 
the actions during the later stages in which the two alternatives were mixed, how actors 
perceive the issues, and the contradictions between their perceptions. 
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3.3 Analysis 
The analysis followed an emergent approach. I first adopted a general longitudinal 
approach (Langley, 1999; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Vane Ven, 2013; Langley & 
Tsoukas, 2016) to understand the evolution of regulatory regimes. Yet, as the analysis 
advanced and I explored the formation of a hybrid regime, I shifted the focus from the 
process to the hybrid model in an attempt to explore its structure and characteristics. At 
this step of the analysis, I used the classical grounded theorizing method (Strauss & 
Corbin, 2008). Ultimately, I compared the characteristics of the hybrid model with those 
of the previous stages of the process. Overall, the analysis followed a four-step process. I 
used Atlas.ti qualitative software (version 8.1), complemented with spreadsheets and 
other means. 
3.3.1 Step 1: Developing the Narrative Based on Historical Data 
The first step of my analysis aimed to explore and ascertain the “truth” and “facts” 
concerning the events (Gephart, 2004), such as the imposition of a regulation at a certain 
time or the formal initiation of a program. By reviewing a variety of data sources, I 
identified all of the events and actions that could influence the phenomenon. I soon 
realized that I needed to understand hazardous waste management within the entirety of 
general waste management in Ontario, as the MHSW program is a subset of the general 
consumer waste system there. The formation of waste management discourse in Ontario 
dates back to the 1950s, but the first major event pertinent to the existing programs was 
launched in 1981, which I set as the start point of my temporal analysis. To organize the 
data, I created a log file and the data were triangulated to resolve potential conflicts, not 
least those past events that were not adequately documented. 
While working with these types of verifiable data, I was simultaneously collecting 
descriptive data (i.e., data that reflect the rationale behind the actions and perspectives of 
different actors). The goal was to ensure that in addition to the events, I identify the 
underlying reasons of the actions as well as the reactions and consequences; these would 
be required for the next steps of my theory development. 
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The data provided a thorough representation of the formation and transformation of the 
MHSW management. On that basis, I wrote a rich chronological case narrative on 
managing waste in Ontario (Jarzabkowski, Lê, & Balogun, 2018; Langley, 1999). The 
data demonstrated that although the MHSW program was a subset of the general waste 
management system, it faced different challenges and followed a different path. The 
output of this step is summarized in a narrative and a temporal map, reflecting three 
stages: unfulfilled self-regulation, government regulation, and hybridization (presented in 
further detail in Chapter 4). Through this process, an initial collective-oriented regulation 
was shaped by the government, faced various conflicts, and ultimately evolved into a 
hybrid model of action that is co-regulated by business and government. The data also 
demonstrated the extensive conflicts among the stakeholders and how the transformation 
occurred as the actors interacted through the process. 
3.3.2 Step 2: Understanding the Structure of the Hybrid Model 
During step 1, continual reference to the existing literature revealed that the first two 
identified stages (i.e., unfulfilled self-regulation and government regulation) are almost 
consistent with the existing knowledge, but the hybridization stage has unique 
characteristics that appear to be unprecedented. Thus, in step 2, I focused on investigating 
the hybrid model. By temporal bracketing (Langley, 1999) of the hybridization process, I 
studied the patterns of actions by different actors throughout this process. The results 
showed how during this stage, business and government were both involved in co-
regulating (i.e., setting the rules and enforcing them). This step allowed me to simplify 
the recurring patterns and propose a model for hybrid regulation. 
3.3.3 Step 3: Characterizing the Hybrid Model 
During the previous steps, I noticed that the hybrid regulation is characterized by 
contradicting issues that form constructive tensions throughout the process. Tension, in 
this sense, is defined as the state of “two phenomena in a dynamic relationship that 
involve both competition and complementarity” (English, 2001; Epstein, Buhovac, & 
Yuthas, 2015). To capture the characteristics of the hybrid model, I bracketed the 
hybridization stage and followed grounded theorizing. I started by “tagging”—an open 
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coding process (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), labelled in accordance with Jay (2013). Tagging 
helps to compartmentalize data into building blocks of concepts. The specific goal was to 
create grounded codes that could represent the dynamics of the collective action. I began 
by asking of the data: What issues emerged throughout the process, and what created 
contradictions (such as disagreements or concerns) among the actors? This dual question 
aimed to generate the tags on underlying tensions and dualities and categorize the data 
into building blocks of tensions. 
After some progress in tagging, I started “theming.” Themes are higher-level codes that 
reflect recurring factors or mechanisms in more abstract bundles of the identified tags 
(Jay, 2013). Theming was performed based on the guidelines for axial coding (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 1984). I expected the themes to reflect recurring 
factors or mechanisms that created tensions in more abstract bundles. I repeatedly asked: 
Why should this tag be categorized under this theme and not the others? Further, why 
should this theme be distinct from the other themes? Tagging and theming involved 
iterative analysis of the data and several shifts between them. 
Theming was followed by theorizing—a more high-level conceptual effort to group 
themes into abstract aggregations. I noticed that the emerging themes were referring to 
contradictory concepts; for instance, two notions of compliance with regulation and going 
beyond regulation were noticeably shaping a “duality.” In fact, the themes represented 
the mechanisms that engender the tensions within the dualities. Theorizing involved 
working with the data and referring to existing knowledge, such as how the ISR literature 
has approached proactivity. By working deliberately with themes that still have unclear 
boundaries and need further clarification, I repeatedly consolidated, disambiguated, or 
deleted the previously generated codes, including tags and themes. In some cases, 
theorizing also revealed the need for further data collection in order to address the 
conceptual gaps.  
My theorization generated four aggregated dualities that provide the ground for tensions: 
compliance versus proactivity; decoupling versus integration, control over means versus 
ends; and harmonization versus distinctiveness. Certain aspects of some of these tensions 
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have been noted in the extant body of research on collective actions, ISR, or the circular 
economy, but others are new. Figure 2 presents the grounded theorizing and how it 
generated the mechanisms that create four salient tensions. 
 
Figure 2. Coding for Tensions in the Hybrid Approach to Regulation 
3.3.4 Step 4: Developing the Comparative Framework 
My higher-level approach to theorizing enhanced the extant understanding of the model 
and led to a comparative framework. First, I noticed that the tension between proactivity 
Compliance vs. 
Proactivity 
Program Scale 
- Extent and scope of government regulations 
- Means for business to influence regulation 
- Economies of scale 
- Scale as transformer 
- Global uniqueness and leadership 
Boundaries of Formal 
Regulation 
Second-Order Themes 
Decoupling vs. 
Integration 
Cost Positioning 
- Discharging responsibilities to industry 
funding organizations (IFOs) 
- Emphasis on ensuring a “level playing field” 
- Consumer sensitivity to visible fees 
- Controversy over source of funding 
- Perceptions of visible or incorporated fees 
Responsibility 
Positioning 
Control over 
Means vs. Ends 
Control Structure 
- Imposing IFOs as the vehicle 
- Compromise to keep all stakeholders content 
- Top-down approach 
- Lack of market support by government 
- Industry-funded monitoring 
- Increased costs of monitoring  
- Information ownership 
Cooperative Structure 
First-Order Tags Tensions 
Issue Interconnectedness - Operational separation and conceptual 
connection of waste management 
Harmonization 
vs. 
Distinctiveness  
Operational 
Simplification 
- Polycentricity across municipalities 
- Provincial government’s leadership 
- Federal government’s global position 
- Harmonious rules with regional trade partners 
-  
- Harmonious rule setting across programs 
- Product specificity 
Government 
Distinctiveness 
Stringency of Regulation 
- Curbing actions by augmenting requirements 
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and compliance is the outcome of the model and the three other tensions feed into this 
tension. Second, upon identification of the four tensions that characterize the 
hybridization, I traced all of the tensions back to investigate whether they had been 
salient in the previous stages. Coding the data for previous temporal brackets revealed 
that during the government regulation (stage 2 of the process), although confrontation of 
actors was a noticeable characteristic of the regime, the constructive tensions were 
absent. In fact, in this stage, only one pole of each of the dualities was salient. This 
compelling finding helped me to theorize further on how a hybrid model is characterized 
by constructive tensions that are beyond the banal confrontations among stakeholders. 
These tensions distinguish the hybrid regulation from the existing models, allowing me to 
explore how managing them can influence the outcomes, which are discussed in Chapters 
6 and 7. The result was a comparative analysis of how the proposed hybrid model is 
distinct from the two pure alternatives, and how it can resolve their respective 
shortcomings. 
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Chapter 4  
4 The Evolution and Transformation of the MHSW 
Program 
This chapter outlines the case narrative of the formation and evolution of MHSW 
programs in Ontario (i.e., the outcome of the first step of the research, as explained in 
Chapter 3). The narrative covers the temporal scope from 1981, when the first critical 
event relevant to this research occurred, until the end of the data collection period in 
December 2018. It has been shaped according to the many data sources collected from 
various actor groups. The foundation of the narrative is based on the historical data, but I 
also touch on the inconsistent or even conflicting stances and perceptions of different 
actors, such as how business and government may interpret a certain event differently). 
Whereas the historical data has provided facts that help me to discover the pattern of the 
hybrid model, the stances and interpretation of different actors allows me to uncover the 
tensions that emerged through the studied process, reflecting the complexity of the 
generated model. Based on critical events and turning points, the narrative demonstrates 
three distinct stages that pertain to business-government coordination. 
Figure 3 represents the critical events in the three identified stages of formation and 
transformation of waste management programs in Ontario. In the next sections, I explain 
the three stages and in the following chapters, I focus on the hybridization stage, which 
directly responds to the research question. In Chapters 6 and 7, I use the data from the 
first two stages to compare the three regulatory models. 
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Figure 3. Mapping Critical Events in the Formation and Transformation of Ontario MHSW Program 
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4.1 Stage 1: Unfulfilled Self-Regulation (1981–July 2008) 
Systematic attention to waste management in Ontario imperceptibly increased alongside 
government and public concerns about air and water pollution in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The first waste management Act was introduced in 1970. Over the next decade, the 
gradual development of this rudimentary Act was reflected in growing provincial 
regulations, such as Regulation 309 (1980) which, under the Environmental Protection 
Act, put more emphasis on the issue of waste and its classification and management. An 
early watershed was the separation of some recyclables, such as bottles, paper, and 
packaging materials, in a regular curbside collection program in leading municipalities in 
1981. This program was gradually diffused across the province and relabelled “the Blue 
Box Program” in 1986. In addition, in 1983, Ontario’s Ministry of the Environment 
(referred to hereafter as “the Ministry”) published its Blueprint for Waste Management in 
Ontario, a voluminous proposal that called for cooperation between the provincial 
government, municipalities, industry, and the public, and introduced many advanced 
ideas at that time to address waste. 
Against this background, a number of municipalities and regions began to take the lead in 
treating hazardous waste as a distinct type of waste. This was deemed part of their 
mandate for provision of health and safety for citizens and environmental protection, as 
disposing of hazardous materials with other types of waste could harm the environment 
and create safety risks. As such, some municipalities used their resources to run 
occasional programs to collect hazardous materials from households separately. The 
scope of such materials was broad, including pesticides, pharmaceuticals, cleaners, 
flammable liquids, aerosols, paints, stains, and virtually all household products that 
carried a sign of potential danger on their labels.  
As the idea of sustainable waste management continued to spread in the 1980s, both 
existing businesses and newly formed companies found the opportunity to provide such 
services to municipalities. The operations of these firms initially included collecting 
household hazardous materials through scheduled local events. In 1991, Hotz 
Environmental Services (Envirosystems, Inc. since 2010), one of the first firms that 
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specifically proposed to handle hazardous waste, was founded in Hamilton-Wentworth 
(now known as the City of Hamilton), expanding to Brantford, Toronto, Waterloo, and 
other areas in the Golden Horseshow within a year. Hotz “Mobile Collection Units” 
could be found at pre-announced locations (e.g., parking lots) over certain weekends, 
collecting hazardous waste in neighbourhoods. The similar materials were usually 
aggregated and repacked by the service provider, before being sent in bulk for safe 
disposal. Running this model, Hotz could handle up to 1,800 incoming citizens in one 
day with the help of more than 50 employees. From a very early point, safety was a key 
consideration in all operations. Hotz received a “Generic Licence” from the Ministry to 
run this model, with considerations such as prevention of spills in collection sites. Figure 
4 demonstrates a newspaper advertisement and a photograph of a collection event in the 
early 1990s. 
 
Figure 4. Left: A Municipal Advertisement to Announce a Collection Event in 
Hamilton, Ontario. Right: A Hotz Environmental Services “Mobile Collection Unit” 
event in York, Ontario (early 1990s) (courtesy of Envirosystems, Inc.) 
Soon the people involved in operations noticed that a significant portion of the collected 
residuals were quality materials, and the idea of “reuse” was shaped as a viable 
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alternative to disposal. Citizens who came to a collection event could take the half-used 
materials brought by other citizens, albeit at their own risk. Given the potentially 
hazardous nature of the materials and the fact that the materials were not always returned 
in their original containers, safety became a key concern that curbed the reuse option. 
Hotz soon realized that paint constitutes about half of the collected hazardous waste and 
began experimenting with paint recycling in 1992.6 However, paint posed a difficulty as 
it came in various types and shapes. Initially, Hotz started by separating paints into water- 
and solvent-based types, as well as dark and light colours, and mixing all of the incoming 
paint in each of these broad groups. This simple separation process yielded just two 
shades: a beige and a greyish brown. The company recognized that the volume of the 
collected paint would be far more than what it could use or send to municipalities for use. 
Managing this volume of paint required knowledge, expertise, and technology to produce 
more attractive shades and find new applications. Interviewee S7, a paint recycling 
expert, described the process:  
How many different colours [could be produced]? Initially we didn’t 
know. Blue can be [about] 10 different shades: navy blue, dark blue, 
light blue, whatever it is. How do we know which colours should go 
together? 
To address these technical issues, Hotz sought advice from a local and a large coating 
manufacturer. Under their guidance, a few more shades were soon developed. Yet, with 
increasing volume, the large manufacturer stopped providing technical advice as it 
noticed that the recycled paint could become a marketable product, potentially competing 
with its own virgin paint. Still, despite the relatively acceptable quality of the early 
recycled paint for spaces such as storage rooms and workshops, nobody was willing to 
use it—not even to be used in municipality facilities.  
                                                 
6
 Albeit, before Hotz, leftover paint was recycled in isolated projects in other regions, such as Quebec and 
certain areas in the United States. 
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Feeling this strong resistance from the paint industry and the market, Hotz managed to 
market its affordable recycled paint in Cuba and later, in other international markets. To 
economize on the costs of shipping and labour, the paint was aggregated in a limited 
number of shades; after pre-filtering, the bulk was shipped to target countries, where it 
could be fine-tuned and repackaged in smaller containers at the buyer’s discretion. Over 
time, Hotz chose to keep its products simple and affordable: it did not add virgin 
materials, such as costly pigments, to the recycled paint; therefore, its colour deck 
included fairly limited shades. Clients, however, could make some changes in their own 
final products. 
With the growing volume of used or residual household hazardous materials returned by 
consumers, some local governments gradually established their own permanent depots in 
municipalities. These drop-off facilities were generally established in areas with a 
considerable population that needed such services beyond occasional events. The number 
of these facilities grew rapidly in the 1990s. Many of them still have limited reuse 
programs to this day. Yet, in dispersed or smaller municipalities with limited turnover of 
hazardous materials, occasional collection events are sufficient. 
This hazardous waste management program continued to run parallel with (and was 
influenced by) the large and broader waste programs at the municipal level. Under 
Ontario Regulation 101, Recycling and Composting of Municipal Waste, 1994, 
municipalities were regulated to manage the Blue Box Program, which collected and 
handled materials such as paper, aluminum cans, and glass. Over the years, this curbside 
recycling program has encountered many complications. Most relevant to the case of 
hazardous materials is the fact that since the 1980s, various industries were trying to 
eliminate the deposit-refund system on refillable containers and introduce single-use 
containers instead. Circulation of refillable containers, supported by environmental 
advocates and mandated partially since 1976, was an operational and financial burden for 
business; thus, industries advocated recycling as a viable alternative to the deposit 
system. 
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During the decades of debate over the merits of recycling versus the deposit system, at 
some periods, the relevant industries financially contributed to recycling programs 
voluntarily to relax the regulation. For example, in 1986, a group of soft drink businesses 
formed an industry funding organization that is widely known as “OMMRI” (Ontario 
Multi-Material Recycling Inc.) to co-fund the Blue Box Program through a depreciative 
funding model, ultimately leaving the full costs on municipalities. Another important 
event occurred in 1992, when grocery product manufacturers introduced the so-called 
“CIPSI” (Canadian Industry Packaging Stewardship Initiative). This initiative was later 
supported by some other industries as well as the provincial government, but was 
challenged by other industries and finally ended in 1995 after a few years of controversy 
(for a short narrative of the program see Chang, Macdonald, & Wolfson, 1998). 
The Blue Box Program was supported by many citizens and was generally deemed a 
success for Ontario. In the late 1980s, this public-private partnership was recognized by 
the United Nations, which presented its first ever Environmental Award jointly to 
OMMRI, the Recycling Council of Ontario, and the Association of Municipalities of 
Ontario. Nonetheless, business’s contribution to these programs was inconsistent as 
different industries and firms held different positions with little motivation for 
cooperation; hence, the isolated “voluntary” programs were short-lived and largely due to 
the pressures imposed by different governments. 
Towards the late 1990s, waste costs became a significant concern for municipal 
governments, government funding for the Blue Box Program ran out, and the cooperative 
effort between industry, the province, and municipal groups was jeopardized, leaving it 
unclear whether the Blue Box Program would be able to continue. Finally, on June 23, 
2002, the Ontario government released the province’s first product stewardship 
legislation, the Waste Diversion Act. Its purpose was “to promote the reduction, reuse, 
and recycling of waste and to provide for the development, implementation, and 
operation of waste diversion programs.” The Act mainly aimed to secure the operation of 
the Blue Box Program through regulated industry funding, as previous invitations for 
voluntary cooperation had failed in securing steady contributions by industry. As 
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interviewee G6, an expert with both provincial and municipal government experience, 
stated, 
I don’t call them extended producer responsibility programs per se, 
because they were primarily financial stewardship programs, but 
nevertheless, it started on that path [to secure industry funding]. 
In this way, financial challenges were critical to the evolution of the programs; yet, in 
regulation, they were framed under state-of-the-art environmental ideas such as extended 
producer responsibility. The focus of the Waste Diversion Act was mainly on handling 
and management of the “designated waste” managed through the Blue Box Program, but 
it was open to the introduction of new waste groups, such as hazardous materials. 
The Waste Diversion Act instated a unique governance structure to ensure that business 
will continuously participate in waste management. It introduced a non-Crown 
organization at arm’s length from the government, namely Waste Diversion Ontario 
(WDO), which became responsible for putting the Act into practice by establishing waste 
diversion programs, with a board of directors composed of various stakeholders. WDO 
was also responsible for establishing the organizations known as industry funding 
organizations (IFOs). These IFOs had to provide for payments equal to 50 per cent of the 
total net costs incurred by municipalities to run the Blue Box Program. Programs run by 
IFOs had to be approved by the Minister of the Environment (hereafter referred to as “the 
Minister”) in advance. Each IFO was required to determine and collect the fees to be paid 
by the stewards, as well as any necessary information, and to establish internal rules for 
such operations. Figure 5 demonstrates the general governance structure and relationships 
established by the Waste Diversion Act. 
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Figure 5. The Structure Established in 2002 by the Waste Diversion Act 
With the IFOs running the programs, WDO was responsible for overseeing the IFOs on 
behalf of the Ministry. The budget of WDO, as a non-Crown organization, was also paid 
by the stewards through the IFOs, rather than by the Ministry. This model was relatively 
new. Monitoring compliance with regulation is traditionally an in-house responsibility of 
the government, funded through the tax system. However, this adopted governance 
structure put the costs of monitoring on industry—and, consequently, their specific 
consumers—rather than on government and, consequently, the public. Moreover, it was 
argued that this funding model would help WDO to be less influenced by politics; for 
instance, changes in the provincial government could not influence this organization and 
the programs by curbing its budget—challenges that had historically impacted waste 
management.  
In a controversial move, the Ministry also established and designated an organization 
called Stewardship Ontario to act as the Blue Box program’s sole IFO, i.e. the only 
collective which was responsible to collect fees from the firms that produced or 
distributed the designated materials. Indeed, every steward had virtually no choice other 
than to choose this IFO as its waste management collective. Therefore, although the idea 
Ontario’s Government  
(represented by the Ministry of the Environment, renamed the 
Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change in 2014, and the 
Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks in 2018) 
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(and their representing 
association) 
Service Providers 
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of stewardship per se, built on many years of debate on the core idea, did not create 
considerable negative reactions in industries except for a few sectors, dictating a 
particular IFO as the representative of different industries generated contention. As 
interviewee S6, an expert with experience in different actor groups, reported, 
All the producers were obligated by law to participate in that 
stewardship organization unless they got permission to do something 
different, and getting permission to do something different was next to 
impossible. It was a quasi-monopoly scenario […] that many of the 
stewards objected to, both in principle and in practice. It was different 
than the way some of these programs had happened in Europe and 
elsewhere in the country where the industry created an association to 
manage [the program]. 
In summary, the Waste Diversion Act laid the foundations of a unique collective-level 
regulation. In contrast to typical regulation, which targets individual firms, the Act 
focused on the collective level and individual firms had practically no other option to 
meet the waste management requirements, at least in the beginning. In 2003, Stewardship 
Ontario registered 3,300 firms as potential stewards and received reports from about 
1,200 Blue Box stewards. Paying stewardship fees started in 2004, which covered half of 
the Blue Box Program expenses as the industry’s mandated contribution. The role of 
WDO was mainly facilitation, ensuring that the IFO was meeting its responsibilities, 
including publishing the performance data. 
4.2 Stage 2: Government Regulation (July 2008–May 2014) 
The hazardous materials programs were built upon the Blue Box mandated action. After 
the initial establishment of WDO as the Ministry’s oversight representative and 
Stewardship Ontario as the IFO, the Ministry gradually expanded the scope of its 
regulations to include materials such as used electronics, tires, paint, and batteries. In 
December 2006, the Minister filed the first version of Regulation 542/06 under the Waste 
Diversion Act to designate MHSW materials. This regulation defined different types of 
MHSW materials. In a Program Request Letter to WDO’s board of directors, the Minister 
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also directed WDO to develop a diversion program for MHSW. Further, he stipulated 
that Stewardship Ontario act as the IFO for the MHSW program as well as the Blue Box 
Program. 
The contentious designation of Stewardship Ontario as the IFO for MHSW materials was 
deemed a political decision, but it could also create economies of scale and facilitate the 
operations, given the previous learnings. In addition, some new stewards for MHSW 
materials were already paying Stewardship Ontario for their products that were collected 
under the Blue Box Program. Some experts (even non-stewards) argue that alternative 
organizations could potentially be more successful IFOs for these classes of waste. For 
example, the paint and coatings industry believed that a Vancouver-based IFO, Product 
Care Association, experienced in hazardous materials programs since the 1990s, was the 
best option to be their IFO. Even Stewardship Ontario itself was reluctant to take on 
responsibility for MHSW materials, which lay out of its expertise with the Blue Box 
Program. 
With this designation, Stewardship Ontario became the IFO for both the Blue Box and 
MHSW programs. The other two IFOs in Ontario, Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment and Used Tires, were both established by the relevant industries. One year 
later, in December 2007, the MHSW Program Plan for Phase 1, developed by 
Stewardship Ontario and approved by WDO, was submitted to the Minister. Phase 1 
included nine material groups: paints and coatings and their containers, solvents and their 
containers, single-use dry batteries, antifreeze and containers, used oil filters, lubricating 
oil containers, fertilizers and their containers, pesticides and their containers, and 
pressurized containers such as propane tanks. The Minister approved the Program Plan 
and it commenced on July 1, 2008. 
Under the regulation, firms that had a commercial connection to such products (i.e., the 
stewards) were responsible for the products throughout their life cycles, including after 
consumption. However, this responsibility was practically relinquished to a collective (an 
IFO) by translating it into a financial commitment of the stewards. The role of the IFO 
was to identify the firms based on the provincial definition of stewards in Ontario, such 
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as producers, brand owners, and first importers. The IFO would then calculate the costs 
of collecting and handling waste disposal for each steward based on its market share and 
the handling costs. Stewards were mandated to enroll in the program and pay the costs. 
Potential free riders were caught by investigation in the marketplace by the IFO or other 
bodies. In practice, these functions required extensive operations. For instance, the 
regulation introduced nine broad product groups, but there were grey areas and the 
inclusion of many products was questionable. Moreover, for some products imported to 
the province, it was not clear which of the involved firms should be legally deemed the 
steward. Managing the operations was therefore complicated. With the extended 
operations of MHSW programs, Stewardship Ontario, which had initially outsourced its 
operations, employed consultants to create an internal structure for managing these 
operations internally. 
A recurring question concerned the source of the funds spent on waste management. The 
regulation and government rhetoric had always emphasized that stewards—rather than 
taxpayers or municipalities—should pay for the costs of waste management. It was also 
often acknowledged that by charging the stewards, these costs became merely another 
item in firms’ operational costs, and were consequently transferred to consumers of those 
products. For the provincial and local governments, this was a more favourable 
mechanism vis-à-vis spending their own budgets on waste management. Accordingly, 
after establishing this funding mechanism, government initially deemed it legitimate for 
the sellers to charge customers an additional fee for environmental protection. These 
handling fees were generally stated as an extra line in bills for Phase 1 materials. 
Not surprisingly, business responses to these enforced programs were mixed. Evidence 
suggests that in the earlier years, business sometimes tried to forestall the regulation by 
means such as suggesting limited voluntary contributions. Nevertheless, when the 
industries realized that regulation was inevitable, they approached it as a means to create 
a level playing field and prevent free riding issues, which were common in the initial 
Blue Box Program. The regulation could force all the involved firms to participate and 
this was an advantage for business. Another consideration of business was the fact that a 
firm’s responsibility was discharged by its financial contributions, and the costs could be 
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transferred to consumers through the environmental handling fees; this was another relief 
for the stewards, but overall, increased prices could have negative impacts on demand. 
However, a major business concern was the predetermined path to meeting the 
requirement. The industries that were influenced by Phase 1 of MHSW raised their 
concerns about the government’s decision to continue the quasi-monopoly of 
Stewardship Ontario as the only way to launch the program. Although the regulation 
allowed these stewards to establish their own IFO or an industry stewardship program 
after the initial launch by Stewardship Ontario, meeting the criteria for government 
approval as an independent IFO was highly taxing. Indeed, firms in industries like paint 
practically had no option but to work with the established IFO for the coming years; 
hence, they decided to take an active role in this relationship. 
In the few years after the introduction of MHSW Phase 1, the main focus of WDO and 
the IFO was on operationalization. The IFO had many challenges to deal with, such as 
identification of products, interacting with stewards, setting fair fees, establishing 
collection sites, and dealing with service providers. Hazardous materials were mostly 
collected by municipal depots or through collection events, but there were also retailers 
who had agreed to establish drop-off depots for their customers to bring back their used 
hazardous materials. These retailers themselves were typically stewards, as they supplied 
their own brands of the designated products. With all of these operationalization hurdles, 
monitoring the programs was arguably a luxury and WDO was merely playing the role of 
a liaison between the IFO and the government.  
Despite the above challenges, implementing Phase 1 was relatively smooth and the 
experts, especially from the government side, generally perceived it a success. On July 
22, 2008, shortly after the commencement of MHSW Phase 1, in a Program Request 
Letter to WDO’s board of directors, the Minister provided direction on the development 
of the subsequent phases of the MHSW program. This direction required an amended 
MHSW program to include all MHSW materials designated under Phase 2 and Phase 3, 
in addition to the materials currently included in Phase 1. Phases 2 and 3 included 
materials such as aerosol containers, fluorescent light bulbs and tubes, pharmaceuticals, 
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sharps such as syringes, and all types of flammable, corrosive, toxic, reactive, and 
leachate toxic materials not included in Phase 1. The Minister’s letter also stipulated that 
the amended program include all of the materials in both of the new phases 
simultaneously. In September 2009, this Consolidated MHSW Program Plan (also known 
as the “Orange Drop Program”) was approved by the Minister and its commencement 
was set for July 1, 2010. The stewards and the IFO had to establish the system for all 
included products in just nine months. 
This quick expansion of the program was a bold decision, but extending producers’ 
responsibility was a proliferating idea at that time, and governments were motivated to 
deploy it as quickly as possible. Almost simultaneously, in October 2009, the Canadian 
Council of Ministers of the Environment released the Canada-Wide Action Plan for 
Extended Producer Responsibility. The idea of extended producer responsibility suggests 
moving the responsibility upstream in the product life cycle to the producer, which 
obviates the need for resource allocation by municipalities and, in turn, taxpayers. The 
implementation of this plan was naturally left to the jurisdictional authority of each 
provincial government. Given its record in waste management, the Ontario government 
did not want to be a late mover. Further, many of the Phase 2 and 3 materials were 
already managed by most municipalities (and had been since the 1990s). Based on the 
Phase 1 experience, extended producer responsibility was proving an effective approach 
to transfer the costs of such programs from local governments to stewards. 
The result of this shift, however, is generally recalled by experts with terms such as 
“mayhem,” “crisis,” and even “disaster” and “catastrophe.” July 1, 2010 is still an 
unforgettable date for all involved in those programs. Twenty-two new material groups, 
many of which were consumables, were added to the initial nine MHSW material groups. 
These new groups included thousands of newly regulated products. Stewards, including 
retailers, were not yet ready to implement the right fees in their systems in a well-
organized and harmonious way. Most of the stewards chose to recover the fees by way of 
a visible price in the bill to customers, which was common after 2008 for most of the 
Phase 1 materials. 
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Commencing the consolidated phase suddenly added an unexpected fee to many 
consumer products and created strong consumer backlash. On July 1, 2010, citizens who 
were shopping for daily products suddenly realized that they had to pay an extra fee for 
many products. Angry with the fees, consumers started to contact media sources. One 
expert (interviewee B14) recalled, 
One of the things that caught the eye of the press was fees being 
charged on some everyday products that people consumed, and that 
people may not deem as being hazardous or special. For example, dish 
soap, and that was pictured in the Toronto Star, because a lady […] 
saw an eco-fee attached to her purchase and wondered what that was 
all about. There was some confusion with the program with which 
materials were included and which were not included, and that 
confusion resulted in fees for corrosive materials being applied to a 
non-corrosive irritant material, which was the dish soap [—hence the] 
higher fees. 
What was coined “eco-fees” soon became a hot topic (see Figure 6). The media started to 
critically question Stewardship Ontario, an organization which it considered responsible 
for these new fees. The problem was more confusing due to diversity of stores, such as 
company-specific specialized stores and independent general retailers. Some stores had 
not included the eco-fees in their bills, and some industries chose to keep eco-fees 
invisible (i.e., adding it to the overall cost of the products) and this created more 
confusion. In some cases, different retailers were even charging different eco-fees for the 
same product. Stewardship Ontario was the main target of this increased outrage from 
consumers and journalists, and some experts maintain that the IFO did not practice good 
public relations to manage the crisis. 
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Figure 6. Instances of Media Attention to Eco-Fees in July 2010 
Some additional side issues exacerbated the consumer backlash. One was unreasonable or 
wrong fees imposed on a number of products. For instance, the eco-fee calculated for a 
box of a product was added to the price of every individual unit in the box. Experts who 
were involved in operationalization of the consolidated program contend that with the 
government’s short notice for implementing the consolidated plan, these problems were 
inevitable. Further, the market was not conditioned for such a dramatic decision in a short 
period and communication was poor, both before implementation and after the crisis. 
The perception of the eco-fees as a new form of tax was another complication. 
Supporting this perception was the coincidence of the consolidated phase’s 
implementation with an important change in the provincial tax system. Based on the 
Ministry’s decision, the consolidated program commenced on exactly the same date that 
the harmonized sales tax was implemented in Ontario. This new tax system was in the 
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Liberal government’s agenda for a few years, and consumers who had a negative 
perception of the new tax system perceived the eco-fees as yet another type of tax 
imposed on Ontarians—a tax on a tax. 
This crisis also gave rise to conspiracy theory. Some involved experts still blame a 
specific retailer for encouraging its angry consumers to reach out to the media. Because 
charging recycling fees involved significant changes in firms’ operations, some 
companies were willing to kill the program by fuelling the flame. But some other 
individuals involved in the operationalization of the programs refute these rumors by 
recalling the Ministry’s short notice and how it confused retailers. As such, the 
operational errors were inevitable, and it was a natural reaction of uninformed employees 
of these retailers to advise consumers to blame those who made the main decision. 
On July 21, 2010, after three weeks of furious debates and fights, the Minister revoked 
the consolidated program by filing a regulation that suspended the payment of fees on the 
products under Phases 2 and 3 of the MHSW program. Soon after, the existing Minister, 
John Gerretsen, was fired and John Wilkinson took the office. The new Minister, who has 
now held that office since August 18, 2010, asked WDO’s board of directors to develop a 
revised program to include only Phase 1 materials. In developing this document, which 
was approved by the Minister, Stewardship Ontario updated the definitions of Orange 
Drop materials, with the new definitions taking effect on October 1, 2012. Despite the 
cancellation of Phases 2 and 3, collection of the newly designated materials in 
municipalities was neither new nor stoppable. Stewardship Ontario continued to operate 
the Orange Drop Program in its entirety until September 30, 2012. To manage the 
municipalities’ dissatisfaction, the Ministry allotted a limited budget to cover some costs 
of six of the 22 material groups for a limited time. 
The 2010 crisis influenced subsequent waste management policies and practices for at 
least another few years. The public remained sensitive to the costs of waste management 
and media frequently covered the operations and costs of Stewardship Ontario. This 
contention was a gift to opposition parties seeking to attack the Liberal government, 
which made that government and its relevant bodies increasingly cautious, as is reflected 
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in the publicly available documents; for example, board meeting minutes of WDO lack 
any detailed information after the crisis years. Another aspect of this caution is reflected 
in the increasing disfavour of the government with respect to visible eco-fees. Arguing 
that visible fees were a reason for the 2010 troubles, government representatives 
gradually put more pressure on business to bury the eco-fees in the final product price. 
Visibility of these fees did not violate any regulations and is common in most other 
Canadian jurisdictions, and even in some industries in Ontario, such as electronics and 
tires. However, in the years to come, stewards in industries such as paint were strongly 
discouraged from making an extra cost for waste management visible. 
The 2010 problems were not limited to public disapproval. They also flamed the fire 
under the ashes of operating stewardship programs, and stewards started raising their own 
concerns about the rules and implementation afresh. One concern was program 
performance targets. The government had raised the idea of aspirational targets and asked 
the IFO to include such targets in its programs. In MHSW Program Plan 2009, for the 
paint and coatings class, the collection target for the first year of the program was 37 per 
cent. Targets for years 2–5 were 47, 57, 67, and 77 per cent, respectively. Other 
performance goals were equally challenging. Moreover, an increasing portion of the 
collected residual paint was expected to be recycled, which involved operational 
challenges. Paint stewards were also expected to establish an increasing number of 
return-to-retail depots in their own stores to make drop-off locations more accessible for 
consumers. Yet, establishing these depots was costly for participating stores and not 
many large companies were interested in volunteering to meet this goal. 
As the collected volumes were ramping up, processing the collected materials was 
another challenge for stewardship programs. For paint and coatings, the only active 
recycler in Ontario was still Hotz, acquired by Envirosystems, Inc. in 2010, and the few 
other existing recyclers in North America did not have a growing market to accept 
Ontario’s collected residual paint. In fact, the market price of the recycled paint did not 
create enough margin for the recyclers to pay for collection; this made the recycling 
operations costly for the IFO and, consequently, stewards. In many cases, they would not 
only pay the costs of collection and transport, but also pay the recycler to take care of the 
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collected materials. With increasing volume, another active company in waste services, 
Photech Environmental, entered the paint recycling business in Southern Ontario and 
broke Hotz’s monopoly. This helped the IFO dramatically in solving the problem of 
accumulated collected paint and complying with the program targets, highlighting 
Photech’s services in separate sections of its annual reports for 2010 and 2012. For 
stewards, despite the importance of compliance, increased collection still meant paying 
more for operations. Both of the paint recyclers continued their operations in the coming 
years. In May 2012, Photech sent its recycled paint to the consumer paint market under 
the Loop Paint brand, whereas Hotz continued its bulk export marketing strategy—a 
weaker alternative in margins but perhaps more convenient. 
Comparing the eco-fees across provinces, stewards raised additional concerns about the 
costs of the program in Ontario. Higher costs resulted in higher-than-average eco-fees in 
the province, which could not only disrupt the market and influence the demand, but 
could also disharmonize the markets across provinces. Whereas in most other provinces, 
municipalities were not charging the programs for their collection services, they were a 
main source of cost in Ontario. Further, stewards and IFOs continuously expressed their 
dissatisfaction about the efficiency of the municipalities and various service providers, 
such as hauling companies and processors. Stewards criticized some municipalities for 
discharging their public responsibilities and utilizing their political clout to influence the 
provincial government’s decision, hiring unnecessary people in collection sites, and 
gaining popularity by leveraging funds imposed on businesses. As one steward 
(interviewee B11) noted, 
We don't have control over [municipalities’] operating hours or how 
much we pay them […]it seems like they've built a Cadillac for return 
depots when they only need a Volkswagen. If you think of the process of 
returning paint, you're coming in, you're taking the can of paint, and 
you're putting it in a box, simple as that. That's what I'm paying 
somebody to do. I understand people have to make a living. I'm not 
saying they don't. All I'm saying is that I think they're being 
unreasonable in terms of what they're requesting as compensation. 
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On the other side, some municipalities condemned stewards for attempting to evade the 
costs of their legal responsibilities and hinder the established recycling programs by 
finding exemptions and leaving the operational costs on municipalities. This sentiment 
was reflected in an uncomfortable conversation with a local government representative 
after I asked a challenging question about the methods of assessing the net environmental 
advantage of a specific recycling program. The question raised the fact that many 
consumers drive personal cars to return small volumes of a regulated material with 
minimal hazard for the environment, and inquired how the net environmental impacts of 
the programs are assessed. The expert (interviewee M1), angry with remembering how 
some stewardship programs were exempted from the regulation in 2010 and left the costs 
to municipalities, also cast concerns about the intentions behind this question: 
[M]any, many product manufacturers are going that way [to prove that 
their products are environmentally safe, leaving the expenses on 
municipalities]. And I don't know who's funding your study, but if it's [a 
company name] who's trying to get out of funding things by finding 
alternative ways for municipalities to give up on these things, those are 
types of things where the municipality will have—and the general 
public will have—some issues. 
The same type of conflict was noticeable among stewards and other service providers, 
such as collectors of waste and processors and recyclers. WDO and the Ministry were the 
go-to authorities of various stakeholders with different levels of power. Whereas WDO 
was still a silent intermediary organization, the Ministry had its own problems and 
concerns. A steward, interviewee B11, described the political dynamics as follows: 
Steward: There was a lot of politics involved, people moving […]. One time 
the Ministry would agree with us and then they would agree with 
Stewardship Ontario and then they would change their mind 
because there was a political faction that was involved.  
Researcher: Could you give an example? 
Steward: The trucking companies, for example, this is a lot of money for 
them. [The IFO] would sit down with them and try to negotiate 
with them and they would run to the Ministry and say, 
“Stewardship Ontario is not being fair with us.” The 
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municipalities—one of the things that really opened my eyes was 
power, because obviously we would engage the municipalities to 
pick up the waste and then we would pay them and you had some 
municipalities that did it in a fairly efficient manner and then 
there were other municipalities that, because they thought it was 
just cost plus, so whatever the cost are, you will pay plus and [the 
IFO] would bring this to their attention and say, “Look, this 
municipality is costing us x, you are costing us x times 5.” […] 
and they'd say, “Well, that is none of your business. Your job is 
you pay us what we tell you.” And the municipalities would 
obviously run to the Minister in Ontario and say again, 
“Stewardship Ontario is not being fair to us; we are a smaller 
municipality, we can't compete with those other municipalities.” 
And so [the IFO] would say, “Okay, well then let that 
municipality handle your work.” [This was the relationship] 
between the municipalities, the trucking companies, WDO, the 
Ministry… 
Researcher:  So why do you see this as political? 
Steward: It comes down to simple political clout. The [municipalities] had 
a tremendous amount of clout. They would go to the local MPP 
and they would say, “Hey, look what is happening, we are not 
going to let these [stewards] push us around, we will remember 
this when the next election [comes.]” So, the Ministry of the 
Environment was getting calls from MPPs across Ontario saying 
here is what is happening. 
Stewards also argued that service providers—viewed by them as actors with no special 
role in waste management and environmental protection—were making fortunes with the 
stewards’ money without stewards being able to negotiate. An anecdote from the same 
steward demonstrates such dynamics: 
One of our more animated [colleagues] went to a meeting and the guys 
running the trucking company showed up [in] Lamborghinis and 
Ferraris, and [our colleague] said, “Really? You guys are driving 
around in Ferraris and Lamborghinis and you are worried about 
[lowering costs]?!” So [the colleague] made sure that the Ministry 
found out that these guys were driving these types of cars to meetings 
where, apparently, they were saying “You are not giving us enough 
money.” 
62 
 
With such tumultuous interactions with other stakeholders, many firms viewed Ontario as 
the most complicated province in terms of waste management. A manager from a 
manufacturing company (interviewee B13) described: 
[In other provinces] there didn’t seem to be all of these special interest 
groups […]. I don’t remember having these issues in British Columbia, 
Quebec, or Alberta. It did seem sometimes when we had meetings [in 
Ontario] that the world was trying to beat up on us, because everybody 
wanted their pound of flesh. 
In the volatile circumstances after 2010, the last thing the Ministry wanted was noise 
from the operation side and local governments. Still, stewardship collectives would 
pursue cost efficiency whenever possible. For instance, in 2011, Stewardship Ontario 
managed to start changing the imbursement model of waste processors to an incentive-
based one, which significantly lowered the income of processors and recyclers. However, 
with such conflicts, the context was devoid of trust among different actors, leaving no 
opportunities for cooperation. In a series of correspondence with an industry leader 
(interviewee B9), when I asked him whether they have ever invited NGOs to their 
collective’s meetings to create mutual understanding, after a 15-day delay the leader 
replied: 
Involving NGOs to advocate for transparency has been so disruptive to 
my normal paradigm that I have had to think long about this […]. My 
point is that there is a wide division and [an NGO’s name] are usually 
positioned against manufacturers. There is a lot of baggage and I am 
not sure that manufacturers would trust them or be willing to engage, 
just like [the NGO name] do not trust manufacturers. 
Interestingly, WDO was historically a fairly silent actor, both before the 2010 issues and 
throughout this ongoing dissonance. Interviewee G9, an expert then involved in 
operations, remembers this low-profile role: 
I didn't really even understand WDO existed. WDO, historically, was 
very small in staff… four, five people. […] WDO didn't have a day-to-
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day role with Stewardship Ontario the way it does now. When all of 
that was going on in 2010, even if you look through the news clippings, 
WDO was never even quoted. It's actually quite interesting to look 
through it and think, "Why wouldn't the media be contacting the 
organization that's supposed to be overseeing all of this when 
something went as wrong, as it did." So WDO's role back then was very 
minimal and hands-off. More behind the scenes than front-facing. 
WDO’s role was more of an intermediary organization between the government and the 
IFOs, facilitating information transfer and mediation when conflicts arose among the 
stakeholders. Its initial structure, defined by the 2002 Act, included board members from 
not only provincial government, but various stakeholder groups with competing interests, 
including different stewards, municipalities, and service providers. On February 9, 2012, 
the Ministry changed the regulation to designate a “disinterested” board structure for 
WDO, with members assigned directly or indirectly by the Minister. It was the beginning 
of a shift in the role of this monitoring body and other elements of the system. 
The transition to stage 3 happened gradually. Although it was sparked by the 2010 
troubles, I consider a major action by business as the threshold of hybridization: the 
transfer of the paint stewardship program from the government-designated IFO to the 
industry’s IFO, which was the harbinger of further changes in the system. 
4.3 Stage 3: Hybridization (May 2014–Present) 
The Waste Diversion Act, 2002, had formally considered the right for business to 
establish its own industry stewardship programs after the programs were initially 
launched—that is, after the first launch of the program, individual and groups of firms 
had the option to establish their own IFOs, distinct from the government-designated IFO. 
However, the requirements for taking on the programs by alternatives rather than 
Stewardship Ontario were so strict that industry’s initial attempts in this direction failed.  
Paint was always a main MHSW material class. In 2014, Stewardship Ontario collected 
9,422 tonnes of paint and coatings materials, equal to one-third of all collected materials. 
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Eighty-two per cent of the collected paint was recycled. Budget-wise, Stewardship 
Ontario’s highest revenue collected from the member companies came from paint. The 
paint and coatings industry had long planned to establish its independent industry 
stewardship program. The industry’s choice was Product Care Association—an IFO 
involved in waste paint management programs in other provinces since the 1990s. Due to 
its experience, Product Care Association was even involved in the initial design of the 
MHSW program in Ontario, but the designation of Stewardship Ontario had kept it 
almost entirely separate from the program in the following years. 
Nonetheless, over time, both government and industry learned that the imposed structure 
curbed the achievement of the program goals, and this learning facilitated the process. As 
one government expert (interviewee G6) described: 
The province probably could’ve done a better job in helping and 
educating stewards on the opportunities that they could avail 
themselves of. A few years later [the Ministry and WDO] realized that 
no one’s coming forward with an industry stewardship program. 
Everyone was just joining the [existing, government imposed] IFO […] 
so, to their credit, they put together a guidebook to develop industry 
stewardship programs. 
Business also views the change as a result of stewards’ continual efforts. Interviewee B17 
who had worked with different sides referred to the active role of business in this change: 
Paint industry chaps jumped through the hoops to get their program 
under control, rather than just paying the eco-fees to Stewardship 
Ontario. The Ministry and Waste Diversion Ontario were reluctant at 
first, but over time they figured that this overloaded truck is stuck in 
mud and business may provide traction to get it out. 
On behalf of the paint and coatings industry, Product Care Association started 
negotiations with WDO and prepared an industry stewardship program which was finally 
submitted to WDO on May 23, 2014. In December, WDO announced that it had 
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approved the industry stewardship program and the effective date of Product Care 
Association’s stewardship program would be June 30, 2015. 
Substituting an industry-shaped program for the government-imposed IFO was deemed a 
step forward for the industry. The industry’s collective, the former IFO, and WDO agreed 
on a process to transfer stewards who were current with financial and reporting 
obligations to Product Care Association. At the effective date of the June 30, 2015, 98 per 
cent of paint stewards, by market share, had already transferred to Product Care 
Association. The new collective seemed to have more agency to develop its industry-
specific strategies and make the programs more efficient while meeting the targets. It 
should be noted that, theoretically, the firms in this industry had the right to establish 
different individual or collective stewardship programs (conditional on WDO’s prior 
approval), but no other program yet exist. Therefore, in the short term, the introduction of 
the new stewardship program meant that, for practical purposes, firms would transition 
from one monopoly to another, as there was no other choice; however, in a year or so, 
they could act differently. Overall, the transition from Stewardship Ontario to Product 
Care Association has been described as relatively smooth. Product Care Association 
announced that it would follow the existing procedures for one year. 
Despite its reluctance to accept the MHSW program in its early years, Stewardship 
Ontario was not content with this change, as it had invested in establishing different 
systems to run the program and was now losing a main part of its MHSW program, 
which had placed the burden of the fixed costs of operation on other MHSW stewards. 
Notably, Stewardship Ontario had already realized that establishing the industry-based 
stewardship programs was a growing trend—one that would impact its business 
significantly. To this end, in 2013, the IFO established a not-for-profit organization, 
Canadian Stewardship Services Alliance Inc., which focused on running such programs 
(especially for the Blue Box materials) to create harmony across Canadian provinces with 
heterogeneous systems. 
As such, following the dynamics in the paint and coatings stewardship program, other 
industries also tried to establish their own stewardship programs, especially when they 
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heard that bigger changes were on the way which would impact this transition. As a 
consultant (interviewee S7) described: 
Industry’s now saying, “Oh, I saw the writing on the wall, let's get out 
while we can, have some more flexibility.” What's happened there is 
they've just been able to not get encumbered and stuck in Stewardship 
Ontario […] because the government isn't allowing new [industry 
stewardship programs] now for these materials. That was why they 
said, “We gotta get out of here now!” 
As a side note, experts believe that government’s acquiescence to change after such a 
prescriptive regulation was the gradual outcome of various factors. First, the 
irreconcilable stakeholder conflicts, especially with respect to inefficiency of the 
programs, proved the regulation inefficient. Among different powerful stakeholders with 
conflicting interests, business seemed to be the best actor to create efficient programs to 
manage the used products that they had manufactured themselves. 
Second and more importantly, despite the environmental protection rationale behind the 
regulation, it was mainly designed to secure the business funding for municipalities to 
continue the status quo in waste management. Indeed, for most of the materials, paint 
included, no significant improvement was observed after nearly three decades of waste 
management practices. Many of these materials were not recycled but instead incinerated 
or disposed of safely. Such solutions are often less desirable and contested by 
environmental activists (Baxter, Ho, Rollins, & Maclaren, 2016) This latter approach was 
far from the emerging discourse of resource management, such as the cradle-to-cradle 
concept and, more recently, the concept of the circular economy. The circular economy 
focuses on enablers such as eco-design, innovation, business model change, reuse, and 
recycling, with the idea that these approaches will mainly be pursued by business 
(Beaulieu, van Durme, & Arpin, 2015; European Environment Agency, 2016). Yet, the 
regulation offered no incentive for such proactive actions by business, as firms could 
comply with the requirements by paying their shares to the IFO. With such shortcomings 
in the regulation and the solidified needs of society to not only prevent pollution but also 
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preserve resources, the circular economy gradually became a catalyst for change. 
Adopting this new approach in policies could also ensure Ontario’s leadership in resource 
recovery programs. 
To improve the situation, the Ontario government first proposed the Waste Reduction Act, 
2013, known as Bill 91. The submitted Bill aimed to make dramatic changes in the waste 
management system, such as focusing on individual producer responsibility, 
relinquishing new high-level enforcement roles to WDO as the government’s monitoring 
hand, and banning visible eco-fees. Such changes created strong backlash from the 
industries and the Bill was finally killed. 
In the next course of attempts, the government directly adopted the concept of the 
circular economy. To effect this transition, in November 2015, the Minister posted a 
proposed waste reduction legislation for public comment. Entitled the Waste-Free 
Ontario Act, Bill 151 proposed to enact the Resource Recovery and Circular Economy 
Act and the Waste Diversion Transition Act. These statutes were intended to replace the 
Waste Diversion Act, 2002. In addition, the Ministry released a Draft Strategy document 
which illustrated how the new legislation might be applied to create a circular economy 
in the province. 
On November 30, 2016, the Waste-Free Ontario Act, 2016 was proclaimed. The new Act 
aimed to dramatically overhaul the province’s recycling regime and transition to a more 
robust producer responsibility that left more flexibility for stewards. The Act empowered 
the Minister to direct the relevant IFO to implement a windup plan. The legislators 
argued that replacing IFOs with business-oriented programs would resolve the concerns 
regarding the IFOs’ monopoly. More importantly, the Act allowed firms to adopt various 
individual- or collective-level programs, theoretically incentivizing firms to remove their 
waste or develop innovative solutions to manage post-consumer materials more 
efficiently and effectively. This regulation was expected to be a game changer, as it could 
provide financial incentives (e.g., fewer costs or even a profit) for improvement. Further, 
having multiple collective and individual programs could spur the competition and 
innovation needed for the transition to a circular economy. On March 1, 2017, the 
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Minister released the final revision of the Strategy for a Waste-Free Ontario: Building 
the Circular Economy. 
As noted, the paint and coatings industry had already taken the initiative and established 
its industry stewardship program, run by Product Care Association. Along with the 
government’s proclaimed support for more flexibility to encourage business to move 
towards a circular economy, Product Care Association attempted to improve its financial 
efficiency by managing program operations, for example, by establishing more return-to-
retail depots at the industry members’ sites (which were often free input channels 
compared to the municipal facilities). Moreover, Product Care Association started 
conversations with some of the more costly municipalities about lowering their 
operational fees. Municipalities, in turn, gradually realized the shift in their position. As 
industry stewardship programs and producer responsibility organizations took on the role 
of the government-imposed IFO, municipalities generally considered three possibilities 
going forward: (1) working with industry-based programs as service providers, (2) 
cooperating with another service provider by letting them use their existing facilities for 
collection and management of waste, or (3) shutting down their facilities completely. 
Given the limited market for recycled paint, the industry stewardship program also 
considered alternative applications for collected paint, including both usable and 
unrecyclable materials, such as dried paint. Easy solutions for unrecyclable paint, similar 
to many other MHSW materials, include incineration to generate energy or desiccation 
and then disposal in special landfills. As a third option, for many years, a cement block 
manufacturer accepted these materials to add to its products, as scientific evidence 
suggests that this could enhance some of the characteristics of cement. But upon the 
introduction of the industry-based program, more innovative solutions received greater 
attention from the stewards. Using leftover paint to manufacture driveway sealants is a 
fourth alternative. Such solutions can solve the problem of unrecyclable materials, reduce 
the recycling costs imposed on stewards, and lower the dependence of the industry on 
recyclers. However, the major vehicle for such innovative solutions is recyclers 
themselves, which gave recyclers a dual role. 
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Although the actors agreed that groundbreaking innovation should be sought in the long 
term, with increased autonomy, the paint industry not only adopted strategies to enhance 
efficiency but also demonstrated many instances of proactivity. As one industry leader 
(interviewee B9) explained, 
10 years ago, industry members didn’t even know each other. 
Stewardship drove the agenda, and now, we can collaborate [within 
the industry]. We've developed a really good logistics and distribution 
network for collecting post-consumer paint. We haven’t developed 
expertise in what we do with that [residual] paint. Well, what we're 
doing is okay, right, but I’d sure like to see that go to another level. 
[For me, that’s] the big opportunity. So, [now we are] using up 
[residual] paint as paint, but what’s even more clever that we can do 
with it? Is it a more deliberate use in cement processes and bonding 
processes? That’s what I would like to see. It’s going to take some 
R&D expertise. 
The large manufacturers’ support for innovation in recycling was unprecedented. 
Whereas paint recyclers were initially deemed outsiders who would consume the free 
waste from virgin manufacturers’ products to produce paint and compete with them, the 
industry gradually became more receptive to this sector, to the degree that even a leading 
recycling company’s top manager joined the industry association’s board of directors. 
Finding new applications for the collected materials was beneficial to everyone in the 
industry, as it would secure compliance, lower the stewardship costs for the members, 
and potentially resolve the concerns of virgin paint manufacturers about competing with 
recycled products.  
The increased involvement of stewards in the program was also reflected in operational 
aspects. For instance, Product Care Association gradually recruited members to establish 
more return depots in their stores. Despite the costs for the participating stores, this was a 
cheaper input channel than municipal depots, which reduced the total costs for the 
collective as well as increasing consumer access and collection volume. Another instance 
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of proactive effort by business was the voluntary collection of a new material group, 
bulbs and lights. This product group was part of the consolidated program that was 
deregulated in 2010. In 2014, Product Care Association offered to voluntarily run a new 
program for this material group, with the condition that the government regulate these 
products after one year to ensure a level playing field. Admittedly, this proactive 
initiative was discontinued because the government did not regulate this material group. 
The regulators have acknowledged that transitioning to a circular economy is a long-term 
plan, beginning with many consultations and step-by-step pilot actions for the first few 
years. As a primary part of this transition—and under the new Act, proclaimed 
simultaneously with the Waste-Free Ontario Act—WDO was replaced with a new 
organization. The new body, the Resource Productivity and Recovery Authority (referred 
to hereafter as “the Authority”), not only acquired responsibility for overseeing the 
programs, but is now responsible for compliance and enforcement as well. As an 
introductory action, the Authority started developing a comprehensive registry to collect 
data from various sources, including individual stewards—a task previously undertaken 
by the IFOs on a limited scale. These data would be used for a number of reasons (e.g., 
setting performance targets and penalizing stewards who cannot meet them). To meet its 
new mandate, the Authority also started to acquire and develop compliance and 
enforcement capabilities. 
Gradually, both collectives and individual firms showed interest in establishing their own 
waste management and circular economy programs in accordance with the government’s 
base regulation. At an individual level, in April 2016, one company (SodaStream) 
managed to get program approval for its refillable pressurized cylinders. Other collectives 
and individual firms also followed this pattern, and government cautiously scheduled the 
transition under the new Act. For instance, several firms proposed their plans to establish 
new programs to manage used tires by the end of 2018. The resultant market dynamics 
were deemed a driver of competition and, consequently, innovation. Ultimately, on April 
12, 2018, the Minister issued a direction to the imposed IFO (Stewardship Ontario) to 
fully wind up the MHSW program by the end of 2020, marking the complete transition to 
individual producer responsibility for all materials collected under the program.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Tensions and Underlying Mechanisms 
In this chapter, I first recap the data from Chapter 4 and summarize how three different 
regulatory regimes were shaped. Doing so will provide a bigger picture of the shaping 
process and also allow me to theorize, in next chapter, on the proposed model of hybrid 
regulation and how it differs from other two alternatives. To this end, in this chapter, I 
draw on the data and explain the unearthed tensions and dualities, as inherent components 
of the studied hybrid model of regulation, and what underlies them. 
5.1 From Regulation to Co-Regulation 
The case of MHSW management demonstrates how, through the identified stages, ISR 
and government regulation were tested and proved ineffective, and how a hybrid form of 
regulation evolved with different features compared to those of conventional regimes. In 
the beginning, the emerging expectations called for industry’s cooperation with other 
actors in post-consumer waste management, but despite government persuasion, business 
avoided taking on the costly responsibilities that were historically positioned at the 
societal level.  
Consistent with the literature, I find that two decades of avoidance and push and pull 
(Chang et al., 1998) ultimately activated government regulatory institutions. Nonetheless, 
a main challenge was the fact that waste management has long been constructed as a 
collective issue. The government’s solution to translate this collective mandate to 
individual firm practices was to impose a collective-level program to be run by a 
designated collective (IFO), along with an oversight authority (WDO), all funded by the 
regulated firms based on the costs of managing the waste their products create. This 
structure was deemed an innovative policy solution for the waste problem, but in 
practice, it proved far from efficient or progressive. Despite its advantages, the strictly 
regulated program not only did not result in new solutions for resource management, but 
also brought forth unexpected confrontation among the involved actors, especially 
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industries and municipalities, and ultimately transformed into a hybrid model of 
regulation. 
Although the goal of this research is not to explore the transition process and causes, it is 
important to mention the factors that facilitated the evolution of the hybrid model. Based 
on the data presented in Chapter 4, four drivers were pivotal in transitioning from the 
collective-level regulation to the hybrid model. First, the regulation had hindered 
industry’s ability to utilize its capabilities to enhance efficiency, and government tended 
to view business merely the provider of funds for waste management; this resulted in 
growing resistance and dissatisfaction among stewards. Moreover, past literature has 
noted that when industry faces shared “enemies,” it gradually develops stronger in-group 
identity and shows more forceful reactions against the out-group (Pozner & Rao, 2006). 
As a result, various industries were challenging the prescriptive regulation 
simultaneously. 
Second, the regulation fuelled the conflict of stakeholder interests and did not suggest a 
solution for such problems, creating ongoing confrontation rather than synergy. Whereas 
the source of funding was business, industries had minimal authority to run their 
programs at their discretion, as the Ontario Regulation 101, Recycling and Composting of 
Municipal Waste, 1994, had transferred that authority to municipalities (i.e., an array of 
444 local entities with heterogenous needs and goals). The regulation had not predicted 
how these different interests among actors could be productively resolved, which 
changed the role of WDO from a monitoring authority to a mediator to control 
contentions. The conflictual years after 2010 made it clear that the existing regulatory 
regime could not proceed further. 
Third, the strong backlash from citizens and media in the midst of the process weakened 
the provincial government with respect to post-consumer policies, making the 
government cautious and increasing media and consumer concerns about the programs. 
Whereas in the past the government had focused on controlling the flames among the 
stakeholders, it was now more open to revising the coerced regime, which made the 
transition possible. 
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Finally, the outcome of the regulation was far from the significant environmental 
improvement that it had aimed to achieve. Instead, the focus of the waste management 
programs was mainly on maintaining the status quo by securing business’s financial 
contribution, rather than reducing the environmental impact by exploring innovative 
solutions and disruptive outcomes.  
The turbulent period after the government regulation, fraught with conflicts among the 
actors, finally facilitated the transition from the government-regulated collective-level 
program into a regime that was co-regulated by both government and business and 
operated by business. The government’s role in this model was to set the vision, broad 
goals, and high-level rules (such as Waste Diversion Transition Act, 2017), as well as to 
provide guidelines and general strategies. The role of businesses in rule setting was to 
translate the higher-level rules and goals into policies for practice based on their own 
discretion. For instance, firms can now choose to establish individual-level stewardship 
programs to manage their own waste, cooperate with other firms to establish a collective 
program jointly, or simply join an existing collective-level program. However, all such 
stewardship programs must still be approved by the Authority and Ministry in advance. 
Upon implementation, both sides will also be involved in enforcement. That is, in 
addition to internal controls by business, external audits are also in place to ensure 
compliance, and the Authority monitors actual program performance to ensure that 
business meets the approved targets. Business’s agency in co-regulation, for example, is 
reflected in the granted power at the operational level to negotiate with municipalities. 
Although collection of hazardous waste is still mostly done by municipalities, the 
industry’s collective had the option to establish other collection channels, such as store 
depots, and choose the service providers. Still, the Authority monitors that process to 
ensure that the established municipal facilities are not neglected. Overall, this system has 
created a new model of co-regulation which is neither government regulation nor self-
regulation, but both intertwined. I further explain the structure of this model in Chapter 6. 
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5.2 Tensions in Hybridization 
As the case narrative depicts, conflicts of interest among different actors (often with 
respect to the costs and efficiency of the program) were a defining characteristic 
throughout the studied process. However, delving deeper into the data allowed me to 
understand that the complexity of the context went beyond mere conflict among the 
stakeholders. To understand the dynamics that characterize this hybrid model of 
regulation, as explained in Chapter 3, I used grounded theorizing and temporal bracketing 
to unearth the precise features that characterize the model. The result demonstrated that 
the co-regulated regime is characterized by four tensions, embodied in dualities, each 
shaped by different mechanisms. 
Interestingly, these tensions and their underlying mechanisms were temporally bound to 
the hybrid regulation—that is, the tensions emerged parallel with transitioning of the 
mandated program into the hybrid collective action. Tracking the elements of the tensions 
in the data demonstrated that prior to the formation of the hybrid model, the government-
regulated system was characterized by just one pole of each duality. This regulatory 
regime was associated with the concepts of compliance, decoupling, control over means, 
and harmonization (all of which are discussed in next sections). As the hybrid form 
evolved, the opposite poles of these four concepts—proactivity, integration, control over 
ends, and distinctiveness, respectively—also emerged and gained salience. The 
juxtaposition of these new concepts with the four existing concepts form four dualities 
that generate ongoing tensions as the characteristics of the identified hybrid regulation. 
The coding hierarchy was presented in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2) and below, I provide the 
data and explanation of each of the four tensions in the hybrid model.  
5.3 Compliance versus Proactivity 
Whereas government regulation often tends to seek and foster compliance, the circular 
economy relies heavily on innovative business models, technology development, 
disruptive changes, and products that can close the material cycles. In addition, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, proactivity in collective actions and ISR is an open question with 
conflicting evidence. Hence, it was not surprising that the developed hybrid model was 
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characterized by an ongoing tension between compliance and the expected proactivity. 
This tension was sustained by different mechanisms, explained below. 
5.3.1 Boundaries of Formal Regulation 
In general, Canada is viewed as a proactive country in regulating for environmental 
protection, especially compared to its main trade partner, the United States. For instance, 
under the third phase of Canada Chemical Management Plan, 1,550 substances are being 
reviewed over five years, and those identified as toxic will be banned. Unsurprisingly, 
business may find this proactivity a constraint, as one industry leader (interviewee B1) 
described: 
Canada has its fair share—some would say unfair share—[of 
environmental regulation]; one of our colleagues [from] a large 
multinational manufacturer says, “Dealing with regulations in Canada 
is kind of like drinking water through a firehose!” And I know because 
we got wet every day. This ultimately impacts business operations. 
From this perspective, extending the scope of regulation not only has economic impacts, 
such as on the flow of business from Canada to the United States, but also hinders 
proactivity and innovation as the expanding scope of regulation calls for more business 
actions to guarantee compliance. Proactivity is often costly, at least in the short term; 
therefore, the more convenient alternative of compliance, which is an ongoing 
requirement due to government regulation, may frequently dominate the relationship. 
Although the data do not refute this argument, they do suggest that expanding regulation 
can in fact have an opposite impact and result in proactive actions by business. 
Interviewee B21, a representative of an IFO, explained how the IFO’s prior compliance-
driven actions were gradually accompanied by proactive actions to influence the next 
phase of government requirements: 
We have to represent our members. Eye-opener! We are not an 
environmentalist not-for-profit for recycling. We are a bridge between 
industry and regulation. Unromantic idea but quite accurate: “We are 
a compliance vehicle for industry.” This is the bottom line. […] So, we 
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constantly maintain compliance, but now we sometimes try to do more, 
like, we sit together and think how we can do more “reuse.” Reuse is 
definitely better than recycle for the environment and it may reduce our 
costs, but it needs a new system. We work on such projects without 
being obliged to. 
The same expert also described how that IFO occasionally expands the geographical 
boundaries of its waste management practices to sparsely populated regions not covered 
by the existing regulation. This costly expansion is often questioned by cost-conscious 
members of the collective. However, it is one of the means that business can utilize to 
influence the scope of government-imposed regulatory requirements. 
5.3.2 Stringency of Regulation 
Like the impact of broadening the government’s requirements, the impact of imposing 
stricter requirements, businesses argue, forces firms to focus their attention on 
compliance. A steward’s representative (interviewee B15) argued that, 
Some provincial governments just compete in raising the bar. Ontario 
likes to be the leader. [Ontario’s regulators] don’t consider whether it 
would work or not; they just want to impose stronger regulations. We 
are always behind on the regulation. We can’t keep up with them. It 
always takes time and resources and effort to implement the new 
legislation and before we are done, they are raising their expectations. 
This doesn’t leave us time to think about innovation, to figure out how 
we can do things better. 
Similarly, interviewee S7, an expert who had worked with various stakeholders, provided 
an example of how over-regulating can be counterproductive by shifting the 
responsibility within the firms: 
We worked with one company and there was a battle within that 
company. It's a well-known brand, and the environmental health and 
safety people who were so focused on making sure that they're clean 
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got us involved [in that project] because they just said, “This [stricter 
regulation] is beyond our capabilities.” Well, [the responsibility] got 
transferred over to finance and, well, they could care less about the 
environment—you know what I mean. […] [The finance people] 
weren't really paying as much attention and it drove the health and 
safety people nuts, but that's how companies take whatever it is and 
internalize it. 
In contrast, government argues that with the authority firms have gained in the 
transformed system, they can take the lead and shape innovative measures, reduce costs, 
and compete towards better solutions. This idea is central to the government’s published 
strategies towards a circular economy. 
Although stringent regulation can foster compliance and hinder proactivity, the data show 
that conversely, it can also trigger proactivity. One example of such proactivity in 
response to strict regulation was the voluntary program, launched by Product Care 
Association in 2015, to manage bulbs and lighting products. Indeed, industry aimed to set 
the foundations of the program through this voluntary action and expected the 
government to regulate this material group after one year. Regulation could set a level 
playing field, secure consistent funding by stewards, and prevent free riding. 
Surprisingly, because the government did not respond to this industry expectation, 
business ultimately stopped the voluntary program.  
The dynamics over stringency of requirements were also reflected in the ongoing 
interaction between business and government in setting the targets. As interviewee S6, an 
expert who had worked with several different stakeholders, described, 
[T]here’s always a tension between what’s being achieved today, and 
the government talks about aspirational targets. That’s part of the 
ambiguity that was created by the legislation. A tacit recognition was 
that industry says, “We’ll do the best we can, but we’ll only go as far 
as what makes sense from a business perspective.” […] Then two years 
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later [stewards] are under pressure for not achieving their aspirational 
targets. 
5.3.3 Program Scale 
The scale of the waste managed by the stewards has always been a source of contention. 
As the program plans must be approved by the Authority, the collection and recycling 
amounts were determined in advance, after negotiations between the Authority and 
business. Historically, the actors had agreed on aspirational targets, expecting businesses 
to aspire to meet them, while no clear penalties were in place in case of not meeting 
them. From the business perspective, controlling the volume is necessary in order to keep 
the program costs manageable. It is therefore unreasonable to expect businesses to set 
ambitious targets that disrupt their cash flows and competitiveness. In practice, 
businesses adjust the scale for continual operation by mechanisms such as promotional 
and communication activities. The following dialogue with two stewardship experts 
(interviewees B1 and B8) illustrates this point: 
Interviewee B1: If they double the amount [of waste] coming back, that’s a cost 
for those producers […]. In the United States, they have these 
challenges because they are communicating very strongly in 
certain states and they are getting a lot back and they say, “Oh 
my god, the cost is so high and we have deficits.” So, there is a 
calibrating that goes on in mature programs like [those] we have 
in Canada. 
Researcher: How can you manage the input? Is it variable? 
Interviewee B8: Because all those [old hazardous materials] are in basements and 
garages, they’ll start coming back as consumers get more 
opportunities to bring them back to the corner of a store. So, if 
this happens, the amount of the environmental fee will have to go 
from $1.30 a gallon to [more] like $2. But it may go down later. 
So, there is ebb and flow in the cost of recycling. 
In contrast, the government aims to increase the scale of the programs for two reasons. 
First, doing so would better protect the environment. Second, the government views 
increased volume as a means to foster competition towards a circular economy—that is, it 
hopes that collecting more waste will create opportunities for new firms to emerge and 
the resultant market dynamics could spur innovation, create new products, and 
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consequently lower the costs of waste management. Hence, scale can be used as a 
transformer to realize the envisioned future. As an expert in operations of the programs 
(interviewee B17) argued, 
When you have a bit more of a broader view, when it's your 
responsibility to government to pay for the program [and] make sure 
you're meeting high environmental standards, then your lens changes 
to say, “I'm not just meeting the service need for my community; I'm 
now meeting a legal requirement for the entire province, and that 
forces me to think of things differently. Can I get better economies of 
scale? Can I rationalize, can I standardize some of the things that are 
happening in the field?” Standard contracts, that saves money. 
As such, scale can be deemed a potential driver of innovation and increasing the scale can 
transform the equation. However, given the significant marginal costs of expanding waste 
management programs in the short term, a larger program can also be viewed as a barrier 
to regional competitiveness, which can encourage business to keep the scale at the level 
of minimal requirements. 
Another factor that fuels the tension between proactivity and compliance is frequently 
reflected in the rhetoric of actors on the government side. These actors tend to position 
Ontario as the vanguard of stewardship and the circular economy programs, and 
frequently highlight the unique aspects of the program. Scale is a key driver of this 
uniqueness and a larger scale would make it possible to develop more advanced features. 
For instance, the program scale allowed the Authority to develop a database during the 
hybridization process which was frequently raised in many consultation sessions and 
interviews as a unique achievement of the system, such as this excerpt from interviewee 
G9: 
This registry is going to be very comprehensive [with] strong data 
coming from Ontario waste providers and everyone in the province. 
That will allow the Authority to do some very intense analytics, because 
that [is what is] missing from anywhere in the world. Taking what was 
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sold in the market and taking what was actually recycled and matching 
them up, nobody actually really does that […] it's all very piecemeal all 
over the world. 
5.4 Decoupling versus Integration 
An ongoing tension in the co-regulated model is whether business should integrate post-
consumer waste into its core operations, or continue considering it as separate from the 
technical core. Three different mechanisms underlie this tension between decoupling and 
integration. 
5.4.1 Responsibility Positioning 
As a unique jurisdictional characteristic, from the beginning, Ontario regulation 
mandated waste management to be operated by the government-designated IFO. This 
structure could utilize the preexisting solutions for waste management, which were all 
based on aggregated collection of materials, but it practically discharged the stewards 
from their presumed post-consumption responsibility by translating that responsibility 
into a merely financial mandate. An expert in government (interviewee G6) recalled, 
The government and the legislation were not initially clear enough in 
assisting stewards to understand exactly how to develop an [industry 
stewardship plan] or what was involved. It was rather vague, it was 
very non-descriptive, and because this was brand new territory for 
Ontario and for companies, it was easier for them to just say, 
“Stewardship Ontario, here's my cheque, just the cost of doing business 
in Ontario that you handle, you discharge my responsibilities.” 
The very notion of collectivity of the action did not face strong criticism, and many 
stewards still find it a more practical and efficient way to manage waste due to the 
economies of scale. Nonetheless, regulators themselves later questioned the collective 
design of the system. These actors found the mandate for acting collectively not only a 
constraint on progress, but a potential threat due to the possibility of price fixing and 
coalescence of competitors. Over time, these perspectives changed and actors on the 
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government side argued that managing waste should be an individual responsibility of 
every single producer. A “true” extended producer responsibility model, therefore, is one 
that integrates waste management into a firm’s business. The responsibility of a firm is 
not transferrable to a collective that is funded by individual firms. Having said this, the 
regulators now acknowledge that it might not be possible (from a practical standpoint) for 
every individual firm to collect and manage its own post-consumer materials 
individually. 
These dichotomous views were also noticeable among stewards. Some stewards who had 
already established their systems based on collective operations found integration 
problematic and argued that the responsibility could be met by exogenous entities. Yet, 
other stewards sought opportunities to integrate their own post-consumer materials into 
their businesses. Each model seems to have its own advantages, and both compete in 
intra-industry discussions. 
Government has always emphasized the notion of a level playing field. More recent 
arguments focus on the fact that policy should create an atmosphere for encouraging and 
protection of individual actions for better waste management practices; in a level playing 
field, they argue, leader businesses would be able to innovate and lower their costs, 
whereas when responsibility is put on the collective, the collective may discourage any 
movement towards individual progress, which can hamper the transition to a circular 
economy. Nevertheless, having a level playing field does not negate the ability of some 
individual firms to fulfill their responsibilities through a collective. In sum, the question 
of whether or not the waste responsibility can be transferred within a firm’s operational 
boundaries does not appear to have a clear answer. 
5.4.2 Cost Positioning 
The debate over whether waste management is an integral part of the core business or an 
ancillary operational practice is also represented by the controversy over whether the 
costs of managing waste should be visible to consumers as a separate item on their bills 
or not. With no restriction in the early regulation, most of the stewardship programs in 
Ontario decided to operate visible eco-fees at point of sale. However, as noted in Chapter 
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4, the government gradually adopted a strong position against visibility of fees. For 
example, when the paint and coating industry developed its own stewardship program, 
despite its eagerness to demonstrate the fees on the bill to remain consistent with most 
other jurisdictions, it was urged to bury the eco-fees in product prices. Indeed, the 
government perceived avoiding visible fees as a tacit condition for approval of the 
industry’s stewardship plan in 2014. Treating the costs of recycling as a visible add-on at 
the point of sale is desired by many stewards, as it can have advantages such as 
harmonization in their sales system across provinces. Yet, some stewards argue in 
support of invisible fees. 
Visibility of fees became a red line issue during the transition to the hybrid model. 
Especially after the 2010 crisis, government adopted an increasingly negative position 
against visible fees. This stance has been gradually framed as a tenet of the whole idea of 
stewardship. Interviewee G9, an expert from the government side, argues that having 
visible fees is at odds with the philosophy of true extended producer responsibility: 
[T]he cost of an [extended producer responsibility] program is not an 
eco-fee. It is not a visible tax. It is a cost of doing business and should 
be treated as such. It is no different than your CEO salary. […] 
Stewards have difficulty recognizing it as a cost of doing business and 
want to treat it as a tax, so they want to have it as a visible fee. […] 
The more that you insist that a television has a $40 visible eco-fee on it, 
it turns more into a user-pay system, and that's not [extended producer 
responsibility]. 
The government views visible fees at the point of sale as a trigger for consumer 
complaints, arguing that the costs of the programs are all open to the public and 
accessible on the program websites, which obviates the need for mentioning them on 
customers’ bills. A representative from the Authority described that years after the 2010 
crisis, some consumers are still contacting them and expressing their distrust about 
whether the fees mentioned on their bills are really used to protect the environment. 
Visibility of the eco-fees also attracts more media attention, and media continue to 
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frequently investigate this area. An interview participant from the Authority remember 
that the media does not care about the Blue Box IFO’s surpluses, because that program 
does not have eco-fees. Similarly, interviewee G9 described, 
When it's visible, they're perceiving it as a tax. When it's incorporated, 
they're perceiving it as a cost of doing business. It's the perception. 
[…] In Ontario, at least, when people see a visible fee, they get mad, 
very mad.  
As such, the question of who pays for waste management has remained a point of 
controversy, buried in rhetoric and semantics, with each actor arguing from a different 
perspective. In fact, in the data, I noticed that even the same interviewee might argue 
differently at two different points in one meeting. Although it is more than evident that 
costs are officially and publicly communicated and imposed, stewards tend to frequently 
credit themselves as the cost-bearers. For this reason, they argue, they should be the main 
decision makers—even as they argue, in a contradictory direction, that increased costs 
will harm the consumers who pay these costs. Government experts asserted that the costs 
should be somehow internalized and absorbed in business, but in some arguments, the 
consumer (rather than general taxpayers) was also acknowledged as the person who 
should pay the costs. These experts further argued that integrating costs into business 
costs will encourage firms to innovate and find solutions to avoid waste management 
costs; thus, integration of costs can have long-term advantages. 
Overall, although most experts from various stakeholder groups seem to agree that 
managing waste is, in most cases, cost-intensive and this cost will normally be passed to 
the consumers through pricing mechanisms, the controversy over who should pay still 
lingers. An interviewee with experience with different stakeholder groups (interviewee 
S7) articulated this controversy:  
It's semantics but it's a way of getting around the optics of the fee […]. 
Different people have different opinions. It really becomes interesting. I 
personally would prefer to see that [on the bill], but other people react 
differently to that. The government doesn't want industry to turn this 
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back on them and make it a political issue. Eco-fees do that. If you look 
at some of the history of the MHSW [materials] and the tax, that was 
what so much of the venom from the public was. 
5.4.3 Issue Interconnectedness  
The co-regulation provides an opportunity to view the problem from more than one 
viewpoint. In this case, the introduction of the concept of the circular economy also 
provided new areas to revisit the program boundaries. In essence, the circular economy 
views environmental considerations as fundamentally intertwined and systemic, which 
requires simultaneous efforts in a number of areas, such as procurement, design, 
production, consumption, and post-consumption. This inherent interconnection has been 
acknowledged in Ontario’s revised approach to waste management, encouraging the 
stewards to consider various objectives and means in the long-term transition towards a 
circular economy. Yet, the government itself is accused of isolating the waste problem 
from other issues in hand—that is, “decoupling” it to make it more manageable. For 
instance, the data suggest that different recyclers criticize the government for not 
supporting green products and even releasing functional policies that ban or discourage 
the purchase of a recycled product that, according to the recycler, has proven technically 
identical to the comparable virgin product. 
Whether or not to address the waste problem in connection with other issues is another 
ongoing question in business. Whereas some stewards believe that they need to address it 
as something that is interconnected to other practices, others argue that such an approach 
would further confuse the problem of waste with other issues, which will increase the 
issue’s complexity, as one stewardship leader (interviewee B15) expressed: 
These new folks tend to mix different things around environment. They 
are now mixing waste management with eco-design, with innovation, 
with production and [greenhouse gases]. These are separate issues. 
They confuse all of these and it becomes a “jack of all trades and good 
at none” [situation]. And we still don’t know how to deal with the 
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waste sector of our industry. We don’t have a solution yet. And they 
don’t say how they want to deal with all these together. 
5.5 Control over Means versus Ends 
The co-regulation based on the studied model raises another question: As both 
government and stewards are involved in both regulatory stages (i.e., rule setting and 
enforcement), to what level should the regulators engage in each? Put differently, to what 
extent should each of the two parties, especially government, intervene in defining the 
means, and to what extent should each focus on controlling the ends? 
5.5.1 Cooperative Structure 
Some involved informants believe that business-government relationships in Ontario are 
noticeably far from cooperative. This argument can be observed in the stage 1 of the 
studied process, when business did not develop appropriate voluntary programs, resulting 
in a stringent government regulatory regime. Yet, this non-cooperative approach seems to 
be bidirectional, as stewards complain about the government’s limited trust and 
cooperation with business. Many other experts agreed with this complaint, asserting that 
regulators of waste management have historically determined both what shall be done 
and how business shall do it. They unanimously described the government’s collective-
level regulation as over-prescriptive. The most salient instances of this over-prescription 
are the imposition of an IFO in earlier years, the pressure on the industry to keep all of 
the involved actors (including service providers) content as an informal condition to 
approve the industry stewardship plans, and dictating the invisibility of eco-fees (while 
this was neither mandated nor uniform across different industries) as another condition 
for program approval. 
Due to this level of prescription, many interviewees agreed that in Ontario (compared to 
other jurisdictions), stewards have had few opportunities to collaborate with government 
or other stakeholders. Some stewards argued that despite their willingness, the 
government is not willing to cooperate with business beyond a certain level, and tends to 
prescribe means as much as possible. From their view, the cooperation does not go 
beyond formal consultations when a new policy is being developed. As an example, 
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when the Ministry and its bodies were planning the transition to the circular economy in 
2017, several stewards’ representatives complained that they were not informed why and 
how the system would change. As a result, stewards believe that opportunities for 
cooperation are systematically missed in the complicated system, where industry’s 
attempts to help are (supposedly) appreciated, but not considered. Business views this 
non-cooperative structure as a general characteristic of the government’s system and 
perspective, which is not limited to the MHSW program. For instance, one industry 
member (interviewee B1) recalled a multi-stakeholder workgroup as a means for the 
government to merely fulfill a bureaucratic mandate: 
[The group] is comprised of NGOs, industry associations, etc. We sit 
around and make nice for a whole period and complain about what 
governments are doing […] and the government talks about what they 
are doing to make our lives miserable and they seem to enjoy it! So, we 
have to do it and the government checks the box, “Consulting 
Canadians and Civil Society,” I guess. 
As such, in absence of an atmosphere shaped by trust and cooperation, the regulators 
normally tended to determine not only the goals but the means needed for the ends. 
Although the co-regulated model partly shifted the regulators’ focus from means to ends, 
the tension seems to be ongoing. This tension is highly salient in the studied case, but 
may also be noticeable in any form of co-regulation. In addition, such a tension may vary 
through the process. 
5.5.2 Control Structure 
Waste Diversion Act, 2002, gave birth to a unique control structure in waste management 
systems, in which stewards fund the government-imposed system to monitor and sanction 
themselves. The non-Crown delegated body, then WDO, gradually grew and developed 
the required systems, and its costs doubled from 2010 until its transformation to the 
Authority in late 2016. As interviewee G9 from the government side mentioned, 
One thing that is a challenge even today when you have oversight: 
there is always a push to spend as little as possible. The stewards don't 
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want—and rightfully so, I don't blame them for this—to spend a lot of 
money on an oversight body that watches them. It would be 
counterintuitive for them. So I think that there, historically, has always 
been a strong push to keep WDO's costs very low and to keep [its] 
interference in the programs, if you will, very minimal. 
Still, WDO’s administrative costs of monitoring, proportionally split among various 
programs, were not a significant part of program expenses. Particularly for MHSW 
programs before 2016, the regulatory costs generally constituted about 1 to 2 per cent of 
all the program expenses. When WDO transitioned to the Authority and took on the 
responsibility of compliance and enforcement as well, stewards started raising their 
concerns about the required resources for its new projects. The first project was 
establishing a new comprehensive IT system—a registry to collect large data directly 
from all relevant stakeholders. With its own logic of efficiency, simplicity, and cost 
reduction, business found this system unnecessary and costly. This issue was raised in 
different forms; such as when, in an observed business convention, a participant from the 
stewardship programs challenged this control structure as follows: 
We’re still pulling the string of this Authority and their budget went up 
$2 million. But a year ago it was already up to $7 million and counting. 
So, we expect that number, I make a guess, will be $20 million next 
year, because they are going to buy a brand new IT system to collect 
the data from all the material categories, and all the program 
operators already have that material. The [stewardship programs] 
collect that as part of doing their job as program operator and they can 
just hand it over [to the Authority]. [The Authority] want to duplicate 
the effort. We all know what IT systems cost and the ongoing 
maintenance will even cost more. 
Although the Authority had its own reasons for needing such a comprehensive registry, 
many of the interviewed stewards described it as a redundant activity with high security 
risks due to the collection of confidential data from all involved companies, with no value 
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added. From the business standpoint, stewardship programs collect all the needed data, 
which are already audited and can simply be expanded with more third-party audits to 
resolve the Authority’s potential trust gap. Several interviewed stewards complained that 
they were not informed about the rationale behind the need for this registry, nor was their 
concern sufficiently addressed in public events in which I participated. In discussions 
with experts from the government, lack of accessible and trustable information for 
monitoring and decision making was explained as a problem with the past system. WDO 
had no control over the information, nor could it force the IFOs to provide the 
information that it required. Thus, from that organization’s perspective, the solution was 
sought in owning the information independently, even if it initially results in redundant 
data collection, as stewards were concerned. 
Therefore, although the co-regulated model aims to balance the level of control of each 
group over means and the ultimate goals, the exact level of control that can foster a 
constructive collaboration between the parties will remain a blurry target, subject to 
ongoing dynamics and bargaining. 
5.6 Harmonization versus Distinctiveness 
When business and government cooperate in a regulatory regime, it remains an ongoing 
question whether the regime should create harmonious practices across various locations, 
products, and industries, or respect granularity and specificity across the impacted units. 
The data show that different factors may urge business and government to support or 
oppose each pole of this duality, creating continuous tension. These factors can be 
categorized according to two main mechanisms. 
5.6.1 Government Distinctiveness 
The value of polycentric institutions in protecting society and the environment, and in 
addressing global environmental issues, has been long acknowledged by scholars 
(Ostrom, 2010b, 2012). Polycentric systems have multiple authorities at differing scales, 
each exercising sufficient independence to make norms and rules within its focal domain. 
A polycentric system can better pursue goals, first by experimentation across the units 
based on local context, and then by sharing the learning (Ostrom, 2012). Moreover, one 
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of the circular economy’s tenets is diversification (i.e., the involvement of complex 
modules and subsystems) because involving heterogeneous subsystems can enhance the 
main system’s resilience (Beaulieu et al., 2015; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013). 
This polycentricity is observable at both provincial and municipal levels. By definition, 
provincial policies bring into account the unique aspects of the jurisdiction. While this 
ability might be the raison d’être of a federal system, participating experts acknowledged 
that it could also create quasi-competitive mechanisms that lead to unnecessary schisms, 
making it hard to align idiosyncratic policies across provinces. In case of waste 
management in Ontario, the architecture of the system makes it unique in Canada, 
referred to by its supporters as “true extended producer responsibility,” which is also 
curiously followed by other jurisdictions. Similarly, as discussed earlier, local municipal 
governments tend to emphasize their unique local needs that should be treated differently 
by stewardship programs. Interviewees from both municipal and provincial levels viewed 
this autonomy as a potential advantage bestowed by the constitution, as one participant 
(interviewee M8) clarified: 
The idea that a municipality still has its own autonomy, that's 
entrenched in the Municipal Acts; it is what it is because of our 
constitution. Our constitution, with the division of powers, 91 and 92, 
that allows municipalities to be responsible for waste. That is not 
unique to Ontario. That is a nation-wide concept. 
From a legal perspective, waste programs should respect these differences as each 
municipality has its idiosyncratic needs. For example, in many regions, consumers carry 
their hazardous waste to depots, but in cities like Toronto, the local government tends to 
have provisions in place to collect MHSW waste from households that otherwise would 
need to use public transport to carry their hazardous waste to depots; a sparsely populated 
municipality may need only a few collection events year round. Municipalities have also 
developed heterogeneous provisions for recycling, such as the type of materials they 
accept and how waste should be categorized. However, operation-wise, such distinctions 
often generate extra costs and problems. Therefore, those involved in managing and 
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funding the operations strongly advocate harmonization and cost standardization. In one 
observed business convention, a steward complained about how the authority of 
municipalities to develop their idiosyncratic systems caused preventable costs to the 
expense of business, resulting in unnecessarily fancy facilities with little practicality: 
They have a region in Ontario, kind of Taj Mahal collection area, 
which the industry has to pay for, and we didn’t want to [raise a fuss 
about it] because during the development of the legislation, they would 
just run to Queen’s Park to complain [to the government]. So, they 
were charging $40 per hour whether they collect 10 [units of products] 
or 500. Just to be the “Maytag repairman.” 
Referring to a classical TV commercial, this quotation reflects stewards’ concern about 
how distinct municipal systems could cause stewards significant costs in some 
municipalities, making the program far from the operationally efficient for business. Of 
course, municipal experts challenged this view by reminding that stewards only paid their 
own share of the programs, not even all of it, let alone for the facilities and existing 
technology. 
Furthermore, by and large, the governments of Canada and Ontario were both viewed by 
business as strong advocates of global environmental actions. This approach specifically 
impacted the chemical industry and MHSW stewards, and firms sometimes expressed 
their concerns about this progressive view, such as Canada’s focus on environmental 
issues in the G8 summit in 2017, or the formation of the Standing Committee on 
Environment and Sustainable Development at Canada’s House of Commons. 
Some business experts interpreted these measures as prioritizing global issues to 
domestic needs, which shrinks the economy. From the business perspective, the 
importance of transnational issues should be determined based on the local issues; one 
example of this was what an industry member termed “the Trump effect.” To illustrate, 
after the U.S. presidential election in 2016, with increasing pressure by Donald Trump on 
other members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), businesses in 
Canada had their own share of concerns about the harms that altering NAFTA might have 
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on the country’s economy. But despite these concerns, some stewards were hopeful that 
the Trump effect might slow down the high-level decisions in Canada about the 
environmental policies, as this expert (interviewee B1) stated: 
With what’s happening in the United States with the whole NAFTA 
thing, I think that’s backed up a bit; I think they are less activist now in 
Ottawa than they were intending to be. That’s my hope [...]. There is 
also a dissenting report by the Conservatives on the Standing 
Committee; that’s kind of pushing back a bit […]. Hopefully, that 
Trump effect will see all those things go away. 
Given that the United States is the main trade partner of many Canadian industries, from 
this expert’s view, the Trump effect could help preserve the local alignment with the 
United States. Conversely, global trends could act in the opposite way, creating 
opportunities for the United States as a “polluted haven.” 
This example reflects the fact that business tends to welcome global harmonization when 
it can facilitate doing business. The Global Harmonized System (wherein different 
countries seek to embrace more commonalities in their requirements for products, 
labelling, and stewardship) is another example of this sentiment. Stewards consider this 
system useful as it can engender more alignment in Canada-U.S. standards, facilitating 
operations for multinational firms. 
In summary, regulators may emphasize developing distinctive systems to meet unique 
regional needs across jurisdictions and municipalities, and may aspire to take leading 
positions in global environmental moves. Meanwhile, business is generally an advocate 
of harmony, especially with its trade partner countries. 
5.6.2 Operational Simplicity 
As mentioned, distinctiveness rarely results in optimal cost effectiveness in a regulatory 
regime. To reduce costs, the system needs to harmonize the units within the domain. 
Harmonization can be favourable for both government and business. For government, 
because the process of regulating is highly time-consuming and resource-intensive, 
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harmonization can simplify the complexity (e.g., by treating different municipal systems 
equally). Further, it is often simpler for regulators to treat all regulated materials equally. 
For stewards, harmonizing the operational aspects of running the programs is a highly 
desirable goal, but harmonizing across different material groups is not, as reflected in a 
quotation from interviewee S6—an expert experienced in various stewardship programs: 
MHSW is very product specific. Therefore, it lends itself more to the 
producers of that product to say, “Well, why am I associated with these 
other people? I produce tanks for consumer carbonated drinks; why am 
I associated with propane tanks?!” 
In summary, harmonization results in a simplicity that underlies efficiency; hence, 
business values harmonization, which serves the economy of the program. Furthermore, 
harmonization creates economies of scale, which again increases cost efficiency (e.g., 
when the same collection system serves a variety of materials). However, because all 
different regions and different material groups have their idiosyncratic needs, an opposite 
force directs the programs to a level of distinctiveness. Interestingly, whereas government 
initially respected the distinctiveness across the regions, harmonization is even desirable 
for regulators who prefer to develop more abstract and generalizable rules. As a result, 
tension between these two concepts will remain a salient tension in a hybrid model of 
regulation. 
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Chapter 6  
6 Theory and Discussion 
This research aims to answer the question: How can business and government coordinate 
their actions to realize a circular economy? To answer this question, I studied a context 
where effective coordination was not realized through a government-persuaded voluntary 
collective action, nor through a government regulation. The shortcomings of either 
alternative (i.e., ISR and government regulation) and the unsatisfactory outcomes 
ultimately led to the formation of a coordination mechanism in which both business and 
government participated in developing a regulatory regime. This regime is more effective 
in generating the expected results and facilitating the transition to a circular economy. 
Thus, I answer the above research question mainly by understanding the resultant 
coordination mechanism, which is a hybrid form of regulation. Moreover, understanding 
the stages before the formation of this hybrid regulation model helped me to better 
understand the model and its advantages compared to the two pure alternatives, and to 
provide a comparative model based on both the literature and my findings. 
In this chapter, I first overview the context and outline the phenomenon based on both the 
literature and my research. This overview lays the ground for making sense of the process 
and answering the research question. Next, I explain the pattern of the hybrid model and 
the main actions in rule setting and enforcement, and how these actions are required to 
achieve the outcomes. I also explain how this model can solve the common limitations of 
the two pure alternatives. Lastly, I elaborate on the tensions that characterize this hybrid 
model. 
6.1 Revisiting the Phenomenon 
Post-consumer waste has historically been managed by local governments, using tax-
based budgets, often as an amorphous mass of useless materials with no distinction 
among producers and products. This aggregative model of waste management has been 
so deeply entrenched in the socio-technical institutions that when the responsibility of 
managing post-consumer materials transferred from the society level to the firm level, it 
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was disruptive and almost impossible for the average firm to control its waste 
individually. This collective responsibility, therefore, required collective action. Yet, in 
Ontario, for about two decades, business avoided taking on the new responsibility 
voluntarily except for a few isolated, short-lived self-regulation programs. The ebb and 
flow of government’s pressure on business resulted in inconsistent responses and 
unfulfilled ISR. Not only was business uncooperative with other actors, but individual 
industries and firms were not even motivated to cooperate among themselves. 
In response, the provincial government regulators imposed costly regulations on business. 
Due to the collective structure of the existing waste management systems, and because no 
other solution was available for handling the relatively urgent problem of waste, the 
regulation aimed to maintain the status quo. The result was a governance system to 
coerce collective-level business actions and translate them into firm-level mandates. This 
translation was achieved through monetary tools which are common in many government 
regulatory regimes, such as carbon taxing. The regulation aimed to secure the pre-
existing waste management systems operated on the discretion of municipal 
governments. Moreover, to secure the expected outcomes, regulators strictly defined the 
means by which the program had to operate and be monitored, all of which was to be 
funded by regulated firms but without giving them much authority to define the means. 
The regulators viewed this model of linking individual and collective regulation as an 
innovative policy regime. Theoretically, it aimed to convert a collective responsibility 
into a shared responsibility (i.e., distributive to any firm). This model could utilize the 
existing institutions and processes that were mostly shaped by almost independent 
municipalities in a polycentric system. This type of regulation partly solved the problem 
of business’s avoidance of taking voluntary collective actions consistently, and met the 
government’s goal of securing sufficient funds to help municipalities maintain their 
existing systems. However, it completely failed in spurring new solutions for the ultimate 
environmental goals. Further, this rigid structure left minimal agency to industry, 
resulting in new costs for firms who deemed the process inefficient. Yet, the collective-
level regulation had hindered industry’s typical capabilities to improve the operations and 
enhance the efficiency. Finally, conflict of stakeholder interests and power imbalances in 
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fulfilling the regulation brought about continuous dissonance and, in many cases, far-
from-optimal results. Thus, overall, neither the society-level not business-level goals 
were achieved. 
Consistent with the past literature, when non-cooperative firms faced shared ”enemies” in 
this context, they gradually developed stronger in-group identity and showed more 
forceful reactions against the out-group (Pozner & Rao, 2006). Various industries 
challenged the stringent regulation, which can be viewed as a form of institutional work 
by industry (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Nilsson, 2013). Simultaneously, the 
government’s ambitious extension of the collective-level regulation to a number of other 
products also created strong backlash from citizens and media, which put extra pressure 
on the regulators, who acknowledged the drawbacks of the prescriptive regulation. As a 
result, the government-imposed collective-level regulation transformed into a new form 
of collective action—one that differs from previously known models and is a hybrid 
regulatory regime. I outline this model by identifying the pattern that was used for 
different materials through the process of hybridization. 
6.2 The Hybrid Model of Regulation 
Inspired by the case of the MHSW program in Ontario, the model that this research 
suggests goes beyond the conventional forms of government and self-regulatory regimes 
and is a mixed regulatory model (Rees, 1988) with business at the centre stage. It is 
different from the two common forms because the involvement of business and 
government is almost equal, in a way that even some stewards perceive the system as 
their own program in which government intervenes—a claim that was rejected with the 
data. It is different from ISR because the government’s involvement is beyond the known 
intervention of non-business actors in ISR (King et al., 2012), and it is not a conventional 
government regulatory system because the role of business is beyond normal. Although 
the importance of “listening to firms” in regulatory systems is acknowledged in the 
literature (Malesky & Taussig, 2017), the level of business involvement in rule setting 
and enforcement exceeds the common levels drastically. 
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Hybridity refers to “the state of being composed through the mixture of disparate parts” 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014: 400). In particular, using the label of “hybrid” in this research is 
informed by the literature on “mechanism-centred” hybrids (Seibel, 2015). Whereas a 
conventional “sector-centred” perspective of hybridity focuses on overlapping sectoral 
segments and coordination structures that arise due to the conflict of sectors (e.g., in 
cross-sector partnerships), a mechanism-centred perspective conceptualizes hybridity as a 
combination of basic sector-specific mechanisms. Such an approach facilitates the 
exploration of latent hybridity (Seibel, 2015). 
As such, a hybrid regulation utilizes different mechanisms common in the two pure 
regulatory solutions (i.e., government regulation and ISR), and moves between the 
mechanisms of these two forms iteratively. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
whereas provincial government regulation protects the discretion of municipal 
governments and their idiosyncratic models, business is preoccupied with the concept of 
efficiency, which calls for harmonized models. In the identified hybrid model, neither a 
heterogeneous nor a homogenous system is prioritized, but in such a complex 
phenomenon, actors iteratively consider these options in multitudinous real situations and 
co-develop systems that may draw on various combinations of the two. The resultant 
program will go through a dynamic process that can better address the emerging and 
outstanding issues over time. Accordingly, the proposed hybrid model inherits some 
characteristics of each of the original regimes but also resolves some of their 
shortcomings. 
To explain the identified hybrid model, we must reconsider that every regulatory regime 
has two core processes: rule setting and enforcement. The former denotes all the 
processes of formation and release of the goals, policies, and rules; the latter deals with 
monitoring and control mechanisms to ensure compliance and penalize non-compliant 
actors. In a pure government-regulated regime, the government both sets the rules and the 
enforcement provisions, either directly or through its affiliated organizations. In a pure 
self-regulatory regime, industry voluntarily sets the rules and may or may not establish 
intra-industry enforcement mechanisms. As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars have also 
noticed self-regulatory regimes in which the government, for instance, runs either rule 
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setting or enforcement, and leaves the other to industry (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; 
Rees, 1988). 
The marriage of government regulation and ISR mechanisms in this particular hybrid 
model requires both actors to coordinate both rule setting and enforcement. This 
interconnectedness is beyond the division of practice between the two sectors with 
occasional interactions. As shown in Figure 7, the identified hybrid model involves five 
core practices in rule setting and enforcement. 
 
Figure 7. A Hybrid Approach to Regulation and Its Five Core Practices 
 
6.2.1 Rule Setting 
Government and business coordinate rule setting through the three first core practices. In 
the first core practice, after the identification of the specific market failure, government 
institutes a regulatory regime. At this point, to ensure that an appropriate and timely 
action will be taken, and business will not pursue avoidance or resistance strategies, 
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government mandates the action by defining the foundations of the regulatory regime. 
These foundations can include ultimate goals, the scope and type of actions needed, those 
responsible, and even broad requirements that need further development. Government 
can also develop roadmaps or propose strategies to guide the next steps, but at this stage, 
the requirements do not go beyond high-level principles and requirements, leaving it to 
business to study the practical aspects and set rules that may vary across different 
industries, sectors, groups of firms, or even individual companies and products. 
This approach is equifinal and ensures the flexibility required for utilizing business’s 
capabilities to develop solutions that meet the high-level goals and principles, but does 
not disregard legitimate firm-level interests. An exemplary instance of flexibility in the 
studied case was business’s agency during the hybridization process (stage 3 in the 
narrative) to take actions either individually or collectively, in any collective forms that a 
group of firms may find effective and efficient. In sharp contrast to the structure that 
government imposed through the collective-level regulation (stage 2), such flexibility 
resulted in the active involvement of industry in maintaining its efficiency-driven 
mechanisms (e.g., minimizing the costs of operations by utilizing different arrays of 
individual and collective actions). More importantly, the active involvement of business 
can bring about competition, as different service providers will emerge to provide more 
efficient and effective services and individual firms may also opt to seek internal 
solutions. This market competition mechanism is a driver of innovation that propels 
movement towards the intended outcomes (here, a circular economy) while serving 
business’s interests. 
The above dynamics unfold in the second core practice, in which business finds the 
opportunity to develop policies that translate the foundational rules into operation-level 
regulations and structures, in the form of competing systems that pursue the designated 
goals. In such a regime, the private involvement goes beyond the conventional means in 
government regulation, such as industry lobbying and government’s formal consultation 
with stakeholders. 
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In the third core practice, the fine-grained regulation developed by business should be 
approved by the government to ensure that it can meet the foundational requirements—
that is, the translation of foundational rules to practice rules set by business will address 
the focal market failure and meet the intended goals. Moreover, because the model allows 
for the formation of heterogeneous self-regulatory regimes by business, this core practice 
helps government to ascertain that the business systems complement each other, and no 
gap will remain unaddressed. Together, these first three core practices embody the 
coordination of government and business in rule setting, as the first part of a regulatory 
regime. 
6.2.2 Enforcement 
Upon implementing the co-defined regime based on the agreed-upon structure, both the 
government and business sides are also involved in enforcement. As the fourth core 
practice, industry actors establish their own monitoring and compliance mechanisms to 
ensure that their regulatory system is implemented in compliance with the regulatory 
regime. Somewhat predictably, business organically creates this endogenous enforcement 
because it not only prevents potential government sanctions due to non-compliance, but 
also, with collectively shaped actions, it serves the participants’ interests by preventing 
free riding. Endogenous enforcement might deploy both norm-based mechanisms similar 
to those in conventional collective actions (Ostrom, 2000a) and formal enforcement 
mechanisms, such as industry audits. 
For two reasons, endogenous enforcement does not obviate the need for exogenous 
enforcement by government or its designated third party. First, historically, ISR has been 
vulnerable to becoming a self-serving means, minimizing industry efforts, and generating 
insufficient efficacy (Borck & Coglianese, 2009; King & Lenox, 2000; Rivera, 2010). 
This risk is higher in contexts with a less successful history of partnership and more 
heterogenous actors, such as the one I studied. Second, given that the hybrid model 
allows equifinality (i.e., firms can adopt various means to meet the ends), there is a risk 
that the expected total sum of the adopted actions leaves unattended gaps; hence, 
exogenous enforcement can ensure that no void has remained across different actions 
taken in the regime.  
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Accordingly, the fifth and last core practice is where government establishes its 
independent mechanisms to monitor the compliance of all firms impacted by the 
regulation and impose penalties and potential incentives on that basis. As a unique 
characteristic of the studied regulatory regime, this government enforcement mechanism 
is mandated to be entirely funded by industry. Such a provision can secure that 
government change or budget fluctuations will not harm the outcomes. 
6.3 Solving the Ubiquitous Drawbacks of Regulatory 
Regimes 
Each of the five core practices involved in setting the rules and enforcing the identified 
hybrid model is arguably necessary to resolve the key shortcomings of prevalent 
regulatory solutions. The first such shortcoming is the fact that the very formation of a 
regulatory regime is uncertain. Business operates at a different level compared to society 
and this jeopardizes the formation of such regimes, because the issues at the society level 
do not immediately transfer to business issues (Garud & Gehman, 2012; Geels, 2011; 
Geels & Schot, 2007). Therefore, when a new issue emerges at the macro level, it may 
gradually take the form of a business responsibility (e.g., managing post-consumer 
materials). In such cases, immediate and comprehensive government regulation might not 
take form to translate the issue into a business mandate. Further, literature has well 
acknowledged that self-regulation is vulnerable to substantial delay, until the external 
pressure reaches a certain level (Egorov & Harstad, 2017). Lack of an official mandate 
for action makes the initiative vulnerable to business resistance or intermittent actions by 
businesses just to safeguard themselves. The first core practice of the proposed hybrid 
model solves this shortcoming by early government rule setting at the minimal level. By 
limiting government endeavours to the fundamental goals and broad requirements of the 
future regime, the formal regulatory process becomes less costly and sufficiently agile—
qualities that are not common in formal bureaucratic regulation. 
Second, in the second core practice, the involvement of business in setting the rules can 
not only prevent potential conflicts which may stem from ineffective regulation, but can 
also give the firms an opportunity to utilize their expertise in market mechanisms and 
enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and innovativeness of the regulatory regime. When 
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rule setting deals with evolving problems and unprecedented business practices, such as 
those to close material loops, constraining the involvement of business to the methods 
common in public policy making, such as stakeholder consultation when legislation is 
under development and lobbying, can miss the multiple aspects and impacts of the policy. 
Insufficient engagement of business can bring about shortcomings in implementation, 
such as minimal business response (i.e., just sufficient to ensure compliance with 
requirements), and lack of fit between the imposed rules and complexities of the resultant 
actions. This shortcoming can lead to the two forms of decoupling, as discussed by 
Bromley and Powell (2012): a gap between policy and practice, or a gap between practice 
and goals. 
Third, government approval of industry’s regulatory process, which occurs as part of the 
third core practice in the model, will prevent the problem of converting a collective 
action to a self-serving mechanism, as noticed in the literature (Borck & Coglianese, 
2009; King & Lenox, 2000; Rivera, 2010). This core practice is not common in any of 
the discussed regulatory regimes. Yet, by doing so, government ensures that first, the 
individual or collective business entity has translated the goals to means and proposed a 
workable structure to coordinate the actions, and second, the aggregation of the planned 
actions by different entities leaves no gap or overlap across the actions that may cause 
future conflicts. Thus, expectedly this practice needs government to protect the interests 
of various stakeholders, which may require a process of negotiation and adjustments. 
Fourth, business’s endogenous control mechanisms in the fourth core practice can utilize 
intra-industry institutions that sustain the action. In a conventional collective action, 
norm-based control mechanisms are the main means to secure the compliance of 
individual entities. Endogenous norms and intrinsic motivations can be such effective 
levers that scholars prioritize them over exogenous regulatory control (Montgomery & 
Bean, 1999; Ostrom, 2000a; Reeson & Tisdell, 2008). Although informal and norm-
based control mechanisms may also take shape in the hybrid model, formal endogenous 
control mechanisms are necessary to prevent free riding. Endogenous enforcement can 
also secure compliance with regulation, as the minimal level of requirement. Moreover, it 
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can prevent the second and more common form of decoupling discussed by Bromley and 
Powell (2012) (i.e., a gap between daily practice and intended outcome). 
Fifth, endogenous enforcement mechanisms in a non-voluntary action, such as the hybrid 
model, are not sufficient, because it may not deliver the required “iron fist,” which is 
missing in many self-regulatory regimes and is often deemed the main reason for 
underperformance of the self-regulated firms (Héritier & Eckert, 2009; King & Lenox, 
2000). In absence of formal enforcement bodies, intra-industry enforcement mechanisms 
may hardly suffice to penalize the non-compliant firms. Therefore, exogenous 
enforcement is crucial when firms are not cooperative enough to self-regulate effectively. 
Further, exogenous enforcement can secure transparency and prevent information 
asymmetry, as performance reports and information sharing are often a requirement of 
regulatory systems. 
In this way, the identified hybrid model is an apt solution for many emerging social and 
environmental challenges that can best be addressed by collectives, given the diverse 
challenges in collective-level regulation to address market failures. We will compare this 
hybrid model with other alternatives in next chapter. 
It should be noted that the above account of the iterations in a hybrid model represents 
the minimal interactions required to prevent the drawbacks of alternative regulatory 
regimes. In practice, such interactions typically exceed these minimums, as business, 
government, and other stakeholders actively interact in each of the five core practices. 
For example, consistent with the data on the hybridization process in Ontario’s MHSW 
program, in the third core practice, the government did not merely approve a proposed 
self-regulatory regime; it may include a dynamic process in which different parties agree 
on different elements of the industry’s regulation. In addition, the proposed interactions 
in the model do not substitute for other common interactions in formal regulation, such as 
lobbying or advocacy by the industry to influence the initial regulatory foundations. 
Regulatory regimes are subject to cyclical change, and the proposed model can also take 
the form of cycles; to this end, point 5 in Figure 7 may continue with a new cycle of rule 
setting and enforcement. 
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6.4 Tensions as Characteristics of the Hybrid Model 
In Chapter 5, I explained how the analysis revealed that the model is characterized by 
four dualities that embody four tensions. These tensions are unique to the hybrid 
regulation, compared to other regulatory regimes. This finding is consistent with the 
existing studies on hybrids, as hybridity, by definition, refers to the composition of 
disparate elements (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Jay, 2013; Seibel, 2015). The same quality 
applies to the identified model, as the model iterates frequently between the two distinct 
regulatory regimes by government and business, and juxtaposes two sets of mechanisms 
that, in a pure form of regulation, do not coexist.  
Further analysis revealed that none of the four tensions were salient in the previous stages 
of the studied phenomenon; yet one pole of each duality was identified at the second 
stage, when government coerced the collective-level regulation. First, the government 
regulation was shaped to engender compliance. Although industry increasingly 
contradicted the prescriptive regulation from time to time, firms had no option other than 
short-term acquiescence (Rivera, 2010) and to meet the minimal requirements. 
Second, at this stage, the program was formally decoupled from business—industry did 
not “own” the practices and merely contributed financially. This action was deemed a 
legitimate response because at that early stage, the government’s primary focus was on 
securing the existing waste management practices through municipal systems, and this 
goal could be met by financial contributions from business. 
Third, this regulatory regime established strong control over means to ensure that, in such 
a de novo collective-level regulatory system, the linkage between individual firms and 
the collective initiative is strongly established and will yield the expected result. The 
government’s focus on means was especially significant because of business’s past 
avoidance of taking collective actions. It took some years until the insufficiency of ends 
in meeting higher-level goals, such as closing material loops, attracted the government’s 
attentions. 
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Finally, regulation typically tends to create harmony. In the collective-level regulation, 
the government was naturally preoccupied with designing a novel system to handle the 
collective-level problem of waste. Not surprisingly, the result did not address the 
heterogeneity of the involved materials, industries, and regions. It established a single 
IFO to run the program in 2002, with its scope gradually expanded to other materials, 
including MHSW materials in 2008. The regulators did not pay sufficient attention to the 
idiosyncratic needs of different sectors and product-specificity of waste management—
though admittedly, is it difficult to include such details in such a regulatory regime. 
These characteristics are not unique to the studied government regulation. Any such 
regime that tackles new collective-level problems is likely to focus on compliance, allow 
decoupling, focus on establishing means, and try to harmonize the practice. 
The transition from the collective-level regulation to the hybrid model was parallel with 
the emergence of four new concepts that are opposite poles of the four initial dominant 
concepts. Interestingly, the new concepts did not dominate their opposite poles; rather, 
the opposite poles continued to coexist and sustain ongoing tensions. Figure 8 
summarizes the process and demonstrates the existence (or absence) of each concept in 
the three stages. The two first stages represent the pure forms and the last stage represents 
the hybrid model. 
As outlined in Chapter 3, a tension is defined as the state of “two phenomena in a 
dynamic relationship that involve both competition and complementarity” (English, 
2001; Epstein et al., 2015). Importantly, the identified tensions are not merely conflicts 
among the actors. In most cases, these tensions exist even within a single actor group, 
such as the ongoing question among the stewards of whether they should integrate waste 
management operations into their core business or decouple it by outsourcing it to 
recyclers and service providers.  
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Figure 8. The Formation of the Hybrid Model and Emergence of Tensions 
Figure 9 includes four 2x2 grids that schematically demonstrate how each of the 
mechanisms that underlie a specific tension (as identified in Figure 2 and also explained 
in Chapter 5) can be associated with an actor and one pole of the duality. For instance, in 
the compliance-proactivity duality, three mechanisms underlie the tension. As per 
“stringency of regulation,” whereas business argues that imposing more strict regulation 
urges firms to merely try to minimally comply, data suggest that more strict regulation 
can also enhance proactivity, and some stewards confirm this view; thus, stringency of 
regulation feeds into this tension even within business. Alternatively, as per “program 
scale,” whereas business argues that increasing the scale of programs increases costs and 
harms the competitiveness of Canadian business, government tries to use scale and 
encourage business to find innovative solutions to appreciate the value of waste; thus, 
program scale feeds into this tension due to the different ways in which business and 
government perceive the issue. It should be noted that this depiction of tension 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
Formation of 
Collective 
Responsibility 
Gradual 
Transition 
Imposed 
Government 
Regulation 
P
er
su
a
si
o
n
 
C
o
er
ci
o
n
 
Inactivity Minimal Compliance 
Decoupling 
Control over Means 
Harmonization 
C
o
n
tr
a
d
ic
ti
o
n
 
A
v
o
id
a
n
ce
 
106 
 
mechanisms provides a schematic view and the identified mechanisms involve somewhat 
more complicated relationships, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 9. Associating Tension Mechanisms to Business and Government 
The four tensions embody the nature of this hybrid model. The fact that they were not 
salient in the previous stages is due to this nature that juxtaposes inconsistent elements 
from pure models. More particularly, the tension between proactivity and compliance did 
not emerge in stage 2 because, first, the prescriptive structure imposed by government 
curbed any actions by business except for the incremental moves that ultimately 
transformed the regime. Further, the compliance-based regime treated the post-consumer 
waste responsibility as a fixed cost added almost harmoniously to all similar products, 
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offering little motivation for proactive efforts. The decoupling-integration tension did not 
take form in stage 2 simply because the regime prescribed a pre-existing system 
decoupled from business—and again, the coerced structure left no room for developing 
integrative ideas. For the same reason, the focus was on controlling the rigid structure and 
the means, rather than leaving them to business and focusing on the end. Finally, the 
stringent regulation treated the regulated units harmoniously, as government regulation is 
often abstract and general, leaving practical details to implementers. 
These tensions can prevent the dominance of one pole of each of the dualities over a long 
period of time, because different actor groups—as well as the heterogeneous actors 
within a group—may lean towards to opposing poles, especially in the long term. For 
example, although stewards initially preferred a decoupled system to fulfill the 
requirements, many of them later considered the potential advantages of integrating the 
system into their business. Therefore, the tensions do not represent a transition phase; 
rather, they depict the ongoing dynamics of this hybrid model. Arguably, the four 
identified tensions apply to any form of hybrid regulation to protect the natural 
environment due to the coexistence of conflicting elements in such a model. In the 
following section, I provide a theoretical overview of each tension. 
6.4.1 Compliance versus Proactivity 
The notion of proactivity or reactivity is a point of apparent conflict in the existing 
literature. On the one hand, collective action is fundamentally viewed as the most 
proactive strategy taken by industry to go beyond compliance and address social and 
environmental expectations (Rivera et al., 2009). On the other hand, ISR scholars have 
noticed that despite this gesture of goodwill, industry often aims to meet the bare 
minimum expectations in advance, rather than waiting for more strict requirements 
(Borck & Coglianese, 2009; King et al., 2012). Further, such actions are far from real 
proactivity, because (similar to business’s response to typical government regulations) 
they entail minimal compliance with basic requirements. These two perspectives, both 
supported by diverse evidence, bifurcate the existing views to ISR. 
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The studied hybrid model represents and reconciles both perspectives. I propose that 
industry moves in cycles of proactivity and passivity. This proposition is supported by the 
observation that when the studied industries confronted the surging regulatory 
requirements, after a period of compliance seeking, they decided to take the lead and 
perform a few proactive actions. Indeed, business may find that economizing the costs by 
focusing on bare minimal compliance can be even more costly when exogenous actors 
take the lead and raise the requirements continually. Thus, although proactive business 
actions impose immediate cost, proactivity may financially pay off in the long term. This 
dual effect creates a tension between compliance and proactivity in the hybrid model, as 
the regulatory elements of the action activate compliance, which seems a less costly 
response. Yet, proactivity can forestall further imposition of government requirements 
with respect to the ongoing action. 
As the data suggest, the compliance-proactivity tension is reflected in industry’s periods 
of proactivity throughout their ongoing compliance efforts, such as the voluntary 
adoption of the bulb and lighting waste program in 2014, or the decision to seek 
innovative solutions for used materials like coatings and tires. Figure 10 represents an 
example of how, through the surging requirements in the studied context, firms signalled 
different levels of proactiveness. Given the uncertain short- and long-term costs of 
proactive actions and the heterogeneity of incumbent the firms that partake in collective 
decision making, choosing between the two poles of the duality will constitute an 
ongoing tension between them. 
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Figure 10. A Schematic Flowchart of Periods of Proactivity in the Hybrid Model 
6.4.2 Decoupling versus Integration 
Decoupling might be the first response of business to a new policy, where compliance 
with the policy becomes ceremonial (Fiss & Zajac, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Sandholtz, 2012). Organizations decouple their practices when they find a conflict 
between their core practices and the fragmented environment, characterized by diverse 
rules, soft laws (e.g., standards), and norms. Decoupling may represent a disconnect 
between either formal policy and daily practice, or daily practice and intended outcome 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012). As Sandholtz (2012) notes, decoupling seems to be the most 
replicated finding across many studies of compliance. In fact, enforcing compliance on 
firms may curb the goal achievement prospects (Wijen, 2012). Nevertheless, decoupling 
can create legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and serves the interests of powerful 
organizational leaders (Westphal & Zajac, 2001), among other results. As represented in 
the case study, when regulation requires a new business practice to protect the natural 
environment, decoupling can save costs and help business buffer its core practices.  
Nonetheless, by allowing business to self-regulate towards the goals, a hybrid regulation 
can also encourage business to integrate the new policy into its core; this may occur in a 
variety of ways. First, business may gradually find potential advantages in integration of 
Initial regulation 
imposition 
Business actions for 
compliance 
Increased short-term and 
decreased long-term costs 
Further actions for 
compliance 
Imposing higher 
requirements 
C
o
m
p
li
an
ce
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 P
ro
ac
ti
v
it
y
  
  
  
  
  
C
o
m
p
li
an
ce
 
Costs of Compliance 
P
er
io
d
s 
o
f 
P
ro
ac
ti
v
it
y
 
Increased costs 
Proactive actions beyond 
compliance 
Maintaining the actions 
Imposing higher 
requirements 
 
Further actions for 
compliance 
… 
Government                              Business                              Results 
Maintaining the 
requirements 
110 
 
the program within its core (as in the studied context, where the industry eventually 
accepted the waste sector within its boundaries, and began to discuss whether integration 
was also possible within individual firms). Second, the diversity of involved firms in a 
collective action and their agency to develop different self-regulatory provisions can 
create integration opportunities that may be pursued by some innovative actors. In 
particular, environmental frameworks such as the circular economy suggest various 
business models that bring environmentally beneficial operations to the heart of firms’ 
practices (Bocken, Short, Rana, & Evans, 2014; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013).  
It should be noted that innovative outcomes in such a system are not merely the result of 
complete integration. For instance, mainstream business may decouple its responsibility 
and transfer it to service providers who, for their own interest, compete to develop 
innovative solutions. As such, the ongoing tension between proactivity and integration 
can support innovation in different forms. In short, heterogeneity of firms in such a 
hybrid regime will create an ongoing tension between adopting practices to decouple the 
requirements versus integrating them within the core business. 
6.4.3 Control over Means versus Ends 
In the studied context, regulators gradually restructured the regime to leave part of the 
means to industry and focus more on control over ends (i.e., outcome-based 
enforcement). This approach can utilize the self-regulatory capacity of firms in 
developing strategies and practice-level policies and designing actions that can meet the 
environmental goals in the most efficient way. However, in a real setting, the regulator’s 
tendency to intervene in means will not vanish easily, for a number of reasons. First, the 
boundaries between the roles of government and business in rule setting and enforcement 
are blurry and remain open to interpretation in different contexts. We can expect that, in 
order to protect its interests, business would prefer to extend its share in rule setting as 
much as it can, and government may tend to curb it. Further, in a turbulent field with 
multiple stakeholders and pre-established institutions, government is also influenced by 
other actors, such as NGOs and municipal governments, and should protect its interests 
as well, which might conflict with those of business, resulting in government’s further 
involvement in setting rules and controlling the ends. As such, the degree to which a 
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government may allocate resources to control the means or the ends will remain an 
ongoing tension in the hybrid model. 
6.4.4 Harmonization versus Distinctiveness 
As noted, scholars have discussed the critical role of polycentric institutions in protecting 
society and the environment and addressing global environmental problems (Ostrom, 
2010b, 2012). Unlike a monocentric governing unit, polycentric systems have multiple 
authorities at differing scales, each exercising sufficient independence to make norms and 
rules within the focal domain. Such systems can have various advantages. For instance, 
given the uncertainty and changing nature of sustainability problems as grand challenges 
(Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015), optimal solutions do not exist; a polycentric system 
can better pursue the goals by fostering experimentation across the units based on local 
context and sharing learning (Ostrom, 2012). The strengths of a granular, polycentric 
system are also well understood in the circular economy approach to sustainability. The 
circular economy supports diversification (i.e., involvement of several modules and 
subsystems) as one of its tenets, because diversification can enhance system resilience 
(Beaulieu et al., 2015; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013). 
Nevertheless, polycentricity may not serve optimal cost effectiveness in a regulatory 
regime. To reduce costs, the system needs to harmonize the units within the domain. 
Harmonization results in simplicity, which underlies efficiency, which in turn serves the 
economy of the action and might be key in sustaining the regime. Furthermore, 
harmonization creates economies of scale, which is again a major driver of cost-
efficiency. In the context of this study, where different regions pursued their own 
idiosyncratic needs, business found it extremely expensive to maintain the existing 
granularity. Arguably, the tension between the two concepts will remain an ongoing 
tension in a hybrid regulatory model. 
In summary, the four tensions in the model represent fundamental dualities that the 
studied hybrid regulation for the circular economy confronts. The tensions between the 
poles of these dualities are not temporary and will sustain as long as the hybrid model 
exists, because the inherent mechanisms in the hybrid model perpetuate the conflicting 
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poles. These mechanisms are fuelled by the conflicting elements of government 
regulation and self-regulatory regimes. Hence, harvesting the results of a hybrid model 
requires tackling such tensions continually and constructively. Such an effort needs both 
groups of actors—that is, government and business—to find the balance in each tension 
over time, in a way that does not jeopardize the hybrid nature of the model (i.e., with 
dominance of the mechanisms of one regulatory regime) over the long term. Maintaining 
such a balance will secure the livelihood of the action and the achievement of the 
expected innovative outcomes. 
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Chapter 7  
7 Contribution and Conclusion 
As stated, the main goal of this research has been to answer the question: How can 
business and government coordinate their actions to realize a circular economy? This 
question is vital because overconsumption of natural resources—and its subsequent 
impact on society—is reaching crisis levels, making the circular economy imperative. 
However, the circular economy requires various disruptive business models and value 
chains, innovative technologies, and novel institutions, which call for synergistic business 
actions and policy changes. Hence, given the urgency of closing material loops, 
coordinating government regulation and business’s self-imposed regulation is critical to 
propel actions. Nonetheless, effective coordination is the missing link in many contexts, 
including the one studied here. 
To this end, simply increasing either government regulation or self-regulation cannot 
address the problems, as each alternative suffers from its own inadequacies. Instead, as 
some scholars have noted, innovative amalgamation of the two can have remarkable 
advantages (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Rubenstein, 2011). I studied a case where, in 
absence of cooperative business-government relations, such an innovative model 
evolved. I identified the pattern of this particular model of hybrid regulation as one in 
which both business and government coordinate both rule setting and enforcement 
through five core practices. The main advantage of the model is that it can ultimately 
result in business proactivity. Proactivity drives innovation and can yield groundbreaking 
solutions to meet the vision and goals set by government. A key finding about the model 
is that it is characterized by particular constructive tensions; this is an important finding, 
as it emphasizes the ongoing dynamics that must be continuously managed. 
Acknowledging such tensions and their potential constructive nature is crucial in 
generating the expected innovative outcomes. 
By answering the above question, this research contributes to theory in three major ways. 
First, it extends the theory of ISR, as one type of collective actions, by attending to the 
marriage of government regulation and self-regulation. Scholars of ISR have long 
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realized that regulators frequently influence or intervene in self-regulatory regimes, 
creating a blurry boundary for “self”-regulation (King et al., 2012; Rees, 1988), but 
mixing the two can have merits too. In spite of this awareness, especially by scholars in 
public policy, literature on ISR (and relevant fields such as collective action and inter-
organizational relationships) is preoccupied with intra-industry coordination. My research 
illuminates this grey area of business-government interactions in ISR by identifying a 
hybrid model. This regime evolved as the outcome of a learnings process after decades of 
trial and error with the two pure models of self-regulation and government regulation. 
The structure of the hybrid regulation model can resolve the common drawbacks of each 
pure alternative.  
Second, by going beyond the static depictions of regulatory regimes, my research 
identifies four major tensions that characterize the hybrid regulation model. These 
tensions stem from the hybrid nature of the action and are shaped through the 
coordination of actions undertaken by heterogeneous actors. They need to be managed in 
balance; otherwise, the hybrid model may tend towards one of the original regulatory 
forms, limiting the potential outcomes of the model and giving way to appearance of the 
common regulatory problems. Thus, active participation of different actors in the model 
can secure its sustainable proactive outcomes. 
Last and perhaps foremost, I suggest that this hybrid model is especially apt for 
addressing the circular economy and other emerging social and environmental collective 
responsibilities that require proactive business actions. Such actions are often urgent and 
need immediate attention, but coordinating and implementing them is costly. Therefore, 
in absence of government mandates, they are not likely to be realized in the short term. In 
fact, the circular economy calls for the orchestration of distinct elements that, with the 
established institutions, may not fit well together. This model can harmonize social-level 
issues with both industry-level and firm-level practices. 
In this chapter, I discuss each of the above contributions in more detail. Using a 
combination of literature and this study’s findings, I provide a comparative analysis of 
the identified model with pure models and discuss the advantages of the former. I 
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conclude by explaining the implications of these contributions for practice and discussing 
their limitations and boundaries, as well as the opportunities they afford for future 
research. 
7.1 Crossing the Boundaries of Regulatory Alternatives 
Some studies on common pool resources and the tragedy of the commons point to 
government-regulated actions that translate resource protection to firm-level mandates, 
but firms can take collective action proactively and self-regulate to prevent the tragedy of 
the commons (King & Lenox, 2000; Oliver, 1993; Ostrom, 1990; Poteete, Janssen, & 
Ostrom, 2010; Rivera, 2010; Sandler, 1992). In contrast to the mandatory nature of 
government regulation, business collective action is largely shaped by the assumption of 
voluntariness, managed by norms and internal control mechanisms, as opposed to 
exogenous rules (Ostrom, 2000a; Ostrom et al., 1994). These two alternatives, for a 
particular purpose and in a limited scope, can substitute for each other; thus, ISR can 
obviate the need for government regulation. In a broader institutional landscape, various 
government-regulatory and self-regulatory regimes can co-exist and complement each 
other.  
In practice, the two pure models are rare. Business often influences government 
regulation by advocating and other means, and government sometimes influences ISR in 
one way or another (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Maxwell et al., 2000; Short & Toffel, 
2010; Sinclair, 1997). This involvement has created grey areas in the boundaries of the 
literature (King et al., 2012). Broadly speaking, management scholars acknowledge the 
dynamics of inter-organizational relationships (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Bagherzadeh, 
2015). Yet, the ISR dynamics are not sufficiently studied, especially when government’s 
role exceeds partial intervention. Given that more complex and dynamic patterns of 
interaction between organizations are associated with successful outcomes (Majchrzak et 
al., 2015), crossing the boundaries of these two models is crucial for addressing the 
increasing complexity of sustainability issues. 
This study contributes to this gap by undertaking an empirical investigation of a dynamic 
model in which, rather than influencing each other, government regulation and self-
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regulation are intertwined. The existing empirical ISR studies do not sufficiently address 
such an amalgamation of the two alternatives. Most notably, Rees (1988), acknowledging 
the need for investigating hybrid models, argues that government intervenes in ISR either 
at arm’s length by mandating the industry to regulate itself (i.e., “mandated full self-
regulation”) or by taking on either regulating or enforcing, but not both (i.e., “mandated 
partial self-regulation”). The hybrid model that I study goes beyond these alternatives, as 
it was developed after trialling the two pure models and involves a balanced combination 
of elements of both regimes. Drawing on the literature and the discussions in Chapter 2, 
Figure 11 illustrates how the studied hybrid model differs from the major known pure and 
mixed alternatives.  
 
Figure 11. The Major Regulatory Regimes and the Proposed Hybrid Model 
Table 3 also draws on both the literature and my findings to compare the hybrid model 
with government-imposed and self-regulatory regimes—specifically, when new but 
challenging collective responsibilities emerge in society, offering no or little incentives 
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for firms to respond voluntarily. This insufficient motivation of business is different from 
many conventional regimes studied in ISR, as will be elaborated later. 
Table 3. Comparing the Model with Pure Regulatory Regimes in the Absence of 
Motivation for Cooperation 
 Self-Regulation 
Government 
Regulation 
The Hybrid Regulation 
Model 
Dominant State Government/stakeholders: 
Persuasion and potentially 
sanction 
Business: Mainly avoidance, 
potentially isolated minimal 
actions as late as possible 
Government: 
Coercion 
Business: Compliance 
and/or contradiction 
Business and government 
coordinate rule setting 
and enforcement 
Outcome Inactivity Often minimal 
compliance to 
prevent penalties 
Compliance and periods 
of proactivity  
Characteristics of the Regimes: 
Embedding 
Responsibility in 
Business 
Not realized Business decouples 
responsibility by 
separating practice 
from outcome 
Tension between 
decoupling and 
integration 
Focus of Control No control Mainly over means Tension between control 
over means and ends 
Approach to 
Polycentric Issues 
Disjointed and temporary 
actions by business 
Harmonized 
regulation to serve 
heterogeneous needs 
Tension between 
harmonization and 
distinctiveness 
Common Shortcomings and Solutions: 
Defiance/ 
Avoidance/ Delay 
Despite the expectations, 
business may avoid taking 
timely collective actions 
Business may resist 
regulation or formal 
regulation may take a 
long time 
With government’s high-
level rule setting, business 
is motivated to flexibly 
self-regulate 
Free Riding Avoidance of participation 
by most individual firms 
Potentially resolved if 
efficient government 
enforcement in place 
Resolved by co-
enforcement 
Lack of 
Transparency 
Ubiquitous information 
asymmetry 
Potentially resolved if 
regulation requires 
disclosure 
Resolved by co-
enforcement 
Underperformance Minimal or no 
performance, due to non-
participation, ceremonial 
adoption, or late response 
Minimal performance 
to comply to policy 
Compliance with 
requirements which 
become stricter over 
time, and periods of 
proactivity and innovation 
that improve performance 
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Many previous studies have shown that problems such as business avoidance/ resistance/ 
delay, information asymmetry, free riding, minimal environmental performance, and 
(most importantly in this context) lack of proactivity and improvement are ubiquitous 
across the different regulatory alternatives to protect the environment (Arimura et al., 
2016; Blackman & Rivera, 2011; Borck & Coglianese, 2009; Darnall & Sides, 2008; 
Egorov & Harstad, 2017; Gamper-Rabindran & Finger, 2013; King & Lenox, 2000; 
Potoski & Prakash, 2013; Rivera, 2010; Sandler, 2015; Tashman & Rivera, 2016). These 
drawbacks will be resolved by adopting the mechanisms utilized in this hybrid model. 
This work proposes new possibilities in coordinating the actions of multiple actors, 
including heterogeneous firms with diverse views of the problem and government. 
Moreover, the comparison among the models clearly demonstrates that, in order to solve 
sustainability issues, we need more mixed models, rather than more of each pure 
alternative.  
7.2 Hybrid Mechanisms and Tensions as Intrinsic 
Characteristics 
The form of hybridity identified in the regime occurs between organizations, rather than 
within them. This is not a common approach to study hybridity. Although the term 
“hybrid” has been used in various contexts, extant studies have mainly explored hybridity 
within organizations such as social enterprises (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana, 
Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2015; Peteraf & Barney, 2003). The hybrid nature of such 
organizations can cause tensions—for instance, between social and economic dimensions 
(Battilana et al., 2015)—due to different identities (Pratt & Foreman, 2000) and logics 
(Jay, 2013) as organizations face conflicting institutional demands (Greenwood, Raynard, 
Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). 
This research, however, explores hybridity that occurs between organizations in order to 
enhance the efficiency of coordination. The result is a mechanism-centred perspective 
which is less discussed in the literature (Seibel, 2015). The model conceptualizes 
hybridity as a combination of sector-specific mechanisms. My findings contribute to this 
stream by delving into what constitutes a specific hybrid regulation. The hybrid model is 
built upon the mechanisms borrowed from the two pure alternatives—mechanisms such 
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as business’s efficiency-driven tools and government’s enforcement practices. The 
juxtaposition of these distinct mechanisms underlies tensions, as these distinct 
mechanisms may serve conflicting aims and compete to attract the regime’s resources 
towards different goals. 
Understanding hybridity is particularly important in regulatory regimes. The advantages 
of hybrid regulation were long acknowledged by policy scholars (Rees, 1988), but were 
not sufficiently studied by business researchers. In contrast to the relatively static 
formulation of regulatory regimes (including ISR) in business literature, there regimes are 
often highly dynamic; thus, studying hybrids can draw attention to the changing nature of 
the regulatory regimes. The acknowledged dynamism in the studied model can better 
address the emergent issues in real time, compared to a static approach.  
Hybridity in such inter-organizational coordination leverages some of the principles and 
concepts uncovered in the existing literature. Consistent with previous works in the broad 
field of multi-organizational collaboration (De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; Majchrzak et 
al., 2015), I argue that the identified tensions make the hybrid model unstable, because 
they involve contrary forces that can throw the relationship off balance. Without balanced 
management of these tensions, the hybrid model may shift towards one of the constituent 
regulatory forms, which will constrain its outcomes. An illustrative example of 
unbalanced management and its impact is the voluntary adoption of bulbs and lighting 
materials by a business collective, described in the data. When government avoided 
regulating the material group, business discontinued the proactively shaped program, as 
government’s role was pivotal in creating a level playing field and preventing free riding. 
Government’s avoidance of taking its enforcement role, therefore, shifted the regime 
towards an ISR regime fraught with non-cooperation and free riding, which ultimately 
resulted in the lighting program’s failure. Forward-moving dynamics are necessary to 
drive action towards the goal, as each pole of each tension represents part of the 
interests—and not meeting the interests beyond a certain level hampers this movement.  
Adopting a tension perspective also helps to better understand the complexity of 
collective actions discussed in the literature. As explained in Chapter 2, scholars have 
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identified conflicting results for exogenous intervention in self-regulated regimes. On the 
one hand, intervention can “crowd out” the collaborative behaviour of the firms in a 
voluntary regime (Montgomery & Bean, 1999; Ostrom, 2000a; Reeson & Tisdell, 2008), 
for example, due to its affect on intrinsic motivations (Beretti et al., 2013; Frey, 1994). 
On the other hand, exogenous intervention can provide the “iron fist” missing in many 
self-regulatory regimes when norm-based controls cannot deliver the expected outcome 
(King & Lenox, 2000; Tashman & Rivera, 2016). Given the diversity and complexity of 
ISR models, such inconsistent outcomes of exogenous intervention are not surprising, but 
adopting a tension perspective can inform these complexities. For instance, intervention 
in the means versus in the ends will produce a different outcome. Whereas strong 
intervention in defining and controlling means is likely to shift a hybrid system towards a 
command-and-control system and negatively impact innovative outcomes, intervention in 
enforcement is less likely to have such an impact but may negatively affect cost 
efficiency. These different outcomes are helpful for theory and practice and further 
research can shed more light on these findings. 
It should be noted that as long as the hybrid model exists, the tensions within it will never 
be resolved, as the conflicting poles that embody the tensions are embedded in the model. 
For example, one may argue that the decoupling-integration tension would be resolved if 
all firms adopt innovative technologies to integrate post-consumer materials in their value 
chain; nevertheless, such a new state, even if realized, would fundamentally obviate the 
need for a regulatory regime, as the ultimate goal would be realized. In other words, the 
hybrid regulation model is a solution for new responsibilities that business may be 
reluctant to assume, not those profitable practices that are proactively embraced by 
firms.7  
                                                 
7
 In Ontario, profitable waste management programs were excluded from the regulators’ radar as business 
addressed them long before regulators attended to such waste. For example, with respect to the MHSW 
materials, although oil filters and containers are regulated, used lubricant oil itself is not, because business 
had already established profitable oil recycling operations. The need for regulating oil only arose after the 
profit declined and used oil was occasionally sent to other regions for incineration. 
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7.3 Levels, Innovation, and Propelling the Circular 
Economy 
Business practices to address ecological challenges often occur at the firm level. Yet, 
sustainable development was originally introduced as a macro-level concept (WCED, 
1987) that should be practiced at all levels (van Marrewijk & Werre, 2003) and in its 
essence, “sustainability is a collective good” (Geels, 2011: 25). As a result, academics, 
managers, and policy makers continue to struggle with the question of how to effectively 
translate higher-level issues into firm-level practices (Geels, 2011; Geels & Schot, 2007; 
van Marrewijk & Werre, 2003). This collective-individual interrelation is especially 
crucial for common goods. 
When industry does not voluntarily translate the collective responsibility into its agenda, 
government is expected to react by imposing firm-level regulatory solutions. Government 
regulation generally targets individual firms. However, regulation may not provide an 
ideal means for crossing the levels. For instance, cap-and-trade systems are widely used 
as an innovative carrot-and-stick regulatory regime to control firms’ greenhouse gas 
emissions. These systems aim to both impose negative externalities as a cost on business 
and encourage firms to reduce their ecological footprints. Yet, the effectiveness of these 
systems has been questioned. When imposed on all incumbent firms, these systems can 
create a new equilibrium—a new normal to sustain “business as usual” by adding an 
almost equal item to operational costs across all firms, which will ultimately be passed on 
to consumers; this can reduce the expected outcomes of the system. 
Tackling the world’s increasing environmental challenges will require more than 
imposing prices on unsustainable practices. Particularly in the circular economy, global 
issues such as resource depletion need innovation to disrupt the status quo (Beaulieu et 
al., 2015; Bocken et al., 2017; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013; European 
Environment Agency, 2016; Geissdoerfer et al., 2017). Further, collective action is 
critical to pursue sustainable development, and policy coherence is critical to spurring 
such practices (OECD, 2018). Translation of a collective responsibility into a shared 
responsibility is necessary but not sufficient. Innovation is also a required outcome, 
whether it is achieved collectively or individually. 
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Innovation forms the missing link in solving such broad sustainability problems. On the 
one hand, government-driven regulatory regimes can hardly translate a collective 
responsibility into firm-level practices while spurring innovation, because developing 
innovation-based policies is significantly more difficult than compliance-based policies. 
Indeed, the relationship between conventional government regulation and innovation has 
demonstrated no consistent picture (Blind, 2012; Blind et al., 2017). Further, business’s 
reaction, especially when regulation is stringent, is often minimal measures for 
compliance and “pinhole seeking.” Moreover, firm-level government-induced responses 
may not achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency at the collective level, as these 
require coordination processes and government is not the best coordinator of business 
actions. 
On the other hand, for several reasons, waiting for self-regulatory solutions to emerge 
organically has proved to be an unrealistic option. The complexity and diversity of the 
emerging sustainability expectations make it even less likely that firms will reach an 
agreement and voluntarily respond to disruptive expectations such as post-consumer 
materials management. Even if business adopts such actions, the efficiency of 
conventional ISR remains unproven. 
The hybrid model can provide this innovation-based journey to the circular economy by 
suggesting a regulatory tool to coordinate actions and translate a collective responsibility 
into a shared responsibility distributed to all individual firms. This level-crossing 
approach is particularly important for the circular economy, as it requires both firm-level 
innovative practices and social-level policy; however, connecting the two still remains a 
challenge (Beaulieu et al., 2015). The hybrid model can utilize business’s innovative 
capabilities, but leaves the decision of whether to act individually or collectively up to 
firms. When this right is reserved for competing firms, they organically generate 
competing solutions to meet the imposed goals through different solutions. The 
multiplicity of firms in a field can create different firm- or group-level self-regulatory 
solutions that compete with each other and propel action towards less costly solutions 
that meet the imposed goals. 
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Among the remaining questions in the ISR literature are, what are the characteristics of 
the institutional problems that are associated with carrying out different regulatory 
mixes? And what are the institutional mechanisms by which such problems can be 
moderated or corrected? (Gunningham & Rees, 1997: 398) This study contributes to 
answering these questions by introducing a mix of the two regimes to achieve a circular 
economy in a non-cooperative context (see next sections). 
Finally, this research also speaks to the so-called “Porter hypothesis.” According to this 
hypothesis, stringent environmental regulation—conditional on efficiency—not only 
enhances social welfare but serves firms’ economic performance as well, because 
stringent regulation can induce business innovation and thereby increase firms’ 
competitiveness (Porter, 1991; Porter & van der Linde, 1995). Various theoretical and 
empirical studies have supported and challenged this hypothesis and the results do not 
provide a consistent picture (Blind, 2012; Blind et al., 2017; Palmer, Oates, & Portney, 
1995). Among those criticizing it, some question how regulation can be simultaneously 
stringent and efficient (Wagner, 2003). The proposed model and its underlying 
mechanisms can address this conflict: regulation can be stringent and efficient when 
stringency and efficiency are determined by different mechanisms. In the hybrid model, 
the role of government is mostly focused on setting goals and foundations, and it is left to 
business to identify the most efficient approach to meet them. Thus, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, although setting higher goals by government can reduce efficiency in the short 
term, when business holds the power to define the rules of the game itself, it can use its 
capabilities in the longer term and enhance efficiency. Indeed, efficiency is a relative 
concept. The hybrid model allows firms and government to attend to the dynamics of the 
process and the changes in the stringency-efficiency-innovation sequences. A command-
and-control regime is unlikely to offer the flexibility that Porter identifies as necessary 
for innovative environmental solutions, as it hinders efficiency.8 
                                                 
8
 Porter and van der Lynde (1995) emphasize the importance of industry participation in setting the 
standards. However, they do not explain how industry may participate in setting stringent requirements. 
Such participation can hardly take form if the roles are not identified. 
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7.4 Contribution to Practice 
7.4.1  Implications for Business 
In addition to theoretical contributions, this research has several implications for 
business. First, the case depicts how business’s reluctance to respond to emerging 
expectations can result in substantial costs and challenges. If the industries in Ontario had 
adopted and maintained voluntary actions to manage their post-consumer materials 
(similar to what industries did in provinces such as British Columbia), they could 
probably have established more efficient actions and consequently shaped the 
foundations of future regulation. Industry’s resistance also constrained its ability to 
participate in future programs (e.g., by giving control to peripheral stakeholders such as 
service providers who made a profit from the program with no pivotal role in serving the 
environment). It took years for business to regain the authority to economize on such 
operational costs. 
Second, when non-business actors convert a higher-level responsibility into a collective 
responsibility for business, responding collectively by firms might create significant 
economic advantages compared to individual actions. Collective action can create 
economies of scale as well as specialization. In the context of post-consumer resources, 
many used materials are inputs to manufacture other products rather than the same 
product. Therefore, waste processing may require different technologies from those used 
by the original manufacturers. A collective pursuit by business can help members 
minimize their costs, if not make a profit. Business practice, however, is mostly shaped 
by individual actions and competition, which may conceal opportunities for 
collaboration. 
Third, business needs to value the role played by regulatory bodies in helping it meet 
social expectations. In the context of this research, actors acknowledged that government-
driven monitoring mechanisms can provide a level playing field and an efficacious lever 
to prevent free riding. An interesting observation from the data is the fact that, 
simultaneous with the involvement of government, the role of other actors (e.g., NGOs) 
was gradually minimized, to the degree that the hybrid model is mostly shaped by 
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business and government. In a context fraught with conflict, dealing with one actor who 
can integrate diverse interests into a more consistent set of requirements seems to be 
more effective than dealing with multiple groups. 
Last, but certainly not least, business must acknowledge constructive tensions in the 
development of such interactive programs and relationships. In fact, many actors, 
including firms, confuse tension with conflict of interest and contradiction. Viewing 
tensions as intrinsic to complex, multi-faceted phenomena, such as the grand challenge of 
sustainability, provides unique opportunities for synergistic actions towards more 
efficient, effective, and innovative solutions (Hahn, Pinkse, Preuss, & Figge, 2014). 
Accordingly, acknowledging the role of different actors in balancing these tensions helps 
business to make more informed decisions. 
7.4.2 Implications for Policy 
In terms of implications for policy, the case of the MHSW program in Ontario 
demonstrates how depriving industry of its coordinating capabilities can be 
counterproductive, creating detrimental conflicts among the stakeholders. In this context, 
the negative conflicts were ameliorated after the government partly relinquished self-
regulatory processes to business. At that point, as the foundations of the program and its 
ultimate goals were relatively respected across the board by all involved actors, the 
conflicts of interest among the stakeholders were replaced with constructive tensions 
between the necessary but contradictory concepts contained in the hybrid model. 
Another implication of this research for regulatory process pertains to the notion of 
responsive regulation—that is, the idea that regulatory policy should be responsive to 
industry self-regulation structure by considering different levels of institutionalization, 
morality, and formality, among other things (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham & 
Rees, 1997; Parker, 2013). Responsive regulation may far exceed the common rights of 
business to provide feedback on legislation or adopt advocacy activities. Although the 
importance of attending to firms’ perspective in legislation has been emphasized in 
literature (Malesky & Taussig, 2017), my model suggests that responsive regulation can 
have more progressive forms. In the Ontario case, two forms of policy responsiveness 
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emerged that were critical for the formation of the hybrid model. At a basic level, after 
business took a more active role, the regulators gradually conferred a level of authority to 
business to establish independent programs and modify some practice-level policies 
independently. Later, at a more progressive level, regulators enhanced the flexibility to 
allow firms to launch different self-regulation systems at the industry, group, or even firm 
levels in future. I argue that to navigate these tensions, regulators must consider the 
notion of responsive regulation as a main lever for business-government interactions, not 
least in maintaining the balance of constructive tensions.  
Perhaps the main contribution of this research to policy is the proposed hybrid model as a 
means to translate collective-level responsibilities into business practices. The model 
resolves many drawbacks in government- and industry-regulated systems. A main 
advantage of the model also lies in the flexibility of firms to choose between individual- 
and collective-level actions—actions that organically evolve and compete with each other 
towards better outcomes. As an add-on to the proposed model, by laying the burden of 
monitoring and sanctioning costs on business, government can both secure the actions 
and direct the costs to the specific consumers of product groups, rather than the general 
public.  
7.5 Boundaries and Generalizability 
Single-case studies usually fall short in generalizability, and this embedded single-case 
study is no exception. Yet, the value of such cases lies in their uniqueness. Compared to 
other cases with the same goal, the case of MHSW programs in Ontario is relatively 
extreme, as the respective roles of business and government in the regime were almost 
equal. This parallel involvement of both sides is far beyond government regulations 
influenced by industry or ISR regimes influenced partially by government. Extreme and 
revelatory cases can add significant value to theory with the generous information they 
provide compared to ordinary cases (Hällgren et al., 2018). Such a case, sometimes called 
“talking pig” (Siggelkow, 2007) or “black swan” (Flyvbjerg, 2006), is valuable in 
extending the boundaries of extant theory, challenging or falsifying previous works, and 
sparking imaginations with creative results for both theory and practice. 
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This study expands theory in the area of ISR by proposing an efficient regime in a 
particular context. The context of the research has three distinct qualities. First, in 
contrast to many other self-regulatory regimes, the driving force of the action was a 
responsibility that was deeply rooted in collective processes, because producers of similar 
consumer products cannot collect and manage their post-consumer materials individually 
unless extreme disruptions take shape in institutions and technology. Thus, the regime 
broadly called for collective action. But, in the complex and multi-actor context, it was 
not clear how this collective action can be fulfilled by individual firms. Second, the new 
expectation was costly and challenging, leaving no motivation for business to proactively 
participate. Exacerbating this unwillingness was the lack of cooperation among the 
actors. Not only did firms in the same industry have little experience in cooperation, but 
cooperation with other actor groups was also deeply harmed by severe conflicts. Third, 
the government was too ambitious to curb the goals to compliance with a set of 
requirements; instead, it sought innovative solutions to help transition to a circular 
economy. 
These three characteristics shape the boundary conditions of the findings. Although the 
results still need to be validated by generalizable empirics, the identified model can be 
proposed for similar contexts in which one or more of the above characteristics exist—
that is, (1) there exists no trusted and optimal means to translate the collective 
responsibility into requirements for individual firms, (2) the involved firms are not 
cooperative or motivated enough to undertake timely and efficient actions voluntarily, 
and/or (3) the problem lacks a solution and therefore needs innovative outcomes. In 
absence of any of these conditions, although the model may still work, it seems less 
efficient compared to the existing models. For instance, where business proactively 
cooperates in leading the environmental agenda, a pure ISR model may work more 
efficiently. My data from other regions show that post-consumer material management 
for the circular economy is an exemplary context involving all these characteristics. 
According to the data, many of the implemented regimes do not generate innovative 
outcomes, which makes them inefficient for the circular economy journey. Notably, 
however, the proposed model may not be limited to the circular economy. 
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Given the design of the research (i.e., exploring an existing model through an embedded 
single-case analysis), the study supports the fact that the proposed hybrid model can be 
more efficient than other models discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, and it can spur 
proactivity and innovation; however, it is key to note that this is only one model to this 
end. That is, there might be other models with more efficiency and higher outcomes. 
7.6 Future Research 
My field work, data analysis, and theorizing have opened up many promising 
opportunities for future research. Some of these possibilities are touched on in this 
research, but still need further work; I list a few such possibilities below. 
The first opportunity is a more focused work on the evolutionary process of the MHSW 
program. Although this study investigates the longitudinal data, due to the research 
question, it is designed to investigate the established hybrid model and its characteristics. 
Adopting a more focused process research methodology and delving deeper into the 
transition processes could shed more light on how (and possibly why) each identified 
stage evolved and transformed (Langley, 1999; Langley & Tsoukas, 2016). 
Relevant to the above opportunity, the role of business in formation of the hybrid model 
deserves better understanding. This role is a type of institutional work carried out by 
business (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Nilsson, 2013). The data suggest that without such 
institutional work through stage 2 of the process, the hybrid model cannot be realized, 
which may result in more stringent regulation and less proactivity. As such, although 
business initially avoided proactive actions for environmental purposes in this case, 
proactivity took the form of institutional work. Understanding how uncooperative firms 
coordinated the institutional work and how the resultant proactivity led to a new form of 
proactivity towards the goal of the hybrid regime can contribute to the literature on 
institutional work and its transformation. 
A third avenue for research is a comparative multiple-case study on different 
jurisdictions. Indeed, different provinces have pursued post-consumer waste management 
in different regulatory forms, resulting in different outcomes. A few Canadian 
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jurisdictions have taken more extensive steps and achieved remarkable results. A 
comparative case study could reveal what underlies the formation of regulatory regimes 
and how the socio-political atmosphere can influence regulatory regimes (e.g., a study 
that considers the type and level of business-government cooperation and how it has 
impacted the ultimate results). 
Although this research focuses on one particular hybrid model, various combinations of 
regulatory regimes may be utilized to yield the expected outcome. In fact, the “area of 
hybridity” demonstrated in Figure 11 can include diverse innovative combinations to 
serve the circular economy. Exploring such models and their potentials can contribute 
significantly to the knowledge of mixed regulatory models—an area which needs more 
work by business scholars. This fourth opportunity for research could help scholars 
investigate the tensions of hybridity in other contexts as well. 
Finally, considering the data retrospectively, it is evident that although actors such as 
NGOs initially played a relatively active role (mostly in the 1980s and 1990s), their role 
was gradually weakened to the extent that they are no longer active players in the current 
study. The simple explanation for this development may be that the involvement of 
government and its “hard institutions,” i.e., regulation, obviated the need for such actors 
and “soft regulation” (Reinecke & Ansari, 2015). Yet, this area could be a fertile avenue 
for research on the complementarity and substitutivity of the roles of actors such as 
NGOs and governments. For instance, under what conditions can stringent regulation 
weaken non-business actors? How can the formation of different institutions (e.g., norms 
and hard regulations) change their roles? And more broadly, how can such entities make 
growth, change, or resolution decisions when the socio-political context changes? 
7.7 Conclusion 
Specifically, I call on you—individually through your firms, and 
collectively through your business associations—to embrace, support, 
and enact a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour 
standards, and environmental practices (Annan, 1999). 
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The above statement to the World Economic Forum by former United Nations Secretary-
General Kofi Annan has commonalities with the Ministry of the Environment’s 1983 call 
for voluntary business actions which opened Chapter 1. Much has been said about the 
pivotal role of business in sustainable development, mostly by adopting a normative 
approach to encourage business to voluntarily participate in synergistic practices. To this 
end, much has been done by individual firms voluntarily. But much has been missed too. 
First, the speed of such voluntary participation to develop solutions is not commensurate 
with the speed of unsustainable practices (e.g., the surging rate of natural resource 
consumption). Second, firms are still insufficiently involved in collective work, 
especially to protect common goods. The notion of competition has arguably 
overshadowed business and constrains collaboration and collective work. In absence of 
collective endeavours, many required changes are not realized in a timely manner; this 
has certainly been the case for the change in institutions and value chains to close 
resource loops. 
With the need for sustainable solutions becoming increasingly urgent and publicized, it is 
now evident that we cannot simply wait for innovative solutions to emerge through a 
Schumpeterian approach. To realize a circular economy, policy is required too. If many 
thought leaders have deemed business the vehicle for sustainable development in the 
past, scientific facts such as those regarding resource depletion demonstrate that the 
vehicle must gain traction. Business can be the vehicle, but policy should accelerate it. 
And that policy needs to encourage both innovation and collective work by firms 
preoccupied with competition. These two aims can be met only through innovative 
regulatory regimes, as banal policy merely revolves around compliance with 
requirements at the individual level. Hence, the uncertainty, diversity, and complexity of 
sustainability as a grand challenge or wicked problem makes conventional policy an 
inefficient means (Head & Alford, 2015). To address such issues, an efficient regime 
embraces business capabilities rather than suppress them (as command-and-control 
regimes do); however, it should also be forceful enough to urge potentially uncooperative 
firms to participate. Thus, the combination of government regulation and business 
regulation is crucial.  
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Furthermore, the assumption of cooperative actors can sometimes be unsubstantial or 
problematic. The notion of within-community cooperation has been considered in 
voluntary collective action studies (Ostrom, 2010b), including those studies that address 
the characteristics of communities that cooperate (Rivera, Naranjo, Robalino, Alpizar, & 
Blackman, 2017). Most works on within-community, inter-organizational, and cross-
sector collaborations are shaped by the assumption of cooperative actors (for example see 
Albareda, 2008). In such contexts, although actors might have conflicts of interest, they 
are willing to compromise part of their interests and navigate through intra-industry or 
cross-sector projects to meet the common goals. Admittedly such cases are not rare, but 
they do not reflect the complete reality. Arguably, a more frequent situation is the 
ubiquitous opportunities that are missed because non-cooperative actors do not even 
think about such collective actions. Non-cooperation is arguably common across 
competition-oriented firms, and it is even more common across firms and non-business 
actors. 
Therefore, the urgent environmental problems at hand demand collective actions in non-
cooperative settings fraught with conflicts, where participants work under “coerced 
cooperation” (Levi, 1988; Ostrom, 2000a). Such dynamics are not ignored in the broad 
cooperation literature (Majchrzak et al., 2015) and are addressed in ISR models 
developed by economists (Lyon & Maxwell, 2016; Maxwell & Decker, 2006; Poteete et 
al., 2010). Management scholarship, however, needs to delve deeper into such contexts 
and extend the existing knowledge. The tension perspective is a useful approach to this 
end. As my research demonstrates, involving cooperative actors is not necessary for a 
collective action to result in innovative outcomes; rather, a regulatory regime can deliver 
remarkable innovation as long as it acknowledges, utilizes, and manages the inherent 
tensions. 
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Appendix A: List of Interviews (Company and individual names are confidential) 
Date Interviewee's 
Position 
Actor Group Duration 
(minute) 
Content of Data Interface 
St
ew
ar
d
sh
ip
 
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t 
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y 
Se
rv
ic
e 
P
ro
vi
d
er
 
O
th
er
 
31-May-16 Two stewardship 
senior managers 
*         60 Introductory information 
about a specific program 
Phone 
call 
15-Jun-16 President and 
CEO 
*         45 General information 
about different 
programs 
Facetime 
28-Jun-16 President *     *   345 General information 
about collection and 
recycling 
In 
person 
11-Jul-16 VP of Operations *         120 General information 
about the waste 
management system 
In 
person 
11-Jul-16 CEO *         60 The waste management 
system from the 
perspective of stewards 
In 
person 
11-Jul-16 Product 
Development 
manager 
*         30 Their innovation process 
and projects 
In 
person 
12-Jul-16 Director of 
Communication 
*         90 Communicating the 
programs 
In 
person 
12-Jul-16 President *         135 General information 
about the MHSW 
program 
In 
person 
28-Jul-16 President/Board 
member 
      *   180 General information In 
person 
02-Aug-16 President and 
CEO 
*         60 Information about one 
industry's actions 
Facetime 
13-Sep-16 President and 
CEO 
*         350 Information about one 
industry's actions 
In 
person 
29-Sep-16 President and 
CEO 
*         70 General information Facetime 
09-Nov-16 Project Manager *         30 Potential innovations in 
industry 
In 
person 
23-Jan-17 Chairman and 
General 
Manager 
*         105 Collective actions and 
challenges 
In 
person 
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25-Jan-17 Director of the 
Ontario 
Programs  
*         120 Processes and 
challenges in Ontario 
In 
person 
06-Feb-17 Director and 
board member 
*         100 Recycling from the 
perspective of a retailer 
and manufacturer 
In 
person 
14-Feb-17 Project leader   *       105 Ups and downs of the 
recycling program and 
government bodies 
In 
person 
24-Feb-17 Sr. Analyst   *       70 Policy making in Ontario In 
person 
01-Mar-17 Directeur 
Général 
*         300 General information and 
history 
In 
person 
02-Mar-17 General 
Manager 
      *   100 About the history and 
operations of the 
company 
In 
person 
02-Mar-17 Retired expert         * 90 Background info about 
the evolution of 
recycling in early years 
In 
person 
02-Mar-17 President and 
board member 
*     *   90 Early years of the 
program and status quo 
In 
person 
08-Mar-17 Corporate 
director 
*         100 Various aspects from a 
steward's perspective 
In 
person 
11-Apr-17 various role in 
operations and 
service 
* *   *   120 History of the program 
in Ontario 
In 
person 
04-May-17 VP executive *         80 History and rationale 
behind historical events 
In 
person 
08-Jun-17 VP operations       *   45 Formation of recycling in 
Ontario in 1990s and 
current challenges 
In 
person 
08-Jun-17 VP business 
development  
      *   105 Formation of recycling in 
Ontario in 1990s and 
current challenges 
In 
person 
23-Jun-17 President         * 90 Policy making processes 
and ebbs and flows 
In 
person 
27-Jun-17 Director of 
operations 
  
 
*     60 Recycling operations in a 
region 
In 
person 
27-Jun-17 Director of Policy     * *     60 History of regulation in 
Ontario and issues they 
address in their region 
In 
person 
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04-Jul-17 supervisor     *     60 History of the program 
in Ontario 
In 
person 
04-Jul-17 President & CEO *         90 General issues about 
recycling 
In 
person 
13-Jul-17 VP executive *         100 History and rationale 
behind decisions 
In 
person 
19-Jul-17 Two directors *         60 General MHSW 
transition 
Phone 
call 
28-Jul-17 VP compliance *     * * 20 General issues Phone 
call 
01-Aug-17 Store manager *         20 Consumers, market 
issues, and collection 
In 
person 
01-Aug-17 Site manager     *     20 Municipal waste 
collection 
In 
person 
03-Aug-17 Executive 
director 
*         130 Evolution and challenges 
of a particular MHSW 
program 
Phone 
call 
10-Aug-17 VP compliance *     * * 150 Evolution of MHSW In 
person 
14-Aug-17 Director     *     40 On municipalities and 
conflicts 
Written 
15-Aug-17 Manager     *     45 Operations for diverse 
materials 
In 
person 
16-Aug-17 VP compliance *     *   100 All aspects of a 
particular material group 
In 
person 
17-Aug-17 Executive 
director 
        * 70 Broader issues and 
challenges in policy 
In 
person 
17-Aug-17 Senior advisor     *     60 Various policy-related 
issues and processes 
In 
person 
21-Aug-17 Project leader     *     120 Programs from the 
municipal perspective 
In 
person 
25-Aug-17 Chairman   *   *   60 Transition in policies and 
programs 
In 
person 
26-Sep-17 Public 
information 
manager 
  *       30 Provincial policies In 
person 
26-Sep-17 Director of 
operations 
  *       60 Provincial policies In 
person 
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27-Sep-17 President       *   60 Recycling a MHSW 
material 
In 
person 
20-Nov-17 Project leader   *       60 Policy making and 
monitoring  
Phone 
call 
27-Nov-17 President       *   95 Evolution of the 
programs 
Phone 
call 
04-Dec-17 Director  *         60 Stewardship from the 
perspective of retail 
Phone 
call 
08-Dec-17 Director     *     45 On municipalities and 
tensions 
Written 
08-Dec-17 Director     *     60 On municipalities and 
tensions 
Phone 
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Appendix B: List of Observations (Company and individual names are confidential) 
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29-Jun-16 site visit A recycling factory * 
  
*   60 Technical issues in 
recycling operations 
12-Jul-16 site visit A stewardship 
organization 
* 
   
  120 General information about 
their program 
12-Jul-16 site visit A steward’s site * 
   
  120 Their innovation projects 
across the company’s 
sites; safety issues 
12-Jul-16 site visit A manufacturing 
site 
  
   
* 60 How they recycle concrete 
and use residual paint as 
an additive to concrete 
12-Jul-16 site visit A stewardship 
organization 
* 
   
  240 General operations, their 
small workshop in the 
office, and collection 
system in stores 
28-Jul-16 site visit A recycling factory   
  
*   180 General information 
07-Sep-16 event An industry board 
meeting 
  
   
  60 The dynamics of their 
stewardship program 
13-Sep-16 site visit An industry 
association 
* 
   
  350 Stewardship management 
processes 
01-Mar-17 site visit A stewardship 
organization 
* 
   
  300 General information 
02-Mar-17 site visit A recycling factory   
  
*   100 Recycling processes 
24-May-17 
25-May-17 
event An industry 
annual conference 
* 
  
*   900 Various professional and 
policy issues 
08-Jun-17 site visit A recycling factory   
  
*   150 Formation of HHW 
recycling in Ontario in 
1990s and current 
challenges 
28-Jun-17 event A stewardship 
program board 
meeting 
* 
   
  60 This research and how it 
can contribute 
01-Aug-17 site visit A store with waste 
collection depot 
* 
   
  30 On collection of waste 
paint 
01-Aug-17 site visit A waste collection 
site 
  
 
* 
 
  30 Broadly on waste 
collection operations 
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15-Aug-17 site visit An MHSW 
collection site 
  
 
* 
 
  60 Operations for different 
materials 
16-Aug-17 site visit A recycling factory * 
  
*   30 Operations 
21-Aug-17 site visit An MHSW 
collection site 
  
 
* 
 
  160 Their operations and 
challenges in collection 
07-Sep-17 Webinar A webinar on 
global 
stewardship 
programs 
  
  
*   60 Harmonization of 
stewardship 
27-Sep-17 site visit A recycling factory   
  
*   30 Recycling operations 
04-Oct-17 Event/ 
Webinar 
A stewardship 
office 
  * 
  
  120 Views on fees and 
stewards’ concerns 
08-Nov-17 webinar A webinar on 
global issues in 
compliance of 
hazardous 
materials 
  
  
*   30 Harmonization of hazmat 
09-May-17 webinar A webinar on 
circular economy 
    
* 65 The dynamics of 
implementing the circular 
economy 
07-Dec-17 webinar A webinar on 
global waste 
management 
issues 
  * * 
 
  105 General info about 
operationalization of a 
new waste program and 
imposing bans across 
regions 
18-Dec-17 webinar A public session 
on Ontario's new 
regulation and 
plans 
  * 
  
  90 General info about the 
fees and windup 
programs, and questions 
for consultation process 
22-Jan-18 webinar Regulation in 
European Union 
and the emerging 
issues 
  
  
*   35 Info on the forthcoming 
changes in European 
regulations 
23-Jan-18 webinar Consultation 
session on the 
tires program 
windup plan 
* * 
  
  180 The plan for next steps 
approved by the Minister 
29-Jan-18 webinar Consultation 
session on the 
tires program 
windup plan 
  * 
  
  120 Question and answer on 
windup plan, mainly with 
focus on service providers 
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Event 
Actor Group Duration 
(minute) 
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e 
P
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vi
d
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O
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07-Mar-18 Webinar Overview of 
regulation in the 
chemical industry 
  
  
*   60 General info about 
regulating new chemicals 
09-Mar-18 Webinar Final consultation 
on fee setting 
policy  
  * 
  
  90 Details on the fees of the 
Authority 
24-Apr-18 Webinar Session on 
regulatory 
changes for 
preservatives in 
paints 
  
   
* 45 Legislative atmosphere in 
the U.S. and Canada with 
respect to preservatives 
21-Jun-18 Conferen
ce 
Conference on 
resource recovery 
partnership 
* * * * * 270 The dynamics and 
frontiers of resource 
recovery in different 
jurisdictions 
21-Jun-18 offline 
observati
on 
The Authority's 
annual general 
meeting 
  * 
  
  60 The trends and issues in 
policies and programs 
07-Oct-18 webinar The Authority's 
consultation 
session on waste 
electronics 
program 
* * 
  
  60 How the WEEE windup is 
planned to be conducted 
in 2020  
10-Dec-18 Webinar Session on global 
issues in 
hazardous 
products labelling 
  
  
*   60 General ideas about 
different regions and 
labelling systems 
requirements 
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